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INTRODUCTION
1.1.   Forest conservation as cost-effective climate change  
mitigation strategy
Forests have become increasingly important geopolitical entities in the past two decades, 
especially in light of the ‘ecosystem services’ they provide (Baveye, Baveye, & Gowdy, 2013). 
While these ecosystem services include biological diversity, water cycle regulation, and 
cultural and aesthetic benefits, among others (Foley et al., 2007), international climate 
negotiations tend to focus on the carbon dynamics of forests and their importance in 
climate change mitigation efforts. In its fifth assessment report, the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimated that between 1750 and 2011 deforestation and 
other land use changes induced 180±85 GtC, accounting for about a third of the total 
anthropogenic emissions (555±85 GtC) in the same period (IPCC, 2014). Conversely, Pan et al. 
(2011) estimate that the world’s forests still harbor 861±66 GtC in the soil, live biomass, 
deadwood and litter, but their function as carbon sink is declining from 2.5 GtC per year in 
the 1990s to 2.3 GtC per year in the early 2000s. Phillips and Brienen (2017) observe that 
the Amazon forest alone represents a significant but declining carbon sink, and estimate 
a change in annual uptake from 0.5 GtC in the 1990s to 0.3 GtC in the 2000s (see figure 1). 
More alarmingly, the consideration of carbon emissions from land use changes and fossil 
fuel consumption reveals a gradual shift from net carbon sink in the 1990s to net carbon 
source in the 2000s. This trend is illustrative for tropical forests in general (Baccini et al., 
2017). Other scholars have manifested their concern that excessive deforestation in some 
regions of the Amazon has induced a tipping point from a tropical forest to a non-forest 
ecosystem, which is aggravated by the rising deforestation rates since 2014 in spite of 
nearly a decade of substantial decline (Lovejoy & Nobre, 2018; Nepstad et al., 2009; 
Rochedo et al., 2018). These negative trends signal the imperative challenge of reducing 
deforestation and conserving natural vegetation for addressing global climate change.
One of the premises for addressing these challenges is that climate change mitigation must 
be attained cost-effectively (Mendelsohn, 2006). Following this premise, a widely known 
review by Stern (2006, p. 537) argued that “curbing deforestation is a highly cost-effective 
way of reducing greenhouse gas emissions”. Reducing global fossil fuel emissions from 24 
GtCO2 in 2002 to 18 GtCO2 in 2050 would cost as much as USD 930 billion per year. The 
same review reported that ceasing deforestation in eight tropical countries, including 
Brazil, could abate 70% of all emissions related to land use change, thereby eliminating 3.5 
GtCO2 in 2050 under a business-as-usual scenario. Such an achievement would involve an 
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Figure 1  Estimated carbon sinks (left) and fluxes (right) in the Amazon basin. 
(Source: Phillips & Brienen, 2017, p. 4)
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INTRODUCTION
opportunity cost, or forgone benefits from economic activity, of USD 5-10 billion per year, 
while transaction costs would amount to only USD 12-93 million per year. Although there 
is a high degree of variation in cost estimations for fully halting deforestation, ranging 
between USD 8.7 billion and USD 271 billion per year (Angelsen et al., 2009), scholars have 
remained confident that such reductions could be the most cost-effective mitigation 
strategy. At the height of Brazilian environmentalism in the late 2000s (Aamodt, 2018; Viola 
& Franchini, 2014), for example, one study estimated that “the end of deforestation in the 
Brazilian Amazon” would have involved an opportunity cost of USD 14 billion as well as an 
additional investment of USD 6.5-8.1 billion between 2010 and 2020 (Nepstad et al., 2009). 
As the political climate became increasingly hostile to environmental concerns in the 
2010s, researchers warned in another study that a business-as-usual scenario will require 
high investments in alternative sectors (e.g. USD 2 trillion for the energy sector) if Brazil is 
to maintain its commitments to the Paris agreement (Rochedo et al., 2018). 
These perceptions on the importance of forests for climate change mitigation and the 
cost-effectiveness of reducing deforestation compared to emission reductions in other 
sectors gave impetus to new approaches to forest governance. In many respects, 
environmental problems like climate change had become not only a political problem 
but also a financial one. Rather than constraining the economic activities that had become 
understood to be responsible for most environmental problems, as was emphasized in 
the ‘limits-to-growth’ perspective of the 1960s and 1970s (Meadows, Randers, & Meadows, 
2004), addressing these problems increasingly meant ‘internalizing externalities’ 
(Tietenberg & lewis, 2012), ‘economizing the ecology/ecologizing the economy’ (Mol & 
Spaargaren, 1993) or valuing ecosystem functions (Baveye et al., 2013; Chichilnisky & Heal, 
1998; Costanza et al., 1997; Fearnside, 1997). In the context of international forest 
governance, these ideas are resonated in the emergence of financial approaches to forest 
conservation such as Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) and Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) in the context of international climate 
negotiations and international markets. In this context, scientific and political debates on 
forest governance need to provide answers for two important questions: how to attain 
deforestation reduction cost-effectively and which financial instruments are most 
appropriate for this purpose? The next two sections provide a literature review that 
explores these questions and indicate how this doctoral dissertation will contribute to the 
discussion.
22
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1.2.  Transformational change for deforestation reductions
Deforestation in tropical countries has been generally understood as a complex 
environmental problem, which is most clearly illustrated by the Brazilian Amazon. 
Deforestation dynamics in this region involves the consecutive processes of (1) penetration 
and land clearing for extractive activities, (2) land speculation for extensive and subsistence 
agriculture, and (3) intensive agriculture (Cleuren, 2001). These dynamics were aggravated 
by insecure property rights (Araujo, Bonjean, Combes, Combes Motel, & Reis, 2009; 
Puppim de Oliveira, 2008), weak law enforcement in the 1990s and unfavorable 
environmental politics in the 2010s (Fearnside, 2016; Lovejoy & Nobre, 2018; Rochedo et al., 
2018). Moreover, governmental organizations have been incentivizing land clearing by 
land owners throughout the majority of the 20th century (Hecht & Cockburn, 1990). 
Deforestation dynamics are not only challenging from the perspective of individual 
economic behavior, but is often ingrained within a complex institutional context. 
In light of this complexity, much literature on forest governance argued that reducing 
deforestation requires nothing short of transformation al change. Angelsen, Brockhaus, 
Sunderlin, and Verchot (2012, pp. 16-17) defined transformational change as “a shift in 
discourse, attitudes, power relations and deliberate policy and protest action that leads 
policy formulation and implementation away from business-as-usual policy approaches 
that directly or indirectly support deforestation and forest degradation”. A comprehensive 
forest policy design, according to some studies, addresses the direct and indirect drivers 
of deforestation, including land tenure and land use planning, economic activities (e.g. 
cattle ranching) and international demand for their products, road construction, and law 
enforcement, among others (Busch & Ferretti-Gallon, 2017; Dunlop & Corbera, 2016; 
Weatherley-Singh & Gupta, 2015). At the same time, forest governance debates have 
acknowledged that such changes are not easy to attain. International REDD+ debates 
have incorporated this acknowledgement by adopting a phased approach to the 
implementation of behavioral and institutional changes necessary to obtain deforestation 
reductions. This phased approach develops “from a readiness phase through policy 
design and implementation toward result-based payments for carbon and non-carbon 
benefits” (Brockhaus et al., 2017, p. 15; Moutinho et al., 2011). Only Brazil, Guyana and 
Indonesia have reached a more advanced albeit in complete stage of policy change for 
REDD+ (Korhonen-Kurki et al., 2018).
23
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Debates on how to attain deforestation reductions extend far beyond the drivers of 
deforestation, especially in the context of REDD+. Contemporary REDD+ initiatives are 
evaluated based on their ability to provide effective, efficient and equitable (i.e. 3E) benefit- 
sharing mechanisms (e.g. Luttrell et al., 2013; Wong et al., 2017). Although effectiveness 
and efficiency were recognized as important from the outset, many scholars find that 
“equity can have significant positive feedback on program outcomes and legitimacy over 
the longer term” (Dunlop & Corbera, 2016; Pham et al., 2013; Wong et al., 2017, p. 439). 
Therefore, providing these 3E benefits comprehensively is an important component of 
the ‘theory of change’ of REDD+ projects, which describes “who needs to be involved, 
whose interests are at stake, and the expected co-benefits and required safeguards” in 
order to attain REDD+ objectives (Putz & Romero, 2012, p. 670). Most literature on the 
design of benefit-sharing mechanisms discuss the individual or collective recipients of 
financial resources for attaining REDD+ objectives. Luttrell et al. (2013) distinguish six 
rationales for the distribution of REDD+ benefits, which emphasize (1) actors with legal 
rights, (2) actors achieving emission reductions, (3) low-emitting forest stewards, (4) actors 
incurring the costs of REDD+ implementation, (5) effective facilitators of REDD+ 
implementation, and (6) the poorest groups in the region. In practice, however, 
incorporating all six rationales seems hard to accomplish. Indeed, the same study observed 
great variation in the application of these rationales, both between and within countries, 
noting that the prevalence of a particular rationale depends on contextual factors, design 
choices and stakeholders involved (see also Pham et al., 2013). For instance, (Luttrell et al., 
2013) observed that initiatives in Brazil were applying a legal rights rationale (e.g. National 
REDD+ Strategy), a pro-poor rationale (e.g. the Bolsa Floresta Program) and an emission 
reductions rational (e.g. Amazonian state governments), among others.
The spectrum of possible approaches to reducing deforestation was sufficiently vast to 
incite division among various actors with conflicting ideas. Particularly international 
REDD+ debates have been infested by discursive conflicts. Hiraldo and Tanner (2011), for 
example, have observed the advocacy for four narratives to REDD+ implementation, 
which distinctively advocated (1) economic growth and market liberalism, (2) strong forest 
governance and law enforcement, (3) environmental protection, and (4) socioenviron-
mental approaches. While some narratives became more dominant than others, the 
development process of REDD+ could be understood as an attempt to absorb this 
discursive plurality. This became clear, for example, in a study by Den Besten, Arts, and 
Verkooijen (2014), which characterized REDD+ development as a discursive-institutional 
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spiral in which discursive development alternates with phases of institutionalization. The 
first phase of discursive development involved a conceptual expansion from deforestation, 
as initially proposed in 2005, to the inclusion of forest degradation, conservation, sustainable 
management and enhancement of carbon stocks in order to conform to the diverse 
realities of participating countries, which was institutionalized in 2007 in the Bali Roadmap. 
After 2007, a new round of political debates incorporated social and environmental 
safeguards in concert with the advocacy of environmental and socioenvironmental 
narratives. These efforts were institutionalized in the Warsaw Framework for REDD+ in 
2013 and the Paris Agreement in 2015 (see also Turnhout et al., 2016; Voigt & Ferreira, 2015).
The discussion so far has highlighted how forest governance debates in the past two 
decades have developed into a strong argument for transformational change in order to 
reduce deforestation. Within this broad context, REDD+ has been the main concept 
around which these arguments have been organized. In Brazil, REDD+ has symbolized 
both salvation and redemption. Shortly after the institutionalization of REDD+ in 
international negotiations, researchers were already heralding the possibility of ending 
deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon (Nepstad et al., 2009). As the 2010s are closing, 
however, this outlook has become increasingly utopian and transformational change has 
never seemed more necessary (Fearnside, 2016; Lovejoy & Nobre, 2018; Rochedo et al., 
2018). Yet understanding REDD+ as a sophisticated strategy for transformational change 
misses a very important, characteristic and highly controversial question: which financial 
instruments are most appropriate for attaining these transformational changes? The next 
section turns to this discussion.
1.3.   Political controversies over market instruments for 
forest governance
Despite the importance of transformational change for attaining deforestation reductions, 
this was hardly the central tenet of initial proposals for organizing international forest 
governance. The conviction had taken hold that environmental problems exist because 
“environmental goods and services, and the general functions which environments serve, 
are not invariably bought and sold in the marketplace”, proposing the construction of 
a ‘green economy’ (Pearce, Markandya, & Barbier, 1989, p. 51). Corresponding with this 
logic, market instruments became considered to be the most adequate approach to 
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financing climate change mitigation in general (Stern, 2006) and reducing emissions from 
deforestation in particular (Eliasch, 2008). In this context, some scholars had coined the 
concept of Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES), which was initially understood as “a 
voluntary transaction where a well-defined ES is being ‘bought’ by a ES buyer from a ES 
provider if and only if the provider secures ES provision” (Wunder, 2005, p. 2). In this 
context, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), adopted by the Kyoto Protocol in 
1997, had been one of the first market instruments that embodied these ideas, allowing 
developed countries to offset their domestic emissions by financing afforestation and 
reforestation projects, among others, in developing countries (Lederer, 2011). Similarly, 
a group of Brazilian scientists had proposed the new concept of Compensated Reduction of 
Deforestation during international climate debates in 2003. Although it was “initially 
viewed as an inadequate measure for mitigating climate change”, it would arguably 
become the seed from which the REDD+ concept sprouted (Moutinho et al., 2011, p. 39). 
This advocacy of using market instruments for international forest governance, however, 
faced tremendous political challenges. Representatives of national governments, most 
notably Brazil, were critical of the earliest REDD+ versions, including Compensated 
Reductions of Deforestation. They manifested their concern that “the market risks being 
flooded with cheap carbon credits” and that “reductions might take place in developing 
countries but allow emissions to occur in developed countries” (Carvalho, 2012; Moutinho 
et al., 2011, p. 41). After the formal adoption of REDD+ in 2007, new policy participants 
manifested similar concerns in a different tone. These manifestations came in the form of 
critiques on the perverse incentives of offset-based market instruments by international 
NGOs (e.g. Greenpeace, 2012) as well as local communities and indigenous peoples 
(e.g. Boas, 2011; Cabello & Gilbertson, 2011), condemning offset trading as “hot air” and 
“CO2lonialism”. Alternatively, some scholars also argued that the use of market instruments 
constitute the most problematic approach in comparison with separate national funds, 
funds in state administrations or budgetary support due to numerous challenges. Vatn 
and Vedeld (2013), for example, argued that market instruments for REDD+ may incentivize 
land grabbing, evoke social exclusion and inequity, reduce transparency, risk leakage and 
neglect social and environmental co-benefits, among others, thereby potentially harming 
the legitimacy of REDD+ (Wong et al., 2017). The collective force of these different voices 
has steered political debates away from carbon offsetting. The development process of 
the REDD+ concept therefore illustrates that political interests, rather than cost-effectiveness, 
have been a guiding principle for preventing the use of market instruments.
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Similar trends of non-use of market instruments have been observed in other nature 
conservation approaches. Many scholars have recognized that existing PES schemes 
mostly materialized into forms of financial support other than market instruments 
(Fletcher & Büscher, 2017; Muradian et al., 2013; Vatn, 2015). These observations were also 
acknowledged by Wunder (2015, p. 241) as he redefined PES as “voluntary transactions 
between service users and service providers that are conditional on agreed rules of natural 
resource management for generating offsite services”. This corresponds with the redirection 
of the REDD+ concept from a market instrument to a mechanism for results-based aid 
(Angelsen, 2017) or performance-based payments (Brockhaus et al., 2017). Indeed, 
Angelsen et al. (2012) observed that in 2010 the contribution from public sources to 
REDD+ finance was approximately USD 14.5 billion per year, while market instruments 
contributed with only USD 0.14 billion per year. Although results-based funding was new 
in the context of environmental governance, it had already been applied to other policy 
domains. In a study on financing public health, for example, Eichler (2006) has defined 
these funding instruments as the “transfer of money or material goods conditional upon 
taking a measurable action or achieving a predetermined performance target”. Both the 
redefinition of PES and the definition of funding instruments refrain from the implicit 
exchange of properties or legal obligations, thereby differing substantially from the trade 
of ‘offsets’, ‘rights’, ‘permits’ or ‘credits’ in market instruments (see Tietenberg & lewis, 2012). 
The development processes of the REDD+ concept have been starkly different from 
emissions trading in most other policy sectors. In a reconstruction of the general history 
of emissions trading, Voß (2007) argued that the conceptual development has been a 
gradually evolving process from a gestation phase in the 1960s and 1970s to a regime 
formation phase since the late 1990s and early 2000s. Moreover, the progression from one 
phase to the next demanded technological fixes or repairs in order to conform economic 
theory to reality and thereby “secure acceptance by target groups and the wider public” 
(p. 336). This generalized understanding becomes more complex when accounting for 
the context-specific developments in different countries. Lane (2012), for example, 
explained how the mainstreaming of carbon markets in the United States required 
political efforts to construct the efficiency of market instruments and demonstrate the 
inefficiency of command-and-control mechanisms (see also Newell, Pizer, & Raimi, 2012). 
By contrast, the European Union initially resisted involvement in emissions trading partly 
due to concerns about outsourcing domestic obligations to reduce emissions, but 
gradually accepted the concept as political conditions became more favorable 
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(Woerdman, 2004). Emissions trading in China, finally, employs an ‘intensity-based cap’ 
involving a flexible reduction target that correlates with GDP development, which 
respects the national sentiment that “economic development is still the first priority and 
the fundamental driving force to improve social welfare” (Hübler, Voigt, & Löschel, 2014; 
Jiang, Ye, & Ma, 2014, p. 18; Zhang, Karplus, Cassisa, & Zhang, 2014). These examples 
illustrate how the same conceptual ideas has strongly adapted to differing political and 
institutional contexts.
Comparing these political debates on market instruments, however, it becomes clear how 
considerations of their use for forest governance were quite different from considerations 
of their use for environmental governance in general. Broader debates on emissions 
trading, for example, seemed to have incorporated critiques into the development 
process (e.g. businesses fearing growth-limits) without relinquishing the central tenets of 
emissions trading (Lane, 2012; Voß, 2007; Woerdman, 2004). By contrast, critiques on the 
use of market instruments for addressing deforestation were able to redirect political 
debates towards the consideration of establishing results-based funding instruments 
(Angelsen, 2017; Brockhaus et al., 2017; Den Besten et al., 2014). Yet this generalization 
still poses two inconsistencies that need to be resolved in order to understand forest 
finance. Firstly, it would contradict a central argument of the discussion so far, namely 
that deforestation dynamics, approaches to transformational change and preferences 
for financial instruments are highly dependent on their political and institutional context, 
accounting for at least some variation. Secondly, and closely related to the former, this 
generalization has been primarily based on a reading of mostly global developments, 
thereby ignoring that advocacies of using market instruments still linger at different levels 
of forest politics. The next section turns to these diversions from the mainstream discourse.
1.4.   Lingering considerations of using market instruments
Although the general tendencies of political debates have given rise to new institutions 
like the Green Climate Fund and the Brazilian Amazon Fund, results-based funding is not 
the only finance modality that has been considered in international and national debates. 
International REDD+ negotiations have determined that results-based finance “may cover 
a wide variety, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources” 
(Voigt & Ferreira, 2015, p. 124). In addition, the Paris Agreement (art. 6) anticipated a ‘sustainable 
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development mechanism’ that allows the trade of Internationally Transferred Mitigation 
Outcomes (ITMOs) for meeting emission reduction targets (Turnhout et al., 2016). While 
further specifications have not been provided and are therefore open to political debate, 
these dispositions grant some freedom to national governments (and other actors) to 
determine their preferred approach to financing deforestation reduction efforts, including the 
use of market instruments. Some countries, such as Costa Rica, have indeed incorporated 
market instruments as central component of their national REDD+ strategy (Corbera, 
Estrada, May, Navarro, & Pacheco, 2011). Such observations underscore that international 
forest governance has retained some degree of openness to different financing options, 
thereby sustaining both discursive and institutional variation between countries.
Discourses and institutions on forest finance have also varied within countries, particularly 
in Brazil. Brazil has often been presented as a country that has decisively criticized market 
instruments in international climate negotiations. Rather than an offset-based approach, 
Brazil established the Amazon Fund that adopted a results-based funding approach to 
enable payments to be transferred to the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) (Kasa, 
2013). However, this institutionalized resistance does not account for the full complexity of 
Brazilian forest governance. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, for example, the Cardoso 
administration (1995-2002) has been known to advocate the use of market instruments in 
general (Viola, 2004; Zhouri, 2004), which included a poorly regulated market for forest 
certificates (Bacha, 2004). Filoche (2017) has pointed out that the use of market instruments 
in Brazil has become more common ever since. This is suggested, firstly, in the “large 
number of existing draft bills dealing with PES” as well as provisions (art. 41) in the Brazilian 
Forest Code, although this concept “is still in its infancy” (p. 23). A second example of 
lingering debates on market instruments was observed in the engagement of Amazonian 
state governments in a Californian REDD+ initiative for offsetting emissions (Lueders, 
Horowitz, Carlson, Hecht, & Parson, 2014). A third and perhaps paradoxical example 
involves the development of a market instrument for allowing land owners to offset their 
legal obligations to conserve nature through acquisition of forest certificates (May, 
Bernasconi, Wunder, & Lubowski, 2015; Soares-Filho et al., 2016). This market for forest 
certificates is a flexibility instrument of the Brazilian Forest Code and, as the latter is a 
strategic component of the Brazilian REDD+ Strategy (ENREDD+), may provide an indirect 
contribution to REDD+ implementation (May, Gebara, Barcellos, Rizek, & Millikan, 2016). 
These observations signify a strange mélange of opposition to and proposition of market 
instruments for forest governance in Brazil. 
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There are no clear indications of why one financial instrument is chosen at the expense of 
the other. From the perspective of cost-effectiveness, with which the argument in this 
introductory chapter started, this choice seems rather arbitrary. In the 2000s, international 
climate negotiations have steered away from offset markets for REDD+ (Den Besten et al., 
2014) in spite of strong arguments to the contrary (Eliasch, 2008). By contrast, the 
substantial deforestation reductions in Brazil during the 2000s were the outcome of 
improvements in law enforcement, environmental policies and investments in nature 
conservation (Cunha, Börner, Wunder, Cosenza, & Lucena, 2016; Moutinho et al., 2011; Viola 
& Franchini, 2014). As the Amazon Fund started to finance more projects, and as new 
market instruments (e.g. PES and forest certificate trading) had been adopted by the new 
Forest Code in 2012 (Filoche, 2017), the downward trend in deforestation rates was slowly 
reverting (Lovejoy & Nobre, 2018) and rendered their current and future effectiveness 
more uncertain (see figure 2). Another potential hypothesis is that the institutionalized 
resistance to market instruments, as embodied by the Amazon Fund, reflected historical 
concerns with defending the national sovereignty over natural resources (Carvalho, 2012; 
Hecht & Cockburn, 1990), while propositions for domestic market instruments would still 
be permitted (Filoche, 2017). This argument is flawed, however, as there is no evidence 
that market instruments proposed by the federal government have indeed been 
 operationalized domestically. As mentioned above, PES is still in the early stages of 
development (Filoche, 2017), while trading forest certificates seems to require further 
specification and debate in order to become legitimately operational (May et al., 2015; 
Soares-Filho et al., 2016). The non-operationalization of the latter is particularly notable as 
the conceptual inception of market instruments for forest governance could be traced 
back to the late 1990s (Weigand Jr, 1998). In addition, some market instruments, most 
notably the offset market involving Amazonian state governments and California, among 
others, transcend the boundaries of national sovereignty, thereby contradicting the 
national standpoint (Lueders et al., 2014).
It has become clear that the emergence and operationalization of financial instruments 
is hardly determined by cost-effectiveness. One may argue that cost-effectiveness has 
evoked a general interest in establish financial instruments, but the outcome of 
development and operationalization processes is the product of essentially political 
factors. National sovereignty concerns represent only one political factor that has 
determined the course of REDD+ development in Brazil. As argued above, however, 
approaches to financial instruments vary greatly within Brazil´s sovereign borders and 
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there are many initiatives that propose offset-based market instruments for domestic 
forest governance, some of which transcend national borders. On the one hand, this may 
suggest that national sovereignty is not the dominant political factor as discourse is not 
constrained by it. On the other hand, few of these market instruments are apparently 
operational, which suggest that sovereignty concerns may have been a conditional 
principle within which discourses transform into institutions. Rather than answering the 
initial question of this chapter, these observations evoke more questions about the 
treatment of financial instruments in political discourse and the materialization in Brazilian 
institutions. Few studies have addressed the politics of financial instruments for reducing 
deforestation in a way that provides more nuanced answers to the issues raised here. This 
dissertation addresses this challenge.
Figure 2   Historical deforestation rates for the Amazon biome and estimated 
deforestation rates in a weak (WEG), intermediate (IEG) and strong (SEG) 
environmental governance scenario.
(Source: Rochedo et al., 2018, p. 696)
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1.5.   Central problem and research questions
This chapter initially set out by asking the following questions: how to attain deforestation 
reduction and forest conservation cost-effectively and which financial instruments are 
most appropriate for such attainment? The literature has extensively debated the first 
question, but available assessments have emphasized effectiveness in general rather than 
considering the costs to attain transformational change. By contrast, debates on this cost 
component seems to implicitly underlie debates related to the second question on 
financial instruments, but the discussion in previous sections indicate that these debates 
have a strong and still understudied political character. The initial questions therefore 
remain only partially answered, leaving old questions and opening new questions about 
how financial instruments materialize in forest governance regimes.
In order to systematically study the use of financial instruments for forest governance in 
Brazil, it is useful to organize the research questions by following a number of central 
themes derived from the discussion above. Firstly, the majority of political debates on this 
issue have centered around the REDD+ concept. Although some market instruments 
emerged from the Brazilian Forest Code (e.g. PES, forest certificates trading), they still 
provide important building blocks for a REDD+ strategy (May et al., 2016). A second theme 
is the observation that the paradoxes related to establishing and operationalizing financial 
instruments for reducing deforestation involve both discursive politics and institutional 
structures. This is evident in the institutionalization of sovereignty concerns in the Amazon 
Fund and other REDD+ institutions, the practices related to carbon offsetting by 
Amazonian state governments, and the lingering political debates on the operationalization 
of market instruments (particularly forest certificate trading). Finally, these paradoxes are 
characterized by a polarization between results-based funding (i.e. the Amazon Fund) 
and market instruments (e.g. forest certificate trading). These themes help to focus the 
theoretical framework (section 1.6) and methodological approach (section 1.7) of this 
dissertation in order to answer the following central research question:
How have the possibilities for using financial instruments for reducing deforestation in 
Brazil been shaped and reshaped in processes of political discourse and institutionalization, 
and what factors and mechanisms underlie these processes? 
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1.6.   Theoretical framework for discursive politics and  
institutional structures 
The centrality of REDD+ in forest governance as well as the polarization of financial 
instruments between funds and markets, defined as two of three central themes of this 
research, have been extensively discussed in the previous sections. Answering the research 
questions of this dissertation, however, still requires a theoretical framework for under -
standing the role of political discourse and institutional structures. This section elaborates 
this framework by discussing these components separately. The first step is to situate 
these two concepts into a coherent framework that clarifies their unique function. This is 
presented as a multilayered scaffolding that composes not only of discourses and 
institutions, but also includes epistemic structures and social practices (section 1.6.1). 
The discussion then turns to a discussion of institutional theory, particularly new 
 institutionalism, in order to find a conceptualization that explains the structuring function 
of institutions without conflicting with the influences of discourse on institutionalization 
(section 1.6.2). The theoretical framework concludes with a discussion of discursive and 
political theories that acknowledge the multilayered structure of social structures and 
practices.
1.6.1.  Understanding institutional stability and transformation
Institutional theory characterizes institutionalization as the consolidation of practices and 
ideas into routines and structures that are resilient to change. This is a very general 
definition, however, as there are several distinct approaches to understanding institutions 
and institutionalization. Hall and Taylor (1996), for example, described the distinct 
 characteristics of historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism and sociological 
 institutionalism, while others (e.g. Schmidt, 2008) have also distinguished discursive 
 institutionalism. 
Historical institutionalism, firstly, builds on the notion of “path dependency” for explaining 
institutionalization processes, which is predisposed towards maintaining institutional 
stability. This does not imply that institutions function to resist change altogether, but 
rather that institutional development is ingrained in historical paths that are hard to divert 
from (Hall & Taylor, 1996). North (1990), for example, follows this conceptualization in 
arguing that decisions made in the past, such as the adoption of a law or the establishment 
of an organization, influence the possibility of decisions in the present. Institutional 
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transformation is therefore understood to be a moment of rupture or ‘critical junction’ in 
an otherwise incremental development process (Hall & Taylor, 1996), which characterizes 
long-term institutional dynamics as a ‘punctuated equilibrium’ (True, Jones, & Baumgartner, 
2007). At the same time, however, some scholars have criticized historical institutionalism 
for overemphasizing institutional stability and providing few analytical tools for 
understanding institutional transformation (Peters, Pierre, & King, 2005; Schmidt, 2008). 
Applied to the discussion in this chapter, historical institutionalism would emphasize the 
predominance of sovereignty concerns for geopolitics in general (Hecht & Cockburn, 
1990) and forest governance in particular (Carvalho, 2012), among other factors. The 
discussion in section 1.4, however, has pointed to a discursive and institutional variety 
both between and within sovereign countries, which opposes an emphasis on historical 
trends. Historical institutionalism therefore provides few analytical tools for addressing 
the central questions of this dissertation.
Rational choice institutionalism, secondly, argues that the core function of institutions is to 
minimize transaction costs for both individuals and society (Hall & Taylor, 1996). More 
specifically, institutions aim to structure the benefit-maximizing behavior of individuals, 
who are calculative and instrumental in their efforts to attain specific preferences, in order 
to prevent that this behavior does not come at the expense of collective benefits. In this 
respect, institutional stability or transformation is explained in terms of efforts to minimize costs. 
This understanding resonates with the general economic argument that deforestation 
reduction is one of the most cost-effective approaches to climate change mitigation 
(Stern, 2006), but there are several caveats that rational choice institutionalism does not 
account for. As has been pointed out in section 1.4, for example, an emphasis on cost- 
effectiveness is void of considerations for the variability of discourses and institutions 
observed with respect to Brazilian forest governance. This argument corresponds with 
similar findings by Weyland (2002, p. 62), who argued that rational choice institutionalism 
“is clearly less useful for analyzing the complicated, volatile and fluid politics” in Latin 
American countries like Brazil. In addition, emphasizing cost-effectiveness of reducing 
deforestation at the societal level would ignore the potential costliness of institutional 
transformation for organizations and individuals relying on the existing institutional order, 
as historical institutionalism would argue (North, 1990). Rational choice institutionalism 
therefore has limited applications for the research of this dissertation. 
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Sociological institutionalism, thirdly, places much more emphasis on the normative and 
cognitive dimensions of institutions and institutionalization in asserting that explanations 
lie in cultural dynamics (Hall & Taylor, 1996). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) have defined 
three processes that characterize the institutionalization process and account for much of 
the organizational homogeneity within a particular context. Firstly, social stability comes 
about through coercive isomorphism, which is warranted by “both formal and informal 
pressures exerted on organizations by other organizations upon which they are dependent 
and by cultural expectations in the society within which organizations function” (p. 150). 
In addition, social stability in the form of organizational homogeneity also comes about 
by professionalization of organizations through processes of education and networking 
(i.e. normative isomorphism) as well as imitation of best practices by other organizations 
(i.e. mimetic isomorphism). In an alternative conceptualization of institutions, Scott (1995) 
argues that institutions involve (1) formal and informal rules (regulative dimension) and 
the creation, monitoring and sanctioning thereof, (2) values and norms (normative 
dimension) that clarify what has value and what is appropriate behavior, and (3) a set 
of beliefs and worldviews (cognitive dimension) for making sense of the world. Rather 
than emphasizing a historical path dependence or a common rationality, sociological 
 institutionalism aims to explain institutional stability and transformation by adhering to 
discursive formations (Foucault, 1972), deep core beliefs (Sabatier & Weible, 2007) or similar 
social structures. Some scholars have challenged the explanatory power of sociological 
institutionalism with respect to understanding institutional transformation as the social 
structures that it refers to are often presented as static entities on which new ideas have 
very little effect (Schmidt, 2008). Although not as problematic as historical or rational 
choice institutionalism, this static and unidirectional approach to institutional events 
poses some challenges for operationalizing sociological institutionalism in the research of 
this dissertation.
Since the 2000s, a new perspective on institutional stability and transformation has 
started to circulate in the literature and emphasizes the role of ideas, which Schmidt (2008) 
called discursive institutionalism (Phillips, Lawrence & Hardy, 2004). There have already 
been attempts to include ideational factors more explicitly into discussions on historical 
institutionalism, but these still retained an emphasis on punctuated equilibrium in their 
acknowledgement of political conflict as instigating factor for critical junctions (Peters et 
al., 2005). Discursive institutionalism, by contrast, centralizes ideas and, more precisely, 
discourse in explaining how institutions are both constructed and constructive. Rather 
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than static structures that influence actor behavior, actors possess both background 
ideational abilities to reflect about the social structures to which they adhere and 
foreground ideational abilities to communicate, deliberate and negotiate these reflections 
with others (Schmidt, 2008). Carstensen and Schmidt (2016) describe three distinct ways 
in which actors use ideas and discourses to exert ‘ideational power’. First, actors have the 
capacity “to persuade other actors to accept and adopt their views” (p. 323) about how to 
think and act (power through ideas). Second, actors aim “to control and dominate the 
meaning of ideas” (p. 326) by controlling knowledge production and distribution, resisting 
alternative ideas and applying shaming tactics (power over ideas). Finally, actors draw 
upon deeper-level ideational and institutional structures within which they ground their 
ideas in order to render these ideas more authoritative (power in ideas). The combination 
of these forms of ideational power underscore that institutions are both constructive and 
constructed rather than static entities.
Based on the theoretical discussion in the preceding paragraphs, this dissertation will 
mainly adhere to the insights from discursive institutionalism for analyzing the use of 
financial instruments for reducing deforestation in Brazil. Particularly the concepts of 
power through, over and in ideas correspond well with the malleability of these 
instruments. In other words, the institutions established in this context are still relatively 
novel (i.e. up to 20 years) and will therefore depend on existing institutional structures (i.e. 
power in ideas) and be susceptible to the political activity of stakeholders (i.e. power 
through and over ideas). Furthermore, discursive institutionalism avoids the problems 
identified for historical, rational choice and sociological institutionalism and acknowledges 
that institutions are social constructions. 
1.6.2.  Understanding policy processes and social structures
The understanding that institutions organize social activity and behavior into specific 
patterns corresponds with conceptualizations from discursive theory, albeit emphasizing 
social structures in general. In particular, the Foucauldian doctrine describes a multilayered 
scaffolding of social structures through which social and natural phenomena become 
sensible and which govern social activity and behavior (Foucault, 1972). At the deepest 
layer of this scaffolding, Foucault (1970), discerns an episteme that governs the regularity of 
statements and practices across widely differing fields of knowledge like economics, 
linguistics and biological sciences. The regularity emanating from the episteme 
corresponds with the path dependency and isomorphism described in section 1.2, albeit 
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they play a role at different analytical levels. The social structures referred to in the 
institutional literature tend to correspond more closely with ‘deep core beliefs’ (Sabatier & 
Weible, 2007), ‘discursive formations’ (Foucault, 1972) or, as discussed in the previous 
section, institutions. These second-layer structures involve collections of rules that 
underlie the possibility of particular statements and practices (e.g. written texts and 
speech acts) and build on the regularities of the episteme. 
A third layer hosts a diversity of discourses in what has been called the ‘politics of discourse’. 
Hajer and Versteeg (2005, p. 175) define discourses as “ensembles of ideas, concepts and 
categories through which meaning is given to social and physical phenomena, and which 
are produced and reproduced through an identifiable set of practices”. There are different 
theoretical approaches for understanding the interaction between and functions of these 
discourses. According to critical discourse theorists, these structures embed power 
relations between discursive communities that are obscured from more superficial layers 
and therefore do not appear explicitly in daily practices and statements of actors 
(Fairclough, 1985; van Dijk, 1993). Structuralist discourse theorists, by contrast, argue that 
these layers of episteme, discursive formations and power relations “create some sense of 
stability, order and predictability and thereby produce a sustainable, functioning and 
livable world […that] acquires its apparent externality, objectivity and structure” (Chia, 
2000, p. 514; Hajer & Versteeg, 2005). Notwithstanding their differences, these interpreta-
tions explain how social structures govern the discursive competition (i.e. ‘politics of 
discourse) for remaining or becoming institutions (Foucault, 1970, 1972). In this sense, the 
extent to which these discourses are indeed produced and reproduced through practices 
corresponds with the extent to which they are institutionalized. 
Discursive literature on forest governance is particularly rich on the materialization of 
REDD+ and offers diverging approaches to what determines the outcome of the politics 
of discourse. Some scholars argue that one particular discourse will eventually become 
dominant and determine the course of REDD+ development (Brockhaus, Di Gregorio, & 
Mardiah, 2014; Gebara, Fatorelli, May, & Zhang, 2014). Others have suggested that the 
different discursive perspectives will converge and reach an agreement on the general 
course of development (Hiraldo & Tanner, 2011; Skutsch & Van Laake, 2008; Thompson, 
Baruah, & Carr, 2011). Den Besten et al. (2014) have described these REDD+ politics as 
a ‘discursive-institutional spiral’ that alternates discursive development with phases of 
 institutionalization. Far less literature has explicitly addressed the impact of discursive 
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formations on specific discourses that emerge therein. Some studies have come close to 
such work as they describe the economic foundations of concepts like payments for 
ecosystem services and nature valuation (Baveye et al., 2013; Gómez- Baggethun, de Groot, 
Lomas, & Montes, 2010; Gómez-Baggethun & Muradian, 2015;  Gómez-Baggethun & 
Naredo, 2015). To date, however, no study has been able to describe how epistemic 
foundations have affected the materialization of REDD+. 
The main strength of discursive approaches to policy analysis is to reveal the structural 
foundations of social behavior and activity that are not immediately apparent in day-to-day 
practices. Moreover, such an analysis could clarify why discourses are competing through 
a detailed description of conflicting ideas, concepts or categories. At the same time, 
however, discourse analysis does not necessarily shed light on the political strategies by 
individual policy participants. Other political theories are more adequate for such an 
analysis, most notably the Advocacy Coalition Framework. This framework specifically 
explains how political actors group together in advocacy coalitions, much like discourse 
communities, on the basis of shared deep core beliefs (i.e. general assumptions about 
reality), policy core beliefs (i.e. subsystem-wide applications of deep core beliefs) and 
secondary beliefs (i.e. detail applications of policy core beliefs) to advance specific political 
interests (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). Furthermore, these advocacy coalitions may adjust 
these beliefs as a result of policy learning processes or, by contrast, defend their beliefs by 
applying perpetual filters. While these analytical concepts clarify how advocacy coalitions 
(or discursive communities) exert discursive power on others, the layered structure of 
these belief systems helps to understand the extent to which these changes are indeed 
transformational. 
The discursive dimension of this theoretical framework primarily builds on discourse 
analysis. Corresponding with the arguments in section 1.6.1., discourse analysis can 
provide a valuable refinement of institutional theory as it provides analytical tools for 
analyzing the politics of discourse (Phillips et al., 2004). One the one hand, it exposes some 
of the social processes related to the establishment and retainment of institutions. 
On the other hand, it includes a consideration of the social structures that underlie 
 institutionalization processes and explain why existing institutions may be sustained or 
challenged. As argued above, however, discourse theory does not offer many analytical 
tools for understanding some of the highly political processes of implementing and 
 operationalizing financial instruments for forest governance. This may be expected, 
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for example, for the political operationalization of trading forest certificates in Brazil, 
since this process has still not been institutionalized other than in the Brazilian Forest 
Code. For these purposes, this research also draws on the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
in order to provide more detail on these political processes. The combination of these 
theoretical elements will help to understand the production and reproduction of forest 
governance institutions in Brazil. 
The theoretical framework also provides some guidance on where to search for data 
material. Phillips et al. (2004), for example, have developed a model for studying 
institutional and discursive processes that emphasizes the production of texts as primary 
conductor. On the one hand, they argue that actions that demand institutional 
sensemaking (i.e. innovative ideas) or affect the legitimacy of institutions are most likely to 
produce texts that may influence these institutions. Furthermore, such influential texts 
tend to be produced by authoritative or central actors that draw upon commonly used 
textual genres as well as other texts or discourses. The literature on discourse analysis 
similarly directs attention the role of speech acts and written communications as principal 
conveyors of discourses and their underlying social structures (Gee, 2005). The use of 
language is organized through implicit application of coherence, sequence, rules of 
interaction and lexicon that give the actor “the feeling that things are as they should be” 
(Fairclough, 1985: p.740). This orderliness of interaction and practice reflects the institutions 
and underlying social structures that govern their regularity. In this respect, the underlying 
social structures of forest governance in Brazil reside in, for example, official governmental 
documents, speech acts during meetings and interviews, and transactions to and from 
financial instruments. Especially the latter is a material indicator of discourses mostly 
valued by stakeholders in their daily involvement with financial instruments for forest 
governance. Taken together, these conveyors of discourse reveal the scaffolding of social 
structures that underpin their possibility and regularity that, subsequently, inspire my 
methodological approach as described in detail in section 1.3. Advocacy coalition 
framework
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1.7.  Research approach
In the years that this research was conducted and written down, from 2013 to 2018, forest 
governance in Brazil has been highly volatile as policy processes were rapidly developing. 
Already during COP19 in 2013 it became clear that REDD+ did not become the offset-based 
market instrument that many social groups feared would materialize, instead becoming 
a performance-based funding mechanism. While Brazil is already able to receive 
results-based payments, its progress still took some years before official documents 
materialized. The National Strategy for REDD+ (ENREDD+), for example, was only released 
during COP21 in 2015, while earlier versions go as far back as February 2013. An important 
factor in this delay involves the adoption of a new Forest Code in 2012, especially 
governmental concerns with implementing some key monitoring and flexibility 
mechanisms. During 2014, when REDD+ debates were nearly stagnant, governmental 
efforts were primarily oriented towards the implementation of the Rural Environmental 
Registry (CAR) as well as the potential for trading Environmental Reserve Quota (CRA). 
Only from 2015 did REDD+ resurface through the establishment of the National Committee 
for REDD+ (CONAREDD+). These developments in the policy field under analysis has 
forced various adaptations to the original research project, changing the focus from 
criticism on an offset-based market instrument for REDD+ implementation to the role of 
these instruments in in Brazilian forest governance and the economic rationales upon 
which they build. 
The changing research field has had significant consequences for the choice of research 
objects during the four-year period. One important case in researching the role of financial 
instruments for forest governance in Brazil concerns the performance-based payments 
related to the Amazon Fund, because this has been the central REDD+ institution in Brazil 
from 2008 to at least 2016 and continues to be an important cornerstone. While these 
payments do not build on the idea of an offset-based market instrument, they may still 
adhere to similar rationales to some extent due to their financial nature. In order to test this 
hypothesis, this dissertation offers an analysis of the foundations of performance-based 
payments related to the Amazon Fund in the context of emerging critiques. This is 
complemented by an analysis of the extent to which offset-based market instruments are 
a key component of these critiques. Another important case in relation to offset-based 
market instruments for Brazilian forest governance is the trade in forest certificates. In 2014 
and 2015 the prospect of this market has been an important concern both for rural land 
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owners and governmental organizations. Particularly the latter, in collaboration with 
academic researchers, invested much time and many resources in understanding the 
potential for this market (Soares-Filho et al., 2016) in order to elaborate a federal decree. 
The final contents of this decree would regulate a market that contributes to providing 
incentives for forest conservation on private lands. While this market is only indirectly 
connected to Brazilian REDD+ practices (May et al., 2016), this provides an ideal opportunity 
for analyzing the operationalization of an offset-based market instrument within forest 
governance. Moreover, this case counterbalances the resistance to such instruments in 
the context of REDD+ development. A discussion that juxtaposes the  performance-based 
payments in the Amazon Fund and the offset-based CRA market could provide insight 
into the differences and similarities of their (de)construction. 
Dealing with a highly volatile research field has also had significant consequences for data 
collection. Since this research involves discursive-institutional analysis that emphasizes 
speech acts and written communications, the primary data sources are semi structured 
interviews with key stakeholders, document analysis of laws, decrees, national strategies, 
minutes of meetings, annual reports and others, and participant and non-participant 
observations during meetings and presentations. As I entered a policy field that was 
unfamiliar to me, both substantially and culturally, the selection of these interviews, 
documents and observations necessarily occurred using the snowballing technique. 
In addition, the highly volatile policy field compelled me to retain a high degree of 
flexibility in the research approach in order to deal with unforeseen circumstances. For 
instance, policy development processes were delayed or stagnated due to changing 
priorities in policy-making, people changed jobs due to regime changes (e.g. impeachment 
in May 2016) or other reasons, key documents only emerged in later stages of the research, 
and key stakeholders involved in earlier stages of development were only identified after 
having interviewed their successors. By the end of the four-year period of this research, 
data analysis had built on collection and transcription of 47 interviews with key 
stakeholders. In addition to the interviews conducted specifically for this doctorate 
research, this research also benefited a lot from interviews, (participatory) observations 
and other knowledge and expertise shared by members of the research group on forest 
governance and ecosystem service management at the Federal University of Minas Gerais 
(UFMG).
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1.8.  Dissertation outline
The remainder of this dissertation presents four research papers that address the individual 
components of the research project. Chapter 2 provides an analysis of the research field 
related to REDD+ materialization in Brazil. This chapter identifies two REDD+ discourses 
that materialize in concrete practices, the most dominant of which emphasizes the 
performance- based payments of the Amazon Fund. The other discourse concerns the 
persisting elements of an offset-based market instrument. Chapter 3 further investigates 
the performance-based payments of the Amazon Fund by paying close attention to the 
basis of those payments. Guided by the recently emerging critiques on its performance, it 
reconstructs how the functioning of the Amazon Fund contains contradictions that are 
open to contestation. Chapter 4 explains how REDD+ in Brazil still builds on the same 
theoretical building blocks as market instruments despite resistance to carbon offsetting. 
Moreover, it proposes that the epistemic structure of ruptured dependence as a useful 
concept for understanding why market instruments are still being discussed in political 
debates in Brazil. Chapter 5 turns to the construction of the Brazilian market for forest 
certificates as a flexibility mechanism of the Forest Code. Using the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework, this chapter analyzes the role of policy learning by policy participants during 
attempts to operationalize this market. Chapter 6 consolidates the findings of these cases 
and relates them to the extended theoretical discussion of chapter 4. The dissertation 
concludes with final considerations for future research and policy-making.

The parallel materialization of REDD+ 
implementation discourses in Brazil
When this doctorate research started in October 2013, the political landscape for REDD+ development 
in Brazil was only cradling its first institutions. The Warsaw Framework for REDD+ would not be 
adopted until December (Voigt & Ferreira, 2015) and initial efforts to develop a national REDD+ 
strategy had only just begun. REDD+ in Brazil was still mostly associated with the Amazon Fund, which 
was already established in 2008 (Hermansen, 2015). As chapter 3 explains in more detail, however, 
the operationalization of the Amazon Fund in the first five years of development was still very slow 
and represent only a small portion of the fund’s capacity in 2018. Despite the small scale of its 
 materialization, the overall tendencies were already becoming clear: the parallel materialization of 
distinct discourses on REDD+ development. The findings in this chapter reflect this initial state of 
REDD+ development in Brazil. 
The political landscape for REDD+ development in Brazil has changed a lot in the past few years. 
After the adoption of the Warsaw Framework for REDD+, Brazil subsequently established the Technical 
Working Group for REDD+ (GTT REDD) in 2014 as well as the National Commission on REDD+ 
(CONAREDD+) in 2015 and has officially published a National Strategy for REDD+ (ENREDD+) in 2016. 
Furthermore, the Ministry of Finance’s Secretariat of International Affairs (SAIN-MF) has become the 
Nationally Designated Authority (NDA) and is in the process of accrediting eligible organizations to 
receive financial resources from the Green Climate Fund. These developments gradually diminish the 
centrality of the Amazon Fund among Brazilian REDD+ institutions, which is described in much more 
detail in chapter 4. Still, the Amazon Fund has retained great relevance in the new institutional 
structure. Indeed, it has been the only Brazilian institution to receive financial transactions from 
international or bilateral agreements and is widely renowned for its extensive experiences as well 
as the sheer magnitude of its contributions. In both operational and financial terms, therefore, 
the Amazon Fund still represented a central node in Brazilian REDD+ governance until at least 2018. 
By contrast, other approaches to REDD+ have remained sporadic and uncoordinated, as this chapter 
will argue, although new organizations like Biofílica and Bolsa Verde do Rio de Janeiro (BVRio) have 
emerged on the radar. These considerations underscore that the core conclusions of this chapter, 
namely the parallel materialization of distinct discourses, have retained their validity.
This chapter is published in Forest Policy and Economics:
Van der Hoff, R., Rajão, R., Leroy, P., & Boezeman, D. (2015). The parallel materialization of REDD+ 
implementation discourses in Brazil. Forest Policy and Economics, 55(0), 37-45. doi:http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/j.forpol.2015.03.005
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2.1.  Introduction
Since its emergence in the mid-2000s, the concept of Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation and enhancement of carbon stocks (REDD+) as 
potentially a low-cost contribution to climate change mitigation has drawn considerable 
attention at local, national and international levels (Angelsen et al., 2012; FAO, 2011; UN, 
2011; World Bank, 2008). At present, the core purpose of REDD+ is to generate the financial 
resources necessary for reducing as well as avoiding carbon emissions in countries with 
tropical forests (Agrawal, Nepstad, & Chhatre, 2011; Angelsen et al., 2012). While political 
interest in the REDD+ concept abounded since its inception in 2003 (see Moutinho et al., 
2011), the practical implementation of REDD+ proved more challenging than anticipated. 
Some of the main challenges persisting in contemporary debates involve the inclusion of 
REDD+ in carbon markets, the distribution of benefits (both financial and non-financial), 
the establishment of a monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) framework, and the 
adoption of safeguards concerning social equity and ecological biodiversity (Agrawal 
et al., 2011; FFPRI, 2012; Vatn & Vedeld, 2013). Many scholars recognize this multiplicity of 
unresolved challenges in REDD+ implementation as directly resulting from its multi-actor 
(Brockhaus et al., 2014; Gebara et al., 2014; McDermott, Coad, Helfgott, & Schroeder, 2012) 
and multi-level (Angelson, Streck, Peskett, Brown, & Luttrell, 2008; Skutsch & Van Laake, 
2008) governance characteristics. Within this context, a growing body of scientific 
literature adheres to a discursive approach to understanding REDD+ implementation, 
expounding why some elements of REDD+ (e.g. finance) are largely elaborated while 
other elements (e.g. social safeguards) have remained contentious and only recently 
attract attention in negotiations (Angelsen et al., 2012; Luttrell et al., 2013; P. H. May & 
Millikan, 2010; Peterson St-Laurent, linas, & Potvin, 2013). While many of these discursive 
studies illuminate the debates, none of these studies articulate how different discourses 
can result into concrete practices (Leipold, 2014; Skutsch & Van Laake, 2008; Thompson 
et al., 2011).
Such articulation of the materialization of discourse to practice becomes especially 
important in understanding the case of REDD+ implementation in Brazil, which has 
received widespread political attention due to the vast contributions to global 
deforestation (i.e. an average of 50%, or 2.6 million hectares, in the 2000s) as well as 
significant achievements in curbing deforestation in the Amazon region (i.e. from 2.8 
million hectares in 2004 to 0.7 million hectares in 2010) (Carvalho, 2012; FAO, 2011; Santilli 
46
CHAPTER 2
et al., 2005). Brazil currently hosts one of the most elaborate networks of REDD+ 
stakeholders from a diversity of public and private sectors that currently implement over 
36 REDD+ projects throughout the country (Angelsen et al., 2012; Gebara et al., 2014). Most 
of these projects in Brazil obtain financial support from the Amazon Fund, which, since its 
creation in 2008 until present, has received and distributed more than 800 million USD 
in donations from Norway and Germany1 for deforestation reduction initiatives in the 
Brazilian Amazon. Moreover, Brazil currently works on a national REDD+ strategy, while 
many state governments in the Amazon region created institutional frameworks to trade 
avoided deforestation to voluntary markets and are negotiating a carbon offset agreement 
with the US state of California (GCF, 2012; Nepstad, Boyd, Stickler, Bezerra, & Azevedo). 
In addition, the country successfully obtained the certification of over 20 REDD+ projects 
which together represent several million tons in avoided CO2 emissions that can be sold 
as carbon credits in voluntary markets. It is not surprising, therefore, that Brazil is currently 
the frontrunner in REDD+ implementation. These examples of widespread emergence of 
REDD+ initiatives involving multiple stakeholders in Brazil pose a rather sharp contrast 
with the slow pace of the UNFCCC negotiations at the international level. Most importantly, 
the case of Brazil suggests that REDD+ implementation takes place in spite of the absence 
of a coherent governance structure at the national and international levels. In light of 
these reflections, it becomes particularly interesting to articulate the  materialization of 
REDD+ discourses in Brazil in order to understand the implementation of REDD+ practices 
in the Amazon region. 
This research paper responds to this knowledge gap by articulating how discourses 
construct particular conceptualizations (i.e. visions of what REDD+ is), strategies (i.e. how 
REDD+ should be implemented) and practices (i.e. the concrete actions realize these 
visions and strategies). This articulation departs from a constructionist understanding of 
discourse, which is elaborated in section 2.2 and operationalized in section 2.3. Based on 
interviews, observations and documental analysis, section 2.4 presents the two main 
discourses concerning REDD+ in Brazil, paying particular attention to its conceptualiza-
tions, and implementation strategies and practices. We then discuss these two parallel 
discourses in light of the current scholarly literature, and conclude with some key remarks 
and recommendations for future research.
1  http://www.fundoamazonia.gov.br/FundoAmazonia/fam/site_pt/Esquerdo/Doacoes/ accessed on 30/04/2014
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2.2.  Discourse analysis and REDD+
Given the focus on the materialization of discourses into practices, this research paper 
defines discourses as “ensembles of ideas, concepts and categories through which 
meaning is given to social and physical phenomena, and which are produced and 
reproduced through an identifiable set of practices” (Hajer & Versteeg, 2005: p.175). While 
other definitions are widely available, this definition particularly emphasizes the 
omnipresent link between discursive frameworks and concrete practices that sustain 
discourses. Within this broad conceptualization of discourses, it is possible to identify a 
critical realist and a constructivist tradition of discourse analysis (Reed, 2000). The critical 
realist tradition, or critical discourse analysis, draws upon a Marxist theory to see discourses 
as mediators between practices and ideologies, namely, superstructures imposed by 
dominant groups in order to hide underlying power relations. In this context, one of the 
key aims of critical discourse analysis is to promote emancipation by exposing the content 
of ideological-discursive formations (Fairclough, 1985; van Dijk, 1993). This approach has 
been adopted by some studies in exposing distinct and often conflicting discourses on 
the conceptual development of REDD+ at the international level (Hiraldo & Tanner, 2011), 
concrete implementation efforts at the national level (Peterson St-Laurent et al., 2013; 
Somorin et al., 2012), and distribution mechanisms (Angelsen et al., 2012). 
The constructivist tradition, in contrast, avoids the distinction between an ideological 
superstructure and an underlying reality. By drawing upon the work of Foucault (2002), 
Berger and Luckmann (1967), and others, this tradition proposes that discourses are 
involved in the social construction of reality by “creat[ing] some sense of stability, order 
and predictability and thereby produc[ing] a sustainable, functioning and livable world 
[…that] acquires its apparent externality, objectivity and structure” (Chia, 2000: 514; 
Foucault, 2002; Hajer & Versteeg, 2005; Rajão, 2013b). Den Besten et al. (2014), for example, 
argued that international REDD+ debates have developed in two successive waves, 
thereby moving away from an initial conceptualization based on Payments for Ecosystem 
Services (PES) towards a broader scope that includes social and environmental ‘safeguards’. 
In a similar tradition, (Brockhaus et al., 2014) argue that, despite the presence of conflicting 
discourses, the general process of REDD+ implementation at the national level is largely 
determined by the more influential (or dominant) stakeholders.  
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Despite the differences and quarrels between the critical realist and constructivist 
traditions of discourse analysis (Fairclough, 2005; Reed, 2000), both approaches agree that 
discourses shape and are shaped by concrete practices. Therefore, discursive formations 
inspire ‘case-specific’ discourses with respect to their contents, which subsequently 
materialize into practices. At the same time, distinct sets of practices are combined in 
‘case-specific’ discourses that may transform these discursive formations over time. This 
dialectical relation implies that practices are always embedded in (pre-existing) discourses 
and that discourses always rely on practices for their existence and transformation (Phillips et al., 
2004; Van Leeuwen, 2008). As such, discursive approaches tend to emphasize either the 
discursive struggles through which practices transform discourses, or the materialization 
of discourses into practices, the latter of which is the focus of this paper. By exposing this 
materialization, this approach is able to show how different groups mobilize contrasting 
discourses to shape the conceptualization of environmental problems (Hajer & Versteeg, 
2005), and to define the strategies and practices to solve them (Backstrand & Lovbrand, 
2006; Den Besten et al., 2014; Rajão, 2013b). 
Despite emphasizing different elements of discourse materialization, the discursive 
literature from both traditions generally recognizes the outcome of discursive conflicts as 
key determinant for the practical manifestation of REDD+ implementation. Some studies 
suggest that the discursive conflicts in REDD+ debates will culminate in a dominant 
position for some of the discourse communities, which will determine the characteristics 
of REDD+ implementation (e.g. Brockhaus et al., 2014). Gebara et al. (2014), for example, 
indicate that governmental organizations as well as NGOs exert the most influence in 
REDD+ policy-making in Brazil. As such, REDD+ discourses are directly linked to specific 
stakeholders of various degrees of dominance as well as the practices in which these 
stakeholders engage. Other studies either implicitly or explicitly suggest that REDD+ 
implementation processes can only be successful in case of convergence of discourses 
and their practices (e.g. Hiraldo & Tanner, 2011). This hypothesis implies that REDD requires 
an alignment of stakeholder interests (either through domination or negotiation) that 
consolidates all stakeholders into a specific conceptualization of REDD+ to allow for its 
implementation (see also Skutsch & Van Laake, 2008; Thompson et al., 2011). Still other 
scholars argue that discursive multiplicity and related conflicts may even be desired at the 
international level in order to attract a wide diversity of stakeholders. Yet they recognize 
that this function (REDD+ as a boundary object) may disappear as soon as REDD+ 
implementation arrives at the national or subnational level (McDermott et al., 2012). 
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As such, REDD+ implementation requires a web of multi-sector and multi-level stakeholders 
cooperating in a coherent governance structure that supports their interests, which they 
recognize as one of the greatest challenges the implementation of REDD+. 
While these studies provide some key perspectives for understanding the implementation 
of REDD+, they leave some crucial details of this process unarticulated. In particular, the 
literature has so far not been able to account for the translation of REDD+ discourses in 
concrete and coherent practices, and most importantly, how REDD+ is achieving 
moderate success (in terms of initiatives implemented) in countries like Brazil despite the 
absence of a coherent discourse at national and international levels. In light of these 
shortcomings, this research paper questions the validity of the hypothesis advocated by 
most scholars discussed above that successful REDD+ implementation would necessarily 
require convergence of discourses and their practices. This research aims to address this 
question by providing a detailed description of the construction of REDD+ in various 
discourses that are represented in implementation practices. This description in this 
research paper addresses three key dimensions: (1) conceptual, how actors understand 
the issue of deforestation and why it should be reduced through REDD+; (2) strategic, the 
principles that guide REDD+ implementations; and (3) practical, the concrete actions that 
make this strategy operational. This study intends to shed light on how the REDD+ 
concept is received in a particular institutional and political context (see also Aquino & 
Guay, 2013; Kanowski, McDermott, & Cashore, 2011) and materialized in specific practices 
in order to contribute to the understanding of the implementation process of REDD+ in 
Brazil and other tropical countries. 
2.3.  Research methodology
This research paper builds primarily on a combination of nine semistructured interviews, 
observations and document analysis obtained by the first author of this article. The 
majority of the interviews were selected based on their influential position in national 
REDD+ policy-making (yielding similar results as Gebara et al., 2014), which was 
complemented with standalone REDD+ initiatives from corporate organizations (e.g. CGV 
and CDI, see below) in order to capture the full range of activities in the Brazilian Amazon. 
This selection yielded seven interviews with governmental organizations, corporate 
organizations and non-governmental organizations. Furthermore, two additional interviews 
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with experts in REDD+ implementation and methodology were selected to enhance 
understanding of REDD+ activities. The interviews were recorded, transcribed and 
analyzed using simple coding methods that initially focussed on the key elements of 
REDD+ implementation (i.e. raising financial resources and distribution of benefits). During 
this preliminary analysis, the codes were regrouped in order to reflect the individual actor 
positions with respect to REDD+ elements, which yielded a matrix representing the extent 
to which each actor adheres to particular forms of governance (i.e. market and government) 
and particular forms of strategy (i.e. commodification and development). This analysis 
yielded two clusters of REDD+ stakeholders that were recognized as the discourses 
presented below. This interview analysis forms the primary data source for this research 
article, from which the two discourses have been identified and all quotes in the empirical 
section are inspired. In order to obtain an updated perspective of the negotiation process 
at the UNFCCC, the second author has also participated as an observer of the COP20 in 
Lima and interviewed delegates from different countries. These data and observations 
served to confirm and validate the main findings of this analysis with respect to general 
developments in REDD+ implementation, as well as obtain some insights on the current 
and future prospects of conceptual development. 
The results from this interview analysis were complemented with and supported by 
a body of secondary data. Firstly, this research paper derives from a collection of 
governmental report documents and brochures, such as the National REDD+ strategy, 
the National Plan for Climate Change, as well as publications, brochures and websites from 
NGOs and corporate organizations, as complementing research data that underscores 
the research results and enhances understanding of REDD+ implementation in the 
Brazilian Amazon. Secondly, during two visits to REDD+ initiatives in the north of Mato 
Grosso, it was possible to collect observations related to the implementation strategies 
and practices related to REDD+ implementation supported by the Amazon Fund. Finally, 
this study also benefited from the empirical data obtained by the second author as part 
of a longitudinal study that has been looking at the formation of deforestation control 
policies in Brazil since 2006, and that so far has collected more than one hundred 
interviews with government officials, politicians, members from NGOs and farmers. 
The empirical findings from these primary and secondary data resources are represented 
in a narrative description, which captures the central discourse features with respect to 
problem definition of deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon, the proposed strategy for 
reducing deforestation and the consequent construction of REDD+.
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2.4.  REDD+ discourses in Brazil
The genesis of REDD+ can be traced back to the proposal of a mechanism of ‘Compensated 
Emission Reductions’ by a group of Brazilian and North American scientists and activists, 
which was introduced in 2003 and integrated at the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate change) during COP11 in 2005 (Moutinho, Santilli, Schwartzman, & 
Rodrigues, 2005; Moutinho et al., 2011). The original idea advocated international financial 
compensation for countries that succeed in reducing tropical deforestation and, as such, 
contribute to climate change mitigation (Moutinho et al., 2011). While subsequent 
conceptual developments required the consideration of a number of technical (e.g. 
monitoring, reporting and verification), social (e.g. equity rights for indigenous peoples) 
and environmental (e.g. biodiversity protection) issues, this original concept based on 
international financial support for deforestation reduction efforts still underpins 
contemporary REDD+ debates (Angelsen, 2013; Angelsen et al., 2012). 
In Brazil, REDD+ appeared as a new chapter in the country’s attempt to control 
deforestation in the Amazon. From the military rule in the 1960s until the 1980s, Brazil 
established a number of large scale colonization and development policies (e.g. Operação 
Amazônia, PolAmazônia and Calha Norte) in order to increase regional economic activity in 
the Amazon and ensure the Brazilian sovereignty over an area seen as highly vulnerable to 
international military intervention. Due to successful efforts to put environmental issues, 
including deforestation, on the international and national political agenda during the 
1980s, the colonization policies towards the Amazon were reconsidered and the federal 
government launched different programs aimed to tackle deforestation mainly through 
command and control actions (Hecht & Cockburn, 1990; Rajão & Hayes, 2009; Zhouri, 
2004). While monitoring and law enforcement still constitutes the main deforestation 
control instrument in use in Brazil, a growing number of actors in the 2000s began to 
recognize the limits of this approach. In this context, the view that deforestation was also 
an economic (rather than merely legal) problem gained widespread acceptance, which 
induced the advocacy of economic incentives for the preservation of forests. It was within 
this broader context that REDD+ was viewed by different actors in Brazil as a way to 
channel financial resources and provide economic benefits for the conservation of the 
Amazon (Moutinho et al., 2011). Despite this common ground, REDD+ implementation in 
Brazil reveals a growing gap between its various conceptualizations and the concrete 
practices they engender. In the next two subsections we present the two main REDD+ 
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discourses in operation in Brazil, enchasing the way in which these discourses have been 
turned into implementation strategies and practices. 
2.4.1.  REDD+ as carbon commodification
Advocates of the carbon commodification discourse constitute a rather disconnected 
group of stakeholders that share an interest in direct payments for corresponding 
emission reductions. In the particular case of Brazil, this small collection of REDD+ 
stakeholders entails a mixture of corporate organizations, state-level governments and 
some non-governmental organizations that often do not act as a coherent group but 
nevertheless engage in similar practices. The remainder of this subsection provides more 
detailed understanding of this discourse.
Conceptual dimension
In line with international debates on REDD+, a group of private and public actors in Brazil 
emphasize the role of carbon-offset markets as a key economic instrument to mitigate 
climate change a global level. This particular discourse presents REDD+ as a way to ensure 
the reduction of emissions by avoiding deforestation, and in this way, producing carbon 
credits that can be purchased by other sectors of the economy (e.g. energy) and countries 
(e.g. Japan) where opportunity cost of mitigation is much higher. Therefore, this rather 
disconnected group of stakeholders share an interest in market-based approaches to 
reducing deforestation that is commonly referred to as ‘neoliberal conservation’ (Arsel & 
Büscher, 2012; Heynen & Robbins, 2005; Roth & Dressler, 2012). 
The most apparent stakeholders of this discourse are corporate organizations, such as 
carbon traders Celestial Green Venture (CGV) and Carbon Decisions International (CDI), 
and environmental non-governmental organizations and some indigenous groups that 
financially, technically or organizationally support local sustainable development projects in 
exchange for carbon credits or financial compensation. According to the representative of a 
carbon trading company, reducing deforestation and correspondent carbon emissions in 
order to mitigate climate change is “why we are talking about REDD+”. Understanding 
deforestation in terms of quantified carbon emissions with a monetary value induces the 
process of carbon commodification. In similar respect, the carbon commodification discourse 
argues that REDD+ should ‘produce’ the commodity of avoided carbon emissions (or 
carbon stocks) for the purpose of ‘consumption’ by emitting countries and corporations. 
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“Carbon trading could be like any other commodity if you want. A new commodity is 
demanded in the world markets and used. In principle, each country should have the right 
to decide how and if they want to incentivize the production of a certain commodity you 
see in their territories.” 
 – Carbon Trader A –
This conceptualization of emission reductions from deforestation as a commodity is 
promulgated not only by private actors, but by some state-level governments as well. In 
particular the Amazonian states that propose U-REDD+ allocation, as well as the GCF Task 
Force to which these states pertain, advocate the offsetting of carbon emissions from 
industrial activities in Brazil or other countries through the ‘competition’ for REDD+ carbon 
credits (Cenamo, Soares, & Karst, 2014; GCF, 2012). As a consequence of this particular 
discourse, REDD+ is conceptualized chiefly as a way to mitigate climate change at global 
level through the use of market mechanism, leaving other benefits (e.g. poverty alleviation, 
biodiversity conservation etc…) as aspects that should be at best safeguarded rather than 
rewarded. 
Strategic dimension
The conceptualization of REDD+ as the commodification of carbon emissions immediately 
points to the establishment of carbon markets as its most central implementation strategy. 
A broad understanding of carbon markets emphasizes an exchange between ‘consumers’ 
and ‘producers’ of avoided carbon emissions and/or carbon stocks. CGV, for example, 
produces carbon credits by certifying projects through standards such as VCS and CCB, 
which produce carbon yields that are sold to consumers on European carbon markets 
(CGV, 2011). Alternatively, U-REDD+ allocation would involve the production of avoided 
carbon emissions and/or carbon stocks by state governments, which are ‘sold’ to the 
federal government in order to comply with UNFCCC commitments (Cenamo et al., 2014). 
Although the consumption of U-REDD+ by the federal government may imply a 
somewhat unusual formulation (the U-REDD+ proposal involves distribution of financial 
resources rather than a market), the competition involved in the allocation of financial 
resources provides an incentive for state governments to achieve (or produce) emissions 
reductions or carbon stocks. In other words, allocation will not occur according to 
correspondence with the multiple objectives of sustainable development policies (see 
below), but rather based on quantifiable achievements with respect to reducing carbon 
emissions and/or maintaining carbon stocks.
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The main argument for establishing such markets derives from the conviction that markets 
can efficiently manage available resources in order to achieve reductions in carbon 
emissions. This approach towards REDD+ projects consolidates a preference for a 
market-based rather than government-based approach, which is justified by the market’s 
ability to solve not only economic but also social problems in a much more efficient 
manner as explained by an influential Brazilian economist (see also Vatn & Vedeld, 2013):
“In fact, the market-based mechanisms give you room for doing compensatory policies 
and for doing social policies, so it’s just a way of seeing things which is more affirmative 
rather than say at the end we can do… we can take into account poverty or social issues 
we start saying this: Green economy is going to take care of the poor. So to do that, we 
needed to price the rich.”
 – Economist from governmental research institute –
While the focus on carbon emission reductions and offset markets dominates the strategic 
dimension of the carbon commodification discourse, actors involved hold rather ambiguous 
positions with respect to the non-carbon features of REDD+ (i.e. protecting biodiversity 
and securing social equity). Carbon traders like CGV, for example, argue that issues like 
poverty and biodiversity loss distract REDD+ from its core purpose as climate change 
mitigation policy. Similarly, the different members of the GCF Task Force do not appear to 
include such issues into their activities in the same way, with the state of Acre showing a 
greater concern for social justice, while the state of Mato Grosso has a stronger focus on 
the economic aspect of REDD+ (GCF, 2012). However, the carbon trading companies 
interviewed suggested that the incorporation of some socioeconomic and biodiversity 
considerations in their activities is seen as a vital part of their business strategy to 
commercialize carbon credits, thus maintaining the carbon focus. 
Practical dimension
The conceptualization and strategy of the carbon commodification discourse of REDD+ 
in Brazil has influenced a specific set of practices concerned with the evaluation and 
implementation of REDD+ projects. These practices emerge within companies that 
mediate the relation between buyers of carbon credits and landowners of tropical 
rainforest. Although carbon commodification practices are diverse and unstandardized, 
the activities of a European carbon trading company provide an excellent illustration of 
how such mediators construct markets and provide the arena where supply and demand 
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intersect.  In this particular case, the ‘suppliers’ of avoided carbon emissions to this carbon 
trader are the direct landowners in the Brazilian Amazon, which mostly involve municipalities, 
local communities and indigenous people. The projects elaborated with these supplies 
entail intellectual as well as financial support for forest conservation and local development 
in exchange for the right to sell carbon credits on the voluntary carbon market in Europe. 
“We do research on the area and on the project. We do our own internal calculations on 
what the threat level is and [whether] it can be addressed. (…) After we have done that, we 
do our own calculations again on what we think the carbon credit yield would be. We 
agree a figure between ourselves and the land owners. We set up a project from beginning 
to end and we pay fifty [percent] to the land owner for the carbon credit rates for the next 
thirty years. At no time we own the land.”
 – Carbon Trader A –
Even though carbon traders certainly contribute to social co-benefits of REDD+ projects, 
an analysis of their practice activities suggest that the main focus remains on generating 
carbon credits for a voluntary market. Thus, when actively looking for a ‘demand side’ for 
their for the carbon credits generated from agreements with Brazilian landowners, these 
companies look for global voluntary carbon markets and major players (e.g. banks, 
multinational companies) interested in offsetting their emissions. In this process they 
“pack” the carbon credits in formats that are in line with perceived investor needs, 
involving an appropriate scale as well as information on REDD+ benefits. This suggests 
that the business activities of this carbon trading company are very performance driven 
and customer oriented. Recognizing the central focus on avoided carbon emissions, the 
additional social benefits related to development activities in Brazil should be understood 
as commercial advantage that, according to this carbon trader, “tells the story”. 
After establishing the financial viability for the creation of a REDD+ projects in a given 
area, the trader has develop a Project Design Document (PDD) that specifies how carbon 
yields are calculated. The development of a PDD is a complex process which involves the 
calculation of the biomass of the area, its forest inventory, a remote sensing assessment of 
the past and present forest cover, and, finally, the projection of future deforestation in 
order to constitute a base line enabling a conservation outcome evaluation of the project. 
The practices to construct a PPD strongly link with the conceptualization of REDD+ as a 
carbon yielder and its market strategy in two ways. First, while these projects mention 
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social and biodiversity concerns (see above), the focus of the PDD development and 
validation is placed on the ability of the REDD+ project to create substantial emission 
reduction, and, in this way, to “produce” carbon offset credits. Second, and most 
importantly, through this production of carbon offsets these REDD+ practices realize the 
market strategy by detaching its tons of carbon from the specific socio-environmental 
context from where it originates. In this way, the carbon offsets produced by different 
projects are turned into a global commodity and become a product that can be split, 
combined, transferred, and exchanged in the same way as any other commodity.
2.4.2.  REDD+ as sustainable development
The sustainable development discourse adheres to a broad set of REDD+ related 
environmental policies and practices that will be subsumed under a National REDD+ 
Strategy that is connected to UNFCCC commitments without participation in the 
UN-REDD+ Programme (GCP, 2008; Gebara et al., 2014; Gebara & Thuault, 2013). As such, 
many actors advocating this discourse are governmental organizations such as the 
Ministry of Environment (MMA), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE). Some groups 
inside the Secretariat of Strategic Affairs (SAE/PR) and Ministry of Finance adhere partially 
to the carbon commodification discourse, but these groups have a more peripheral role 
in the implementation of REDD+ in Brazil. The Amazon Fund, a distribution mechanism 
created in 2008 for the management of financial resources of REDD+ related activities in 
Brazil, constitutes one of the central instruments in the National REDD+ Strategy. This 
result-based mechanism is financed by donations from the Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) budget mainly from Norway, but also with substantial contributions 
from Germany, mostly in the form of technical assistance. The fund has also received a 
small donation (relative to the fund’s size) from PETROBRAS, the Brazilian oil giant that is 
under the majoritarian control of the Brazilian government. Between 2009 and 2014 the 
fund has received about 901 million USD that are allocated by the Brazilian Development 
Bank (BNDES) to support REDD+ initiatives from state and municipal governments, 
research institutes, and non-governmental organizations. Although the Amazon Fund 
may not represent the full extent of the National REDD+ Strategy (e.g. the Forest Code also 
plays a significant role), it does illustrate how stakeholders from national, state and local 
levels are connected in sustainable development activities in Brazil under the auspices of 
REDD+. The remainder of this subsection discusses the conceptual, strategic and practical 
considerations that characterize this sustainable development discourse.
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Conceptual dimension
During the 20th century one of the key concerns of the Brazilian central government has 
been the economic development of the Amazon, which is considered both a strategic 
asset to be exploited and an unchartered area to be protected from foreign intervention 
(see above). With the uprising against large-scale deforestation triggered by the 
government’s colonization policies during the 1970s and 1980s, it was necessary to 
reconsider, at least in discursive terms, the development strategy towards the Amazon. In 
this context the notion of “sustainable development” has gained widespread support 
across different sectors and is broadly defined as a form of economic growth “that meets 
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs” (WCED, 1987). In the case of the Amazon rainforest, the concept of 
sustainable development has often been conceived by the Brazilian government as the 
centralized coordination of economic development through the provision of financial 
incentives and technological capabilities aimed at nullifying the environmental 
externalities of economic activities on the long term. In this way the government aims to 
“ensure that the forest standing is worth more than the forest cut down”. The following 
excerpt from an interview with a senior official from the Secretary of Strategic Affairs (SAE/
PR) illustrates this conceptualization:
“When you talk about forests in the Amazon, [you talk about] low technology. We are still 
in the rock era in the Amazon, it is unbelievable! We should improve technology in the 
Amazon in all ways, so they can have health programs, security programs [and so forth]. 
What they have in the cities, they should have in the field.”
 – SAE/PR representative –
When REDD+ appeared at the scene in the mid-2000s, it was readily identified by 
policy-makers from the Ministry of Environment as a way to finally obtain the financial 
resources necessary for implementing sustainable development actions. Therefore, these 
actors saw REDD+ not as a means for obtaining carbon yields to mitigate climate change, 
but rather as an instrument fostering sustainable development that alleviates the social 
causes of deforestation. This emphasis on the socioeconomic rather than the 
environmental dimension is a direct legacy of historical views of the Amazon and the 
persistently developmentalist concerns that has driven the policies towards the region 
(Rajão & Hayes, 2009).
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Strategic dimension
The conceptualization of REDD+ primarily as the solution for a socioeconomic problem 
with environmental impact particularly manifests in a set of strategies that places the 
government (and not the market) as the main channel for the distribution of REDD+ 
benefits. This emphasis becomes particularly clear in the tendency of different senior 
officials to equate the national REDD+ strategies with governmental actions already in 
place in the Amazon. A representative from the Ministry of Environment (MMA), for 
example, stresses the integration of REDD+ in existing sustainable development policies:
“Brazil saw that REDD+ as a public policy is very convenient, because we were already 
seeking REDD+. We were already seeking things that were in the way of Green Economics. 
Here in the Ministry, REDD+ is treated very nearly to our plan against deforestation: 
PPCDAM. (…) REDD+ is one element that puts together all those other policies that were 
already in the field.”
 – MMA representative –
Indeed, the cross references between the National REDD+ Strategy and the Brazilian 
Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon (PPCDAm) 
confirm the convergence of REDD+ and existing policies (MMA, 2013). Within this view, 
REDD+ is a continuation and expansion of governmental actions already in place, with 
governmental organizations viewing the mechanism mainly as potential additional influx 
of financial resources for sustainable development policies. With this aim in mind, it 
becomes clear that, according to this discourse, the distribution of the benefits from 
REDD+ should be coordinated by the same entity responsible for fostering the 
development of the region, namely, the federal government.
Another important strategic catalyst for advocating a sustainable development discourse 
is the adoption of a strategy that aims to isolate the operation of REDD+ at an international 
level from Brazil’s national policies. The Ministry of Foreign Relations (MRE), for example, 
strongly rejects the notion that REDD+ should provide carbon credits to be sold at an 
international level. This rejection stems from the view that REDD+ offset alleviates the 
emission reductions commitments of rich countries while augmenting Brazil’s obligations 
to reduce carbon emissions from deforestation. More specifically, the federal government 
fears that the legal obligations from carbon offsets will constrain its freedom in pursuing 
national political interests (e.g. building a hydroelectric dam or opening an iron ore mine) 
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As such, the federal government denounces carbon offsets in an effort to maintain 
national sovereignty, which is a concern that resonates the impact of the military regime 
between 1964 and 1985 (see Hecht & Cockburn, 1990). 
These sovereignty concerns are reflected in Brazil’s non-participation in the UN-REDD+ 
Programme, the refrainment from acknowledging carbon offsets in the draft of the 
national REDD+ strategy, and the repeated statements from Brazilian diplomats in the 
context of the UNFCCC negotiations (Carvalho, 2012; GCP, 2008). In similar respect, the 
Amazon Fund issues certificates to donor countries that ambiguously states an “equivalent 
value in CO2 tons” in reference to the donated value in dollars, the amount of which is 
transferred to Brazil in recognition of the efforts already undertaken in reducing 
deforestation rather than obligating future reductions. Moreover, by way of consolidating 
the governmental control over REDD+ activities, the two advisory committees of BNDES 
in charge of the Amazon Fund are both dominated by governmental organizations with 
only a minor participation of members from the Brazilian academia and civil society. 
These observations suggest that sovereignty concerns of the Brazilian government (most 
notably MRE) have compelled the consideration of a sustainable development discourse 
for REDD+ by denying the possibility of a market for carbon offsets.
Practical dimension
The materialization of the conceptual and strategic elements of the sustainable 
development discourse into concrete REDD+ practices is perhaps best illustrated by 
tracing the allocation of financial resources of the Amazon Fund. The Guidelines and 
Criteria for Allocation of Resources of the Amazon Fund, elaborated by the Amazon Fund 
Guidance Committee (COFA), states that all Amazon Fund projects must “directly or 
indirectly contribute towards REDD+” (point B7) and “demonstrate a clear coherence with 
PPCDAm” (point B3), among thirteen other criteria. These criteria indicate that REDD+ 
practices occur along the lines of wider sustainable development policies as represented 
in PPCDAm, which involves the three pillars of land regularization, monitoring and control, 
and promotion of sustainable activities. In addition, it is important to mention that none 
of the fifteen criteria state a requirement for demonstrating substantial results in terms of 
emission reductions. Instead, according to a researcher on REDD+ implementation at the 
project level, performance in emission reductions has been downplayed in favour of 
other distribution criteria: 
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“It is not the data of avoided emissions that allowed [projects] to apply for money. It was the 
technical expertise that went into the readiness that made their financial partners see that 
‘oh, these guys are really serious’. They have publications. They have all this expertise.”
 – Researcher REDD+ implementation –
This expertise translates into an ability to provide, for example, transparency into the 
project activities (point B11), which demands a basic level of organizational performance. 
These observations indicate not only the kind of projects, but also the kind of organizations 
that pertains to the sustainable development discourse of REDD+ implementation in 
Brazil, namely, professional organizations involved in a variety of activities corresponding 
with national sustainable development and deforestation policies.
Two projects currently supported by the Amazon Fund illustrate the points raised above. 
The project Sementes do Portal of the Ouro Verde Institute is dedicated to establishing a 
local exchange platform for alternative agricultural products. Its activities involve 
supporting small farmers to compete with large landholders through the introduction of 
local markets for the sustainable agricultural production of forest products (e.g. cajú, 
manioc, corn, cupuaçu, nuts, etc.). By providing small farmers with organizational advice 
and financial resources for buying seeds, the Ouro Verde Institute empowers them and 
augments their competitiveness. Alternatively, according to an anthropologist interviewed 
for this research, another project in the region of Alta Floresta involves a contribution to 
the governmental enforcement capacity by supporting local farmers on the condition of 
compliance to environmental legislation and registration in national register. Especially 
the latter condition serves to regularize property rights for all economic actors in the 
Amazon region, which makes a profound contribution to monitoring and control activities 
by governmental organizations (see BNDES, 2012). While these two projects may 
contribute to forest restoration and the capture of CO2, the mitigation of greenhouse 
emissions by reducing deforestation on a large scale is distant from the core activities of 
promoted by these projects. 
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2.5.   Competition, coexistence and collaboration between 
REDD+ discourses
The observations in the previous section indicate the presence of two distinct discourses 
that materialize in rather different sets of strategies and practices. On the one hand, we 
identify a carbon commodification discourse that departs from a neoliberal conservation 
perspective on the problem of deforestation as the motivation for the commodification 
of avoided carbon emissions. This commodification underpins the argument that markets, 
which connect supply and demand of carbon credits or U-REDD+, constitute the most 
efficient solution for this problem. REDD+ implementation strategies and practices 
inspired by this discourse actively contribute to the construction such markets. On the 
other hand, we observe a sustainable development discourse that emphasizes the 
region’s lack of access to technology as well as poverty as the main driver of deforestation. 
Advocates of this discourse posit REDD+ as financial support for national sustainable 
development policies that aim for similar objectives. As such, REDD+ becomes a financial 
mechanism that integrates and coordinates existing environmental and development 
policies in which the reduction of emissions from deforestation is a side effect rather than 
the central objective. Table 1 enumerates these findings.
Given the distance between the two discourses and related strategies and practices, it is 
not surprising that there has been some conflicts for dominance between the groups of 
actors on the different sides of the debate. Apart from obvious differences between 
corporate initiatives (i.e. carbon trading) and projects in the Amazon Fund, these conflicts 
are particularly evident within the ongoing development of the National REDD+ strategy, 
where the federal government largely excluded the participation of the private sector and 
the states while inscribing the sustainable development discourse. At the same time, the 
many side events during the COP20 in Lima organized by the Amazonian states and 
carbon traders, on the one hand, as well as the agreement of Acre state directly with the 
German Development Bank, on the other hand, suggest that private and governmental 
organizations at various levels independently promote their respective discourse while 
debunking the other. 
In the context of these discursive conflicts, the sustainable development discourse 
currently appears to hold a quite dominant position not only in the number of stakeholders 
and the volume of financial resources linked to activities in the Amazon Fund (see Gebara 
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et al., 2014), but mainly through the interest it engenders within the international 
negotiations. At international level, mostly due to the protagonist of Brazil at the UNFCCC, 
a framework has been approved at the CO19 in Warsaw that contains close resemblances 
to the Amazon Fund governance structure. In particular, while the Warsaw Framework 
leaves the possibility for the future development of a market approach for REDD+ as part 
of the Ad Hoc Durban Platform (to be concluded at the COP21 in Paris in 2015), UNFCCC’s 
REDD+ will be, at least until 2020, a result-based non-market mechanism that depends 
mainly on donations to the Green Climate Fund. Most importantly, in accordance to the 
sustainable development strategy outlined above, paragraph 16 of the decision 9/CP19 
notes that “the insertion of results on the information hub does not create any rights or 
obligations for any party or other entity”, thereby emphasizing the non-binding character 
of REDD+ and empowering the sustainable development discourse in Brazilian REDD+ 
implementation. 
Table 1   Central features of parallel REDD+ implementation discourses (see section 2.4).
Carbon commodification 
discourse
Sustainable development 
discourse
Conceptual dimension · REDD+ as the production of 
carbon credits 
· Emphasis on climate change
· REDD+ as inducer of 
sustainable development
· Emphasis on socioeconomic 
drivers of deforestation
Strategic dimension · Carbon market as the most 
efficient option for achieving 
emissions reductions
· Non-carbon elements generally 
downplayed
· Government as the best option 
for inducing development
· Strong concern for national 
sovereignty protection
· Consolidation of existing 
policies
Practical dimension · Mediation between supply and 
demand on carbon market
· Projects constituted through 
Project Design Documents
· Commodification of emissions 
reduction as well as carbon sinks
· Selection of projects based on 
aligned with policy objectives
· Regularization of property right 
system
· Monitoring and control
· Promotion of sustainable 
production activities
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On the other hand, however, the carbon commodification discourse cannot be regarded 
as a failure just yet. The country successfully obtained the certification of ten Verified 
Carbon Standard (VCS), two Natural Forest Standards (NFS), and nine Climate, Community & 
Biodiversity Standards (CCB) REDD+ projects, which together have the potential to avoid 
tens of millions tons CO2 (more than any other country) that can be sold as carbon credits 
in voluntary markets2. While not all credits have been sold, private companies in Brazil and 
abroad have already spent considerable resources in acquiring carbon offsets as part of 
their social responsibility initiatives and green marketing campaigns. According to Forest 
Trends, carbon offset transactions in voluntary markets reached 192 million dollars in 2013 
with more than 80% of these credits from REDD+ projects mostly based in Latin America. 
In the same line, the recent acquisition of 40 million USD from the state of Acre in emission 
reductions by the German Development Bank announced during the COP20 in Lima 
also brought some hopes for the REDD+ carbon commodification discourse3. These 
announcements offer a hopeful prospect for those actors who, since the mid-2000s, 
strived to develop a global carbon offset market in order to channel substantial resources 
into forest protection.
Despite the conflicts, these two discourses largely co-exist independently and even 
reinforce each other’s agenda. In broad terms, both discourses seek to reduce deforestation 
and corresponding carbon emissions for which they seek the necessary financial resources. 
On the one hand, the Amazon Fund and the Warsaw Framework for REDD+ rely mostly 
on the channeling of official development assistance (ODA) from developed countries. 
In this way, rich countries are able to comply with an agreement signed in 1970 that asks 
them to donate 0.7% of their gross national income4, by which they also seek to satisfy 
voters at home by contributing to the mitigation of climate change (Hermansen & 
Kasa, 2014). On the other hand, the carbon commodification REDD+ projects tend to rely 
mostly on the acquisition of carbon credits from private companies, which select projects 
based not only on the price of the CO2, but also has benefits for company image and 
product branding as a result of buying credits from that specific region (i.e. indigenous 
community, biodiversity hotspot). With their strong concern for the financial elements of 
REDD+, these seemingly differing discourses share a common denominator in seeking 
2  http://www.vcsprojectdatabase.org, http://www.climate-standards.org and http://www.naturalforeststandard.
com/projects/project-index-2/  accessed on 30/05/2014
3  http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/dynamic/article.page.php?page_id=10654 accessed on 30/05/2014
4  http://www.un-documents.net/a25r2626.htm accessed on 30/05/2014
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financial compensation (either through commodification or sustainable development) 
for practices that have a tangible impact on the social, political and economic reality of 
deforestation in the Amazon region. 
It should be emphasized that this common objective is only partially related to the 
compromise reached in 2010 during the COP16 in Cancun on avoiding an increase in 
global temperature above 1.5 or 2.0 °C (Art. 4, Decision 1/CP.16). In the Copenhagen 
Accords, signed in the aftermath of the troublesome COP15, Brazil made the commitment 
to reduce its greenhouse emissions by 36.1 to 38.9% in relation to its projected emissions 
by 2020. In order to achieve this, the Brazilian government has included the reduction 
of deforestation in both the Amazon and the Cerrado biomes as its most important 
nationally appropriated mitigation action (NAMA), which would avoid the emission of 668 
million tons of CO2 equivalent. However, Brazilian negotiators have repeatedly highlighted 
that, in accordance with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, 
developed countries should achieve the largest emission reductions, giving a secondary 
role to REDD+ and other initiatives from developing countries. For this reason, the Brazilian 
government generally refrains from acknowledging REDD+ as (one of) the leading instrument 
for international climate change mitigation efforts. As governmental organizations dominate 
the more widely advocated sustainable development discourse, Brazil leaves largely out 
of sight the overall contribution of these reductions resulting from REDD+ to the mitigation 
of climate change at the global level, and instead focuses more explicitly on acquiring 
financial compensation for reducing deforestation.
2.6.  Conclusions
The observations in this paper strongly indicate that REDD+ implementation is a 
heterogeneous process that is corresponding to the observations by Brockhaus et al. 
(2014) and Kanowski et al. (2011) and depends strongly on the historical context and 
the pre-existing discourses to which stakeholders adhere. These pre-existing discourses, 
in the case of Brazil, entail the predominant governmental concerns of regional development 
and sovereignty protection that presuppose the sustainable development discourse, 
as well as notions of neoliberal conservation that sustain the carbon commodification 
discourse. It is clear from the previous section that both discourses contain a wide 
elaboration of its conceptual, strategic and practical REDD+ elements that are most likely to 
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perpetuate discursive conflicts for the foreseeable future. As such, the need for an alignment 
or convergence of stakeholder interests as a prerequisite of REDD+ implementation, 
indicated by Skutsch and Van Laake (2008) and  Thompson et al. (2011) among others, 
may not be always valid. Therefore, corresponding to McDermott et al. (2012), instead of 
waiting to resolve the conceptual issues of REDD+ at the international level, the case of 
Brazil shows that, at a national and subnational level, discourses already materialize in 
partially conflicting strategies and practices that nonetheless coexist alongside each other.
While it is difficult to judge whether this parallel REDD+ implementation is plausible in the 
long run, we warn for a possible collapse of the REDD+ identity. This collapse, firstly, 
will lead to conceptual and organizational polarization of REDD+ stakeholders, which we 
already observed in the case of Brazil. In this context, the identity of REDD+ will not be 
represented by its features since these features vary considerably among implementation 
practices. REDD+ could instead only be characterized by the central objective that 
inspired the acronym: climate change mitigation by reducing emissions from deforestation 
and forest degradation. However, attaining this objective may complicate implementation 
processes as a consequence of a collapsing identity. As REDD+ constitutes a variety of 
conceptualizations, it will remain unclear who will be responsible for deforestation efforts, 
who should finance these efforts and who should reap the benefits. Although it has been 
argued that alignment of stakeholder interests is hardly viable nor completely necessary, 
the organization of implementation practices in a nested approach would certainly 
benefit both REDD+ in particular, as well as deforestation reduction efforts in general. 
In this respect, the coherent advocates of the sustainable development discourse 
would reflect this requirement better than the disconnected advocates of the carbon 
commodification discourse. While this approach is plausible for the internal development 
of discourses, however, the substantial differences and the polarization between both 
discourses so far have prevented the emergence of coordinated efforts.
This article barely touched upon the ramifications of parallel REDD+ discourses and, more 
importantly, their implementation practices, and is therefore only a preliminary inquiry 
into Brazilian REDD+ implementation. At the same time, however, it indicates a need for a 
renewed research focus in order to improve efforts to reduce deforestation and coherent 
carbon emissions. The heterogeneous character of REDD+ demands an abandonment 
of a focus on the discursive competition for dominance, and a focus instead on the 
coexistence of distinct discourses and practices, the dialectical interactions between 
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them, and the problems that may arise in the process. More specifically, research efforts 
should focus on the potential integration of implementation practices deriving from 
distinct discourses, rather than on convergence of stakeholder interests. Such an approach 
could direct attention away from the fruitless attempts to establish a single REDD+ 
identity towards a more promising coexistence of REDD+ implementation practices at the 
international, national and subnational levels.
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Clashing interpretations of REDD+  
'results' in the Amazon Fund
As the political landscape for REDD+ in Brazil contains a dominant sustainable development discourse 
and a persisting carbon conservation discourse, it is necessary to further explore these skewed power 
relations. The discussion in the introductory chapter suggests that the persistence of the latter 
discourse finds much support within economic rationales. In general, market instruments build on 
extensive economic theories (Baveye et al., 2013; Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2010), are supported by 
economists who emphasize their cost-effectiveness (Lane, 2012) and have been a popular policy 
instrument for environmental governance, even in Brazil (Filoche, 2017). Conversely, these considerations 
do not account for the dominance of the sustainable development discourse. The findings in chapter 2 
already suggest that the sovereignty concerns of federal government organizations have played an 
important role in thwarting an offset-based approach to REDD+, but this factor by itself does not 
explain why these organizations have endorsed the characteristics and agreements that make up 
the Amazon Fund. In order to answer these questions, the present chapter focuses the analysis on 
the sustainable development discourse and explores the political foundations for the Amazon Fund. 
As donations to the Amazon Fund build on bilateral agreements with donor countries, it is useful to 
analyze the rationales behind these agreements and their impact on the organization of financial 
transactions. 
This chapter is published in Climatic Change:
Van der Hoff, R., Rajão, R. & Leroy, P. (2018). Clashing interpretations of REDD+ ‘results’ in the Amazon 
Fund. Climatic Change, 150(3), 433-445. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2288-x
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3.1.  Introduction
One of the challenges of international and national forest governance involves the 
establishment of financial instruments that contribute to the attainment of results. Over 
the last decade, the concept of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation (REDD+) partially abandoned an initial strong emphasis on market 
instruments for offsetting carbon emissions in favour of a result-based funding (RBF) 
approach that financially rewards historical emission reductions (Carvalho, 2012; Van der 
Hoff, Rajão, Leroy, & Boezeman, 2015). Even though international agreements, including 
the Warsaw Framework for REDD+ in 2013 (see decision 13/CP.19) and the Paris Agreement 
in 2015 (i.e. art. 6), might still allow REDD+ offsets, there are many uncertainties about its 
viability (Streck, Howard, & Rajão, 2017; Voigt & Ferreira, 2015). Furthermore, the substantial 
bilateral investments made by Norway and Germany as well as the approval in October 
2017 of USD 500 million from the Green Climate Fund (GCF) for REDD+ further consolidate 
this approach (Den Besten et al., 2014; Turnhout et al., 2016; Voigt & Ferreira, 2015). Although 
the use of RBF as a financial instrument for policy-making is already extensively applied 
and evaluated (Broom, 1995; Eldridge & Palmer, 2009; Oxman & Fretheim, 2008), its 
development and application in the context of REDD+ is only emerging in international 
and national forest governance (Brockhaus, Korhonen-Kurki, Sehring, & Di Gregorio, 2015; 
Norman & Nakhooda, 2014). In this context, the Brazilian Amazon Fund is currently one of 
the largest and most experienced RBF instruments worldwide, with over a decade of 
operational activity, up to USD 2 billion in donation pledges, and an approved disbursement 
of over USD 707 million for the support of 100 projects (BNDES, 2018). At the same time, 
scholars are slowly beginning to observe the emergence of critiques on the Amazon 
Fund’s effectiveness with respect to reducing deforestation (Angelsen, 2017; Hermansen, 
McNeill, Kasa, & Rajão, 2017). 
This paper aims to contribute to understanding the challenges and conflicts involved in 
the construction of RBF instruments by juxtaposing the discourses of both investor and 
recipient countries related to the Amazon Fund. More specifically, it focuses on diverging 
interpretations of what could count as ‘results’ that form the basis for financial transactions 
and effectiveness evaluations of the Amazon Fund. As managerial approaches for 
environmental governance become increasingly commonplace, an analysis of the political 
conflicts involved is a useful step towards enhancing the legitimacy of financial instruments 
for addressing climate change. Section 3.2 opens with a discussion of the available 
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literature with respect to the deployment of RBF instruments both in general and in 
relation to REDD+, after which section 3.3 elaborates the methodological approach of this 
paper. The subsequent sections describe the discourses of both recipient and donor 
countries with respect to their adherence to the Amazon Fund (section 3.4) as well as 
the internal contradictions that emerge in recent years (section 3.5). The paper concludes 
with some considerations for understanding RBF instruments.
3.2.  Results-based funding and REDD+ 
Much literature has discussed the relevance of RBF in education and healthcare policies 
(Broom, 1995; Low-Beer et al., 2007; Meessen, Soucat, & Sekabaraga, 2011) as well as 
environmental governance (e.g. Angelsen, 2017; Norman & Nakhooda, 2014). This literature 
has produced a very diverse terminology, including ‘results-based funding’, ‘payments- 
for-performance’ (P4P), ‘performance-based aid’ and many others (Angelsen, 2017; 
Eldridge & Palmer, 2009; Müller, Fankhauser, & Forstater, 2013; Oxman & Fretheim, 2008). 
Eichler (2006, p. 5) defines RBF more generically as the “transfer of money or material 
goods conditional upon taking a measurable action or achieving a predetermined 
performance target”. This definition denotes that payments are conditional on the 
demonstration of results through quantitative performance indicators (Müller et al., 2013; 
Turnhout, Neves, & Lijster, 2014). Moreover, it reflects the argument that RBF directly 
addresses the ‘principal-agent problem’ in which one actor (i.e. ‘principal’) seeks 
behavioural change or provision of specific services from another actor (i.e. ‘agent’) 
(Eichler, 2006; Eldridge & Palmer, 2009). These characteristics evoke optimism among 
some scholars about “the potential of performance-based financing to reform” (Meessen 
et al., 2011, p. 153). As such, RBF is reminiscent of ideas related to New Public Management 
(NPM), which emphasizes a managerial approach to addressing policy issues and 
represents public administrations that are efficient, ‘lean and purposeful’, in contrast to 
public administrations that advocate orderliness as in bureaucracies (Gruening, 2001). 
Another strand of literature has adopted a more critical stance towards the potential of 
RBF. Although RBF did improve the uptake of preventive health services in low income 
countries, for example, Oxman and Fretheim (2009) expressed their concerns about the 
long-term sustainability of desired effects (e.g. contracting out), the occurrence of 
undesirable effects like cherry-picking (e.g. excluding care for ‘difficult’ patients) and 
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unintended behaviours (perpetuating child malnourishment to retain benefits), and 
general effectiveness in addressing complex and broad problems. In addition, Eldridge 
and Palmer (2009, p. 163) observed that, for some health models, “there was variation in 
whether payment was made for outcomes or for process indicators” and warned that 
confusing performance indicators like immunization rates as targets may actually yield 
adverse effects on effectivity. Furthermore, similar critiques have appeared in NPM 
literature, particularly with respect to its paradigmatic nature. Hood and Peters (2004, 
p. 271), for example, identified the unintended effect of “goal displacement” where 
performance indicators “remained largely processual and compliance-oriented, in spite of 
the all-pervasive rhetoric of [results-oriented approaches]” (see also Lynn, 1998). These 
observations suggest that many problems of RBF emanate from a lack of clear definitions 
and, consequently, a susceptibility to diverging interpretations.
The issues of unclear definitions and discursive diversity has also affected national and 
international REDD+ debates (Den Besten et al., 2014; Hiraldo & Tanner, 2011; Somorin et al., 
2012; Van der Hoff et al., 2015). Some scholars have already identified that REDD+ 
implementation does not necessarily require stakeholder alignment or discursive 
dominance, as much literature would suggest, but may involve a parallel materialization 
of distinct discourses (Turnhout et al., 2016; Van der Hoff et al., 2015). Still, this materializa-
tion implies an alignment of stakeholder interests between donor and recipient countries 
in order to solve the aforementioned principal-agent problem. This alignment involves 
the balancing of appropriate compensation (i.e. recipient risks), performance expectations 
(i.e. investor risks) and ownership of the results obtained (i.e. host vs donor country) (Müller 
et al., 2013; Zadek, Forstater, & Polacow, 2010). In this respect, the establishment of the 
Amazon Fund in 2008 built on a desire of the Brazilian government to receive non-offset-
based compensation for past deforestation reductions (Carvalho, 2012) that coincided 
with the decision of the Norwegian government to increase its international climate 
mitigation efforts and thus becoming a leading player at the climate negotiations 
(Hermansen, 2015; Hermansen et al., 2017). Some scholars, however, subject the RBF 
structure of the Amazon Fund to critical scrutiny. Angelsen (2017, p. 258), for example, 
questions whether the ex-post agreements of the Amazon Fund are “results-based in 
practice because the marginal incentives [for further deforestation reductions] are not in 
place”. Other scholars argued that stakeholder interests may not be fully aligned yet, but 
the conflicts and contradictions are internally negotiated with relevant stakeholders rather 
than publicly criticized in the media (Hermansen et al., 2017). 
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The ongoing debate in the literature suggests that a closer look at clashing interpretations 
of results between donor and recipient organizations may be useful for understanding 
potential challenges of RBF operations. We define discourses as “ensembles of ideas, 
concepts and categories through which meaning is given to social and physical 
phenomena, and which are produced and reproduced through an identifiable set of 
practices” (Hajer & Versteeg, 2005, p. 175). In an earlier article that applies this definition, we 
already identify the Amazon Fund as the central REDD+ institution of a ‘sustainable 
development discourse’ of REDD+ in Brazil (Van der Hoff et al., 2015). Extending this 
argumentation, we argue that Brazilian organizations are not the only stakeholders that 
actively produce and reproduce this discourse through the practices of the Amazon Fund, 
since donor countries have made equal contributions to its materialization (Angelsen, 
2017; Hermansen, 2015). As such, this research paper contributes to the literature above 
by describing the interpretations of recipient and donor countries with respect to RBF, 
especially emphasizing their understanding of ‘results’ or ‘performance’ upon which 
funding is based. Moreover, such analysis aims to understand the processes of stakeholder 
alignment in the bilateral agreements of the Amazon Fund and the discursive tensions 
that arise from them.
3.3.  Research methodology
The primary data of this research paper entails thirteen semi-structured interviews 
conducted by the first and second author between 2012 and 2017. The criteria for interview 
selection include the representativeness of either recipient or donor country as well as 
close involvement in discussions on the development of the Amazon Fund. Interviewees 
related to the donor countries (i.e. Norway and Germany) include officials of Norway’s 
International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI), the Norwegian embassy in Brazil, 
the German Development Bank (KfW) and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). Officials of the recipient country (i.e. Brazil) include the Brazilian 
Development Bank (BNDES), the Steering Committee (COFA) and Technical Committee 
(CTFA) of the Amazon Fund, as well as the Brazilian Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MRE) and 
Finance (MF). These interviews were supplemented with auxiliary expert interviews with 
observing scholars and NGOs. The interviews were recorded, transcribed and analyzed 
using simple coding methods that initially emphasized the distinct financial transaction 
processes that, after analysis, were regrouped to reflect the interviewees’ concerns related 
75
CLASHING INTERPRETATIONS OF REDD+ ‘RESULTS’
to contract criteria, disbursement strategy and emerging contradictions. This research 
paper also relies on secondary data that support the statements from the interview 
analysis, including relevant legislative documents, the donation agreement, the Amazon 
Fund project document, the minutes of COFA meetings, annual reports and website 
information (www.amazonfund.gov.br). Secondly, the empirical data was enriched and 
cross-checked with observations related to operations of the Amazon Fund, including 
onsite visits to Amazon Fund projects in the state of Mato Grosso, informal conversations 
with governmental officials, participation in a roundtable on the GIZ evaluation, and 
participation in meetings between recipient and donor countries. Finally, we circulated 
earlier versions of this article to key informants in order to check for inconsistencies of our 
findings and interpretations.
3.4.   Brazil: result-based funding as a reward and support 
to national policies
Prior to the inception of the Amazon Fund in 2008, governmental organizations in Brazil 
were not favorable towards international forest governance debates, and particularly 
opposed the possibility of including forests in offset-based mechanisms like the original 
REDD+ concept (Carvalho, 2012). In the first half of the 2000s, a change in administration 
engendered favorable circumstances for the reconsideration of this opposition. The idea 
of receiving financial compensation for deforestation reductions strongly appealed to 
governmental organizations in Brazil, but particularly MRE argued that these payments 
should not engender future obligations nor offset domestic emissions of donor countries. 
The sharp reductions in deforestation that took place between 2004 and 2012 have been 
one of the main leverage points for a strong Brazilian position in the international climate 
negotiations. In this context, the original idea of ‘Compensated Reduction of Deforestation’ 
developed into a REDD+ approach that revolved around a ‘sustainable development 
discourse’ (see Van der Hoff et al., 2015), which in 2008 operationalized the international 
financial support for domestic forest policy instruments with the establishment of the 
Amazon Fund (see decree 6.527/2008). An NGO representative observed that “countries 
like Brazil (…) do not admit something mandatory, or something a little bit more 
commitment, [but] always voluntary [in part due to] a history of sovereignty [concerns]”. 
As such, Brazil developed an understanding of RBF as reward for reducing deforestation 
already achieved rather than a contractual commitment to provide further reductions. 
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This understanding of RBF resonates in the rules establishing the Amazon Fund and 
related bilateral agreements with Norway. Firstly, the Amazon Fund performs an annual 
monetary valuation of emission reductions (i.e. USD5/tCO2) based on the difference 
between the actual deforestation rate and a 10-year historical average (i.e. baseline) that 
changes every 5 years, which reflects the fundraising limit (BNDES, 2018). Moreover, the 
minutes of the 16th COFA meeting (December 2014) indicated that MMA interpreted these 
annual calculations of the fundraising limit as cumulative, suggesting that the results 
between 2008 and 2016 allowed the Amazon Fund to receive a total amount of USD 21 
billion according to CTFA calculations. Secondly, the Memorandum of Understanding as 
well as the donation agreements between Brazil and Norway repetitively employed the 
words ‘donation’ and ‘contribution’ for defining the nature of payment. This implies that 
the transfers of financial resources were permanent and do not require restitution in case 
of a reversal in deforestation trends. Finally, the decree establishing the Amazon Fund 
explicitly stated that the diplomas, which validate the payments and their correspondent 
emission reductions, “are nominal, non-transferable, and do not generate rights or credits 
of any kind” (decree 6.527/2008, art. 2-2). This underscores the abstinence from offset-based 
transactions while still formally indicating the emission reductions for which donor 
countries make their contributions.
The sovereignty concerns of Brazil can also be found in the structure of the Amazon Fund, 
albeit with some concessions. The nomination of the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), 
rather than the World Bank, as managing organization for the Amazon Fund stemmed 
from Brazilian demands for sovereign autonomy over the financial resources and 
institutional capacity for managing projects (Hermansen et al., 2017). At the same time, 
Brazilian legislation limits the use of donated financial resources to “preventing, monitoring 
and combating deforestation and promoting the conservation and sustainable use of the 
Amazon biome” (decree 6.527/2008, art. 1). While offset-based REDD+ projects would 
involve contractual emission reduction targets in relation to business-as-usual emission 
projections (Rajão & Marcolino, 2016), project approval is based on their support to 
national policies for attaining (sub)national emission reduction targets. The Amazon 
Fund Guidelines and Criteria for Resource Allocation determine that projects need to 
demonstrate, for example, “coherence with the national and state Action Plans for the 
Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon – PPCDAM – (B5), which is 
an operational plan that aims to enhance monitoring and control, promote sustainable 
production activities and improve land title regulation. PPCDAm contributes to the 
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attainment of Brazil’s nationally determined contribution (NDC), which proposed to 
“reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 37% below 2005 levels in 2025”. These observations 
indicate that the Amazon Fund is embedded within a broader political structure that aims 
to reduce emissions. According to a Brazilian diplomat, “one of the reasons that REDD+ 
cannot be offset is because calculating how much of the emission reduction is the result 
of national policies and how much is not, is something impossible and incomparable”. 
Understanding the performance of the Amazon Fund in terms of its contribution to 
national policies for reducing carbon emissions has an important role in ensuring 
autonomy of resource allocation. The breadth of the actions covered by PPCDAM allows 
projects substantial flexibility to conform to the eligibility criteria of the Amazon Fund 
without necessarily proving how specific projects may induce deforestation and emission 
reductions. For instance, COFA decided in April 2014 (15th meeting) that the fund should 
give priority to ‘structuring’ projects, which in practice involved a particular focus on 
implementing the Rural Environmental Registry (CAR). CAR is an instrument of the new 
Forest Code that enhances landowner visibility, and thereby enforcement capacity, by 
providing land use information of all private properties across Brazil. As a consequence, 
around 60% of financial resources of the fund have been allocated to CAR projects (18th 
COFA meeting, August 2015). Concurrently, some studies have demonstrated that before 
2015 CAR has not been systematically used for law enforcement and has not led to 
deforestation reductions (Azevedo et al., 2014; Rajão, Azevedo, & Stabile, 2012). Therefore, 
the ongoing support for the implementation of CAR stemmed from a “faith that it is going 
to function” in the future and not by proven results, as noted by a member from COFA. 
These observations suggest that project performance indicators reflect their contribution 
to national forest policies (e.g. number of CAR registries) rather than achieved emission 
reductions or obligations to do so. 
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3.5.   Donor countries: results-based funding for future 
climate mitigation
Norway and Germany, represented by NICFI and by KfW and GIZ, respectively, share a 
common interest in donating to the Amazon Fund for a number of reasons. Firstly, these 
organizations have a long history in development aid that is continued with their 
involvement in the Amazon Fund. During the 1990s and early 2000s, Germany led a group 
of countries that supported the Pilot Programme for the Conservation of Brazilian 
Rainforests (PPG7). As PPG7 came to a close, Germany saw in the Amazon Fund the 
opportunity to continue and scale up their support to forest conservation initiatives. In 
this regard, a GIZ official argued that “now it was time […] to really have a policy active in 
the whole of the Amazon, no longer by means of a pilot programme”. In Norway, 
development aid was given a boost after socioenvironmental NGOs successfully placed 
forests on the political agenda, particularly emphasizing the cost-effectiveness of investing 
in deforestation reduction in tropical countries rather than domestic action as an 
important factor (Hermansen, 2015). A few years later, a press release by the Norwegian 
Ministry of Climate and Environment (2015) quoted the statement by minister Sundtoft 
that “extending the [NICFI] initiative is the best contribution Norway can provide to a 
good agreement [during COP21] in Paris”. While the donations to the Amazon Fund 
cannot involve formal offsets due to Brazil’s resistance and have no link to the country’s 
NDC, some scholars have argued that the support from Norway, while formally still 
development aid, denotes a ‘political offset’ for domestic emissions (Angelsen, 2017; 
Hermansen et al., 2017). As such, the donations of financial resources to the Amazon Fund 
are aimed at incentivizing future emission reductions from deforestation and forest 
degradation, thereby representing a contribution to tackling climate change. 
While the donors saw the Amazon Fund as part of their climate mitigation strategy, they 
also understood and abided to rules of the fund and the related Brazilian understanding 
of RBF. Donors recognized that the payments are made in reference to emission reductions 
from deforestation already achieved by Brazil in the past and accepted that Brazil is not 
obliged to demonstrate how Amazon Fund projects contribute to additional reductions. 
A KfW official asserted that “it was not imposed on [BNDES] to deliver these numbers, 
because (…) what [KfW] pays for was already obtained”. Instead, donor countries acknowledged 
and rewarded the historical achievements of Brazil as reflected in the calculations of the 
fundraising limit (see section 3.4). An official of the Norwegian embassy explained that:
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“It is very hard to prove in a scientific way that this partnership has produced those results, 
but that is not the point. The point is that the results are coming in and Norway wants to 
support those results by recognizing results-based efforts and contributing with financial 
support to Brazil. And we believe that Brazil will continue to reduce deforestation, and that 
is the main basis of the desire to want to continue the partnership.”
At the same time, donor countries still assured their contribution to incentivizing further 
emission reductions as the allocation of financial resources by BNDES is conditional upon 
reinvestment in projects that contribute to further achievements (see section 3.4). In this 
respect, as a NICFI official illustrated, the ‘hands-off’ approach to their contract with BNDES 
stemmed from a confidence that BNDES “cannot spend it on the army [or] build a public 
park in Rio de Janeiro”.
Donor countries also agreed with Brazil on the importance of ‘structuring’ projects that 
add to ongoing governmental policies, rather than isolated initiatives. An official of the 
Norwegian embassy, for example, argued that “you cannot [reduce deforestation] with 
projects [alone], the government needs to change its policy and incentive structures”. 
Extending this argument, a GIZ official claimed that “the Amazon Fund is a very important 
instrument for (…) consolidating Brazilian environmental policies”. In addition, this GIZ 
official added that, from a perspective of providing technical support, “Brazil is an anchor 
country [since] they already have the knowledge and economic power that allows for 
bilateral technical cooperation with Germany”. As such, donor organizations highly valued 
the competence of BNDES as assurance that the financial resources will be adequately 
employed for achieving further deforestation reductions. A KfW official concluded that 
donating to the Amazon Fund is “kind of a safe bet, because there was diminished 
deforestation and (…) the method of calculation was conservative”. Moreover, donor 
countries intended to provide financial support for institutional changes that adequately 
address deforestation. In this respect, for example, NICFI officials have reaffirmed that “CAR 
is an important instrument for supporting public policy in Brazil and supporting one of 
the most important tools they have for reducing deforestation, which is monitoring and 
control”. These intensions made it acceptable for donor organizations to evaluate the 
performance of the Amazon Fund on the basis of their support to national policy 
implementation rather than performance indicators that reflect project-level emission 
reductions (e.g. Anache, Toni, Maia, & Queiroz, 2016).
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3.6.   Clashing conceptualizations of result-based funding
Although the interpretations of Brazilian and donor organizations agreed on many 
features of the Amazon Fund, there were some indications of diverging views between 
the two sides. Initial clashing conceptualizations arose with respect to spending the 
financial resources from donations. Donor organizations complained that by December 
2012 the fund had only approved 36 projects and disbursed USD 55 million, less than half 
of the amount donated (see figure 3). Part of the reason involved the demanding 
guidelines and criteria for the approval of project proposals, for which BNDES requires the 
availability of financial resources for the entire project lifespan. In addition, NICFI was still 
following transfer procedures that demanded “an immediate, demonstrated and planned 
need” for financial resources from BNDES. Consequently, donor countries transferred USD 
116 million in only five donations (BNDES, 2018), after which they started pressing BNDES 
to accelerate the very project approval procedures that they appreciated as sign of 
competence. The issue was resolved by efforts on both sides. As the number of project 
proposals to the Amazon Fund grew in subsequent years, donor countries were able to 
make up for the delay and transferred USD 654 million in 2013 (see figure 3). At the same 
time, NICFI operationalized changes in transfer procedures for all projects (not just 
Brazilian) in 2013 that liberated payments upon demonstration of emission reductions, 
which were now in line with “annualized” budget approval procedures.
It was following the establishment of this new procedure to transfer annual payments 
based on results rather than needs that revealed the existence of clashing interpretations 
of the temporal aspect of results in the Amazon Fund. As mentioned above, the Amazon 
Fund accumulated the monetary values of annual results since 2006. However, both 
donor countries signaled that they are unwilling to make financial payments based on 
achievements too far in the past, especially if deforestation rates continue to rise. A KfW 
official, for example, articulated this concern quite clearly: 
“For sure a donor would not want to pay for an achievement which is like ten years back. 
(…) The huge gains in 2004 to 2010, we would not want to pay for that. [Therefore], if you 
ask me how the Amazon Fund is doing, it is more like how they use the money they get to 
produce more results [in the future].”
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While BNDES accumulated the monetary values of annual results since 2006 (see section 3.4), 
KfW’s donation history shows that transactions made so far related to emission reductions 
from 2009 onwards. This trend was most clearly observed in the transaction patterns of 
Norway. Since 2013, its payments have been exclusively based on emission reductions 
achieved in the preceding year (BNDES, 2017; Norway, 2018). Moreover, NICFI officials have 
presented this rule as a guiding principle for its budget approval of donations to the 
Amazon Fund since the start. Only transactions from Petrobras, a national oil company 
donating to the Amazon Fund, have consistently related to results in 2006. These 
observations directly contradict the interpretation of the Brazilian government that the 
fundraising limit of the Amazon Fund is a cumulative monetary valuation of emission 
reductions of which only 10% has been received. (see section 3.4). Officials from the two 
donor countries did not question Brazil’s attempt to obtain payments based on the 
accumulated results via other sources, such as the GCF. However, the unwillingness of 
Norway and Germany to reward those results make it very unlikely that the fundraising 
limit may be met.
The clashing interpretations on the temporal aspects of results have very practical 
consequences for future donations as the calculative basis for fundraising limits (i.e. the 
difference between actual deforestation rates and the reference level) is declining. For 
instance, while the reference level for achievements from 2011 to 2015 was still built on the 
average deforestation rate between 2001 and 2010, and therefore included the substantial 
reductions of those years, the new reference level builds on the average deforestation rate 
between 2006 and 2015, thereby excluding some of these achievements. As deforestation 
rates have increased 7,464 km2 in 2009 (year of first disbursements) to an estimated 7,893 
km2 in 2016, the monetary value of deforestation reductions dropped from USD 2.5 billion 
in 2015 to USD 41 million in 2017 (BNDES, 2018). This situation suggests that donations may 
dry up over time if results continue to wane, despite the accumulation of results in 
previous years.
A second clashing conceptualization emerged with respect to the epistemological 
approach to the attainment of valid knowledge on the results of projects supported by 
the Amazon Fund. While the calculation of the fundraising limit (i.e. emission reductions) 
has not been challenged, some governmental bodies within the donor countries started 
to be concerned with the disconnect between these calculations and the basis for 
financial resource distribution (i.e. policy alignment). On the one hand, the donation 
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agreement between Brazil and Norway  in 2013 stated that the disbursements of 
contributions “shall be […] based on fulfillment of the reporting requirements” (art. VI-3), 
including the submission of “reports and documentation assessing the contribution of 
the Fund in reducing emission from deforestation and forest degradation” (art. VIII-1). On 
the other hand, donor countries did not acknowledge that this information has been 
provided. A KfW official, for example, argued that “there is not yet a monitoring process in 
place to get to the numbers of how much deforestation was avoided by these projects”. Similarly, 
a GIZ official articulated that “the Amazon Fund begins as a REDD+ [mechanism] for 
receiving resources but does not [apply] REDD+ for distribution”. These sentiments seem 
to have instigated discursive conflicts and pressure to improve the functioning of the 
Amazon Fund. Norwegian officials also articulated their concerns during a high-level 
meeting held in March 2015, where BNDES, donor organizations, officials of the Brazilian 
government, NGOs and researchers came together to discuss the “evolution, challenges 
and perspectives” of the Amazon Fund. While recognizing the autonomy of BNDES in 
managing the Fund, Norwegian and German officials demanded for the first time a 
“stronger strategy focus” and the need to “review the priorities of the Amazon Fund”. One 
5 http://www.obt.inpe.br/prodes/prodes_1988_2016n.htm
Figure 3  Donations, disbursements and deforestation rates per year 
source: BNDES, 2017; PRODES/INPE5
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senior official from Norway articulated the concern that “the problem [of evaluating 
performance] is not to be solved with […] more information at project level”, thereby 
hinting at the lack of information on aggregate contributions of the Amazon Fund to 
bringing down deforestation. 
In spite of differing interests in and approaches to evaluating the performance of the 
Amazon Fund (see section 3.5), both donor countries agree on the importance of 
improving performance indicators. The Real-Time Evaluation of NICFI in 2014, for example, 
pointed out that BNDES did not comply with a provision in the donation agreement 
(art. 8.1) that requires the bank to publish “reports and documentation assessing the 
contribution of the fund in reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation”, 
even though the same report also acknowledges that this non-compliance is “not seen 
as a major concern for either party” (LTS International, 2014, p. 224). Correspondingly, 
the Norwegian Office of the Auditor General has published a report in May 2018 that also 
pointed to the need for improved the performance evaluation of projects funded by 
NICFI (Riksrevisjonens, 2018).
The concern with evaluation has been gradually materializing in Brazil. In 2016 GIZ and 
BNDES published an evaluation report that assessed the performance of an Amazon Fund 
project in relation to its objectives, but only one of the 44 guiding questions of its 
conceptual framework addressed the extent to which “the project has contributed or may 
come to contribute directly or indirectly to the reduction of emissions from deforestation 
or forest degradation” (Anache et al., 2016, p. 71). This evaluation was followed by several 
other project evaluations conducted by GIZ and KfW, all of which addressed this question 
to some extent, thereby suggesting an increasing concern with the Amazon Fund’s 
contribution to reducing emissions. At the same time, these evaluations still admitted 
indirect contributions to emission reductions and applied mostly qualitative performance 
criteria. Finally, German officials have reported new evaluation efforts by the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (CEPAL) since 2018. It remains unclear, 
however, whether these evaluations will answer the concerns from donor countries about 
the fund’s contribution to emission reductions, especially in a context of rising deforestation 
rates. 
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3.7.  Discussion and conclusion
Our analysis shows that both recipient and donor countries have retained a general 
interpretation of the Amazon Fund as a promising and well-functioning mechanism for 
incentivizing deforestation reductions. While there has been some conflict in initial years, 
these have been quickly resolved as the Amazon Fund evolved. Concurrently, the failure 
to sustain Brazil´s downward deforestation trend after 2013 (see figure 3) revealed a 
clashing interpretation of RBF in two fundamental ways. Firstly, interpretations have 
diverged about the temporal emphasis of the results for which financial resources were 
mobilized. Brazilian officials strongly argued that all results obtained since 2006 have 
merited a financial reward as those reductions have already benefited the planet. Although 
donor countries have agreed that such results should form the basis for payments, they 
are more concerned with the attainment of future results and have therefore made 
provisions to warrant the direct effectiveness of their donations. This is best reflected in 
Norwegian budget approval and (since 2013) financial transaction procedures that are 
exclusively based on results achieved in the preceding year, which safeguard incentivizes 
for the Brazilian government to generate further results. In this respect, donor countries 
have indicated that it is increasingly unlikely that the huge results obtained by Brazil 
between 2006 and 2013 will be translated into RBF payments in the future. 
A second manifestation of clashing interpretations concerns the measurement of results 
in a valid way. For the Brazilian government is sufficient to measure the past results of 
emission reductions at biome in relation to a historical baseline, as defined by the Amazon 
Fund original agreement. In their view, the investments from Amazon Fund projects do 
not need to demonstrate the ability to provide additional reductions as long as the 
approved projects are in line with the guidelines of deforestation reduction policies. This 
view was challenged as donor countries have increasingly scrutinized the Amazon Fund 
in an attempt to substantiate the additional results generated by its supported projects. 
They found that the challenges to measuring the impact of indirect contributions to 
deforestation reductions (i.e. structural changes in the regional development model as 
well as increased institutional capacity) may be insurmountable. In addition, an emphasis 
on performance indicators that more adequately reflect additional deforestation 
reductions from Amazon Fund projects may prevent such structuring projects from 
meeting the eligibility criteria for financial support. Following Turnhout et al. (2014), an 
insistence on performance indicators that reflect the direct impact of the Amazon Fund 
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on emission reductions reflects an impoverished foundation for disbursing financial 
resources, because it risks the underappreciation of the full complexity of deforestation 
dynamics in the Amazon. RBF approaches that emphasize carbon emissions, such as the 
original REDD+ concept, have been subject to severe criticism for their misrepresentation 
of local realities in policy-making as well as knowledge production (Rajão, 2013a; Wilson, 
2013). Nevertheless, these demands for demonstrating the results of the Amazon Fund in 
scientifically rigorous manner are likely to become an important topic for donor countries. 
This is also true for the scientific community and NGOs, who have so far kept their criticisms 
largely behind closed doors (Hermansen et al., 2017). One may therefore expect that a 
return to the discussion on what ultimately constitutes good governance for addressing 
environmental issues (see Hood & Peters, 2004; Lynn, 1998).
The issues currently facing the Amazon Fund could also migrate to UNFCCC debates, 
especially on the definition on how the Green Climate Fund will operate and make RBF 
payments. A renegotiation of the basic principles of RBF, as currently expressed in the 
Warsaw Framework for REDD+, is still unlikely (Müller et al., 2013; Voigt & Ferreira, 2015), At 
the same time, “tying payment to quantified results would enable funders to take a more 
hands-off approach to determining how funds are used”, which appears to be increasingly 
conditional on the ability to demonstrate the effectiveness of RBF activities (Müller et al., 
2013, p. 4). In this context, two scenarios are more likely to occur. In the first scenario, donor 
and recipient countries may still consider bilateral agreements that build on the RBF 
model defined by the Warsaw Framework for REDD+, but include requirements for 
measuring results generated by the new investments in addition to the existing 
demonstration of past results. For instance, this could involve measuring emission 
reductions at project level without issuing or transferring offsets. In the second scenario, 
countries may slowly abandon the RBF model and invest instead in the potential new 
mechanisms that are currently under negotiation in international environmental 
governance debates. These include, most notably, the internationally transferred 
mitigation outcomes (ITMOs) under Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement. 
Notwithstanding the modality of forest finance, it has become clear that performance 
indicators continue to be a critical but controversial issue in both scientific literature and 
political debates on RBF. More specifically, an important question for scientific research is 
whether and on what grounds alternative RBF instruments containing a more direct 
relation between the project performance and their impact on central objectives, such as 
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the (contractual) emission reduction obligations that are characteristic of offset markets, 
become considered as substitutes for aid-based RBF instruments, especially when the 
latter fails to meet stakeholder expectations. The Amazon Fund must be considered as a 
unique and important experience in many ways, most notably its longstanding history, 
volume of donations and its support to numerous projects. As such, it has many lessons 
for the implementation and operationalization of RBF not only in Brazil but also in and 
between other countries that aim to undertake similar efforts. As political debates still 
struggle to find the most adequate approach to financing deforestation reduction, we 
believe that the considerations presented in this paper are a necessary first step towards 
the improvement of financial instruments for addressing climate change.
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Can REDD+ still become a market?  
Ruptured dependencies and market logics  
for emission reductions in Brazil
The clashing interpretations of results in the Amazon Fund and the consequent openness of political debates 
to the possibility of alternative financial instruments for REDD+ raise questions about the probability that the 
latter may in fact occur. Although there is no immediate suggestion that market instruments are the first and 
foremost candidate to substitute results-based funding, they do seem to represent the other end of a spectrum 
of potential approaches to REDD+ finance. Indeed, chapter 2 has demonstrated a polarized and parallel 
 materialization of the sustainable development discourse that revolved around the Amazon Fund and the 
carbon conservation discourse that applies a logic of market instruments. Combining the critiques on 
results-based funding and market instruments as the most proximate alternative, the present chapter aims to 
analyze the existence of epistemological foundations for shifting towards market instruments.
The introductory chapter of this dissertation already explained that the epistemological positioning of this 
research extends beyond the politics of discourse and considers deeper layers of social structures as well. 
While chapters 2 and 3 involve an analysis of the politics of discourse, the present chapter explores these 
deeper layers. More specifically, it analyzes the foundational structures of market instruments and projects 
them on the institutions associated with the sustainable development discourse. In this way it is possible to 
understand at which depth political debates continue to influence these social structures and at which depth 
this influence ceases to have any effect. The outcome of this analysis helps to understand the malleability of 
financial instruments for REDD+.
At this point of the research it is useful to consider REDD+ development in Brazil more comprehensively than 
presented in chapter 2. In addition to the Amazon Fund, Brazil has established GTT REDD+ (2014) and 
CONAREDD+ (2015), has adopted ENREDD+ (2016) and has appointed SAIN-MF as its NDA. Although the Amazon 
Fund continues to be an exemplary institution, a consideration of the most contemporary institutional 
framework for REDD+ in Brazil provides a more reliable outlook on future trends.
This chapter has been submitted to Ecological Economics in 2018.
4
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4.1.  Introduction
After almost 20 years of debating the concept of Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES), 
scholars have increasingly reached agreement about the non-market nature of existing 
PES schemes. Empirical observations demonstrated that most PES schemes do not 
constitute an environmental market at all (Fletcher & Büscher, 2017; Muradian et al., 2013; 
Pirard & Lapeyre, 2014). Consequently, PES definitions have been modified from an 
emphasis on the trade between buyers and providers of ecosystem services (Wunder, 
2005) to “voluntary transactions between service users and service providers that are 
conditional on agreed rules of natural resource management for generating offsite 
services” (Wunder, 2015, p. 241). In the context of forest governance, the conceptual 
development of “Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and the 
role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest 
carbon stocks in developing countries” (REDD+) has been exemplary for these changes. In 
their historical account of REDD+ institutionalization, Den Besten et al. (2014) have 
described conceptual transformations that excluded a market-based approach due to 
critical concerns about the overemphasis on carbon, potential avoidance of emission 
reductions from buyers and the dependence on technological solutions. Some national 
governments, most notably Brazil, were also critical of such approaches for similar reasons 
and have openly resisted them (Carvalho, 2012). As a consequence, contemporary REDD+ 
schemes have been characterized by some scholars as ‘results-based aid mechanisms’ 
(Angelsen, 2017). These trends indicate that financial transactions still take place with 
respect to both PES and REDD+, but the conditions of these transactions are mutually 
agreed upon by trade parties rather than immediately related to the provision of 
ecosystem services (Fletcher & Büscher, 2017).
While the materialization of REDD+ strategies certainly divert from a characterization as a 
market instrument, more recent developments provide some subtle evidence that the 
use of market instruments is not entirely off the negotiation table. Some scholar have 
argued that the Paris Agreement has contributed to a situation where the use of market 
instruments for REDD+ is “an open issue and remains very contested in the context of  the 
UNFCCC (Turnhout et al., 2016, p. 8). The Warsaw Framework for REDD+ contributes to the 
ambiguity about the use of market instruments by retaining openness about their 
possibility yet abstaining from any predefined disposition towards their use (Voigt & 
Ferreira, 2015). Other scholars have suggested that REDD+ schemes obscure market-like 
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relations, as donations are used as ‘political offsets’ in order to “respond to critiques 
regarding the lack of domestic efforts to reduce emissions” (Angelsen, 2017, p. 22). Finally, 
the prevalence of offset-based approaches to REDD+, albeit a minority, has been observed 
within some national contexts, most notably in Brazil (Van der Hoff et al., 2015). If the 
REDD+ concept is decidedly not a market instrument, as acknowledged by most literature, 
on what basis are political debates on their possibility still persevering? In what way could 
REDD+ still become a market instrument?
This research paper aims to answer these questions by describing how the REDD+ 
concept still retains some of the rationales that underpin market instruments. For this 
purpose, we use the materialization of REDD+ in Brazil as a case study, since it is widely 
known for its resistance to carbon offsetting and currently has one of the most advanced 
REDD+ implementation processes in the world. In the next section, we discuss in depth 
the building blocks of environmental market instruments and develop an analytical lens 
that we call ‘ruptured dependence’. After explaining our research approach in section 4.3, 
we describe in detail how Brazilian REDD+ institutions reflect each of these building 
blocks and the extent to which the latter adhere to ‘ruptured dependence’ (section 4.4). 
Section 4.5 returns our argument to the use of market instruments for REDD+ schemes and 
explains why this issue still prevails in political debates. We conclude with some considerations 
for future REDD+ politics.
4.2.   Environmental markets: building blocks and  
their critiques
Market instruments for environmental governance embody an approach to addressing 
environmental issues that aims to reduce destructive consequences of economic activity 
by building on the same logic that engendered them. Since the emergence of 
environmental awareness, particularly on climate change, many scholars have advocated 
a respect for the human dependence on nature and the limits or planetary boundaries 
imposed by this dependence (Meadows et al., 2004; Rockström et al., 2009). According to 
Gómez-Baggethun and Naredo (2015), such calls for respecting planetary boundaries 
through more stringent public regulation and political intervention were mostly rejected 
in favour of an emphasis on economic growth, market instruments and technological 
solutions. In the same line, economists advocate the decoupling of economic growth 
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from its negative environmental consequences (Meadows et al., 2004; Pearce et al., 1989) 
and frame market instruments as most efficient approach to addressing environmental 
problems (Mendelsohn, 2006). Market instruments thereby embody the conviction that 
environmental problems exist because “environmental goods and services, and the 
general functions which environments serve (e.g. as a waste sink), are not invariably 
bought and sold in the marketplace” (Pearce et al., 1989, p. 51). Economists argue that such 
market instruments advance the internalization of externalities by incorporating 
environmental consequences into decision-making processes (Tietenberg & lewis, 2012), 
which seems to acknowledge the human dependence on nature. As mainstream 
approaches to environmental problems, including markets instruments, build on 
economic conceptualizations (Gómez-Baggethun & Naredo, 2015), however, these 
instruments perpetuate a world view in which “the rational egoist of orthodox, 
neo-classical economics is […] independent from social, biological and ecological needs 
and relationships” (Barry, 2007, p. 212). This sets up a paradox: the use of market instruments 
reflects an attempt to incorporate human dependence on nature into economic systems 
without altering its ontological foundations that assert the opposite. 
The critical literature on market instruments for environmental governance sheds some 
light on this paradox by demonstrating that the incorporation of human dependence on 
nature is far from comprehensive. Some scholars have argued that environmental market 
instruments build on fragmentary representations of reality by isolating only one element 
of an essentially highly complex system (Arsel & Büscher, 2012; Farnsworth, Adenuga, & de 
Groot, 2015; Turnhout et al., 2016). More broadly, these representations often obscure the 
ecological, economic and political dimensions of the reality of environmental issues, 
which some scholars refer to as a ‘commodity fetish’ (Kosoy & Corbera, 2010; Norgaard, 
2010; Peterson, Hall, Feldpausch-Parker, & Peterson, 2009). In this respect, the construction 
of environmental markets oversimplifies these issues in order to render markets viable 
(Moreno, Chassé, & Fuhr, 2015; Stephan, 2012). Other scholars have extended this critique 
of reductionism to the attribution of monetary values to nature, arguing that “possibly 
some of it, probably not most of it, and definitely not all of it” is adequate for monetary 
valuation (Farnsworth et al., 2015; Hajkowicz, 2007, p. 25; Spangenberg & Settele, 2016). 
Moreover, monetary values reflect only one of many approaches to making value 
judgements and ‘crowd out’ “a complex amalgam of intuitions […], beliefs, norms, 
principles, dispositions, attitudes, emotions, passions and sentiments” that motivate 
nature protection (Graeber, 2001; Hill, 2006; Lo, 2014; Neuteleers & Engelen, 2015, p. 256). 
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Rather than incorporating the human dependence on nature comprehensively, this 
critical literature implies that market instruments reproduce what we call a ‘ruptured 
dependence’, which becomes clear through a closer scrutiny of the building blocks of 
market instruments, namely singularization, monetary valuation and appropriation. 
Environmental market instruments build, first and foremost, on a clear understanding of 
the object of trade that will contribute to nature conservation. More specifically, they 
require the characterization of a singular object (‘qualification’), the expression of these 
characteristics into common metrics (‘commensuration’) and the decontextualization of 
the tradable object (‘disentanglement’), a process also described as ‘singularization’ 
(Callon & Muniesa, 2005; Lovell & Liverman, 2010; Stephan, 2012). Many environmental 
markets define their trade objects in terms of restrictions to use rights of natural resources 
(e.g. Lam & Pitcher, 2012; Soares-Filho et al., 2016). Since the late 1990s, environmental 
markets also increasingly build on a conceptualization of natural properties in terms of 
‘ecosystem services’, which denote the “supply of valuable products and materials, 
support and regulation of environmental conditions and provision of cultural and 
aesthetic benefits” and include services like climate regulation, biodiversity, protection 
against flooding, and even psychological and spiritual wellness (Armsworth et al., 2007; 
Fearnside, 1997; Foley et al., 2007, p. 25). In this respect, reducing emissions from 
deforestation, for example, contributes to the preservation of such ecosystem services 
(Boyd, Boykoff, & Newell, 2011; World Bank, 2016).
The construction of singular and tangible trade objects builds on scientific knowledge 
that represents the mechanics (i.e. ‘the gears and bolts’) of natural systems that starkly 
contrasts with alternative (i.e. emotional or spiritual) knowledges (Barry, 2007; Worster, 
1994). Consequently, understanding nature means “reducing plants and animals to 
insensate matter, mere conglomerates of atomic of atomic particles devoid of internal 
purpose or intelligence”, and as such becomes controllable and manageable in a way that 
removes “the remaining barriers to unrestrained economic growth” (Worster, 1994, p. 40). 
Environmental markets related to emission reductions (i.e. carbon offsetting) build on a 
mechanistic understanding of climate change dynamics that problematizes the 
contribution of carbon emissions from deforestation and forest degradation to global an-
thropocentric greenhouse gas emissions (Angelsen et al., 2012; World Bank, 2016). 
Furthermore, such representations involve high-technology methodological approaches 
such as Forest Reference Emissions Levels (FREL), Measuring, Reporting and Verification 
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(MRV) systems, and forest monitoring systems in order to quantify carbon emissions and 
carbon stocks (see Voigt & Ferreira, 2015). This mechanistic approach to understanding 
natural and environmental issues conceptualizes environmental issues in terms of a 
scarcity problem that is a direct consequence of natural resource depletion and Earth’s 
diminishing carrying capacity (e.g. Meadows et al., 2004). In this way the mechanistic 
approach to nature is integral to markets as it enables the subdivision of broad scarcity 
problems (e.g. overfishing or deforestation) into discrete rights (e.g. quantity of fish or 
forested hectares per quota) that can be transacted.
A second important building block for environmental markets concerns the conversion of 
knowledge about the aforementioned scarcity problems into a monetary value. According 
to Pearce et al. (1989, p. 5), the scarcity of natural resources or ecosystem services only 
becomes meaningfully problematic when “something is provided at a zero price, 
[because] more of it will be demanded than if there was a positive price”. By placing this 
scarcity problem “directly or indirectly in relation with the measuring rod of money” 
(Pigou, 1920, p. 11), it becomes “reduced to a problem of scarcity of capital [and] considered 
as an abstract category that could be expressed in homogeneous monetary units” 
(Naredo, 2003, p. 250). Building on this economic rationale, many scholars began 
advocating the attribution of monetary values to nature since at least the 1950s (Baveye et 
al., 2013; Chichilnisky & Heal, 1998; Costanza et al., 1997; Pearce et al., 1989; Wunder, 2007). 
Estimations of the value of environmental benefits (i.e. willingness-to-pay) and 
environmental costs (i.e. willingness-to-accept) are among the most widely used 
methodologies, which estimates a perceived value of nature in the context of competing 
private interests (Chee, 2004; Soares-Filho et al., 2016; Zhang & Li, 2005). Alternative 
approaches, albeit more generic, include calculations of the opportunity costs, or forgone 
economic benefits of reducing negative environmental impacts (Angelsen et al., 2012; 
Pagiola & Bosquet, 2009).
The monetary values described above refer to ‘exchange values’, or the “[purchasing 
power] that possession of an object can convey”, rather than ‘use values’, or “the utility of 
some particular object” (Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2010; Zhang & Li, 2005, p. 180). 
Basically, this attribution of a monetary value to nature functions as a common 
denominator for understanding environmental problems in the context of other priorities 
(Costanza & Daly, 1992; Pearce et al., 1989). This conceptualization of monetary values as 
‘purchasing power’ implies that the tradable objects of environmental markets become 
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intelligible in comparison with alternative objects that are similarly attributed with an 
exchange value and may even allow a certain degree of substitutability. As a consequence, 
decision-making in environmental markets often involve a trade-off between two or 
more alternative approaches to environmental issues (Chee, 2004; Pearce, 1998; Pearce et 
al., 1989; Tietenberg & lewis, 2012). In compensating deficits of legal requirements 
determining the forested area on private lands, for example, rural producers may choose 
between reforestation on their property, purchasing other (forested) properties, or 
purchasing environmental reserve quota (not to mention accept penalties) in order to 
effectuate legal compliance (Soares-Filho et al., 2016). This juxtaposition facilitates our 
understanding of the negative environmental consequences of economic activity by 
internalizing their monetary values into decision-making processes and could potentially 
redirect investments to minimize environmental harm (Solow, 1973).
The third and final building block of environmental markets concerns the appropriation of 
the tradable objects described above, where it is assumed that the establishment of 
individual property rights is both an institutional requirement for the functioning of 
markets and also an implicit end goal of market interventions. As nature valuation 
translates natural resource scarcity into capital resource scarcity (see Naredo, 2003), 
efficient allocation of capital resources becomes an important consideration in addressing 
environmental issues, a characteristic that is often attributed to markets instead of com-
mand-and-control approaches (Lane, 2012; Mendelsohn, 2006; Newell et al., 2012). Many 
contemporary proposals to establish environmental markets often emphasize efficiency 
gains as most important component, as has been argued with respect to, for example, 
payments for ecosystem services (e.g. Wunder, 2007) and environmental reserve quota in 
Brazil (Soares-Filho et al., 2016). In this respect, while economic scholars acknowledge that 
command-and-control policies may actually achieve efficiency gains in specific situations 
(see also Cole & Grossman, 1999; Wittneben, 2009), their primary function is mostly limited 
to correcting for market inefficiencies or establishing a strong institutional framework 
within which markets are to operate (Tietenberg & lewis, 2012). Weaknesses in the latter 
function have indeed been identified as underlying factor for many contemporary 
environmental issues (see Araujo et al., 2009; Puppim de Oliveira, 2008).
In sum, the processes of singularization, monetary valuation and appropriation reproduce 
a social order of ruptured dependence on nature. Singularization renders a clearly defined 
tradable object that reflects that part of nature upon which humans depend. Monetary 
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valuation further decontextualizes nature and renders it commensurable with other trade 
objects within a particular modality of value judgements. Appropriation, finally, excludes 
consumption of nature by others and enables the possibility of exchange, which is 
legitimized on the basis of efficiency. This understanding of ruptured dependence will be 
the analytical lens through which we analyze REDD+ in Brazil.
4.3.  Theoretical and methodological considerations
The central purpose of this research paper is to understand the extent to which REDD+ 
implementation in Brazil still retains the building blocks of environmental market 
instruments in spite of outspoken resistance to carbon offsetting. Such an analysis involves 
a search for similarities between the originally offset-based environmental market and the 
currently performance-based funding mechanism. This objective corresponds strongly 
with a Foucauldian analysis of the epistemological structure, or episteme, that governs the 
regularity of statements and practices in the politics of discourse. This regularity concerns 
a set of rules that govern the relations between individual statements and practices, such 
that some become more possible or valid than others (Foucault, 1970, 1972). Mannheim 
(1954) also recognizes a regularity in the use of the concept of ‘collective-unconscious’, 
which is continuously being shaped and reshaped by historical-social or situational 
motivations. More specifically, he describes thought structures that transcend reality in 
order to either maintain the status quo for largely political reasons (i.e. ‘ideologies’) or 
rupture the existing order in favor of a desirable new order (i.e. ‘utopias’). Mannheim’s 
approach emphasizes the role of agency in shaping and reshaping the ‘collective-uncon-
scious’, whereas Foucault’s approach focuses on how the existing order of things governs 
practices and statements. Since our interest is to understand the extent to which the 
building blocks of environmental market instruments are still reproduced within 
non-market instruments like REDD+, we follow the Foucauldian conceptualization of 
regularity that structure the politics of discourse with respect to REDD+ implementation 
in Brazil.
This paper adopts an interpretive approach to the analysis of Brazilian REDD+ policies in 
order to describe the regularities of market and non-market instruments in forest 
governance. According to Yanow (1999), interpretive policy analysis emphasizes the 
construction of specific interpretations of reality as reflected in the combination of various 
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‘artifacts’ (i.e. language, objects and acts). Extending this view, Foucault argued that such 
artifacts not only produce and reproduce specific practices and statements within a 
specific interpretation, but also convey the epistemic structures that govern how some 
are more possible than others. Since Brazilian REDD+ policy has only started to take shape 
after international REDD+ debates consolidated in 2013 (see below), most meaning still 
comes from language (e.g. debates, legislation, documents, plans, etc.) rather than objects 
(e.g. credits, diplomas, etc.) or acts (e.g. financial transactions). 
The primary data for our research paper, therefore, builds on document analysis, which 
include national strategies and other submissions to UNFCCC, minutes of committee 
meetings and associated subgroups, and legislative documents, among others. This data 
has been complemented with participant observations during two series of workshops. 
The first series of workshops were organized by SAIN between September and December 
2017 on the development of strategy for receiving results-based finance, whereas the 
second series of workshops was organized by MMA between February and October 2018 
on the development of a Safeguards Information System for REDD+ (SISREDD+). Finally, 
this research has benefited from a longitudinal study by the first author on the role of 
financial instruments for REDD+ governance since 2012, which has yielded 22 semi-struc-
tured in-depth interviews with key stakeholders in developing REDD+ in Brazil, as well as 
a longitudinal study by the second author on the formation of Brazilian forest policies 
since 2006, which has yielded over one hundred interviews. These interviews include rep-
resentatives of the Ministry of Environment (MMA), Ministry of Finance (MF), Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MRE), the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and representatives from state and municipal governments. Our 
analysis has paid particular attention to the building blocks of environmental markets, 
which were operationalized into three focus categories, namely (1) the indicators that 
measure results or performance (i.e. singularization), (2) the calculation basis for financial 
transactions (i.e. monetary valuation) and (3) the formal obligations involved in these 
transactions (i.e. appropriation).
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4.4.   Building towards results-based payments for REDD+ 
in Brazil
In November 2013, participants in the UNFCCC debates during COP13 in Warsaw agreed 
upon a series of decisions that established the Warsaw Framework for REDD+ (WFR), 
which became a milestone in international   REDD+ development since its inception in 
2003 (Moutinho et al., 2011; Voigt & Ferreira, 2015). Part of its importance stems from insti-
tutionalization of REDD+ that impedes or at least complicates carbon offsetting, which 
has been one of the main critiques in preceding debates (Den Besten et al., 2014). On the 
one hand, the WFR affirms that “results-based finance […] may come from variety of 
sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources” (see 
decision 09/CP.19), which effectively allows for the use of market instruments. On the other 
hand, the possibility of carbon offsetting has been complicated by the agreement that 
“results-based actions that may be eligible to appropriate market-based approaches (…) 
may be subject to any further specific modalities for verification” (decision 14/CP.19, 
paragraph 15). Moreover, the WFR recognizes “the key role that the Green Climate Fund 
will play in channelling financial resources to developing countries and catalysing climate 
finance”. These provisions denote the institutionalization of a REDD+ concept that abstains 
from carbon offsetting, but scholars still anticipated that this issue remains highly 
contested in political debates (Turnhout et al., 2016; Voigt & Ferreira, 2015).
For now, however, international REDD+ finance channels through the Green Climate 
Fund. The WFR has operationalized this by deciding that the obtainment of results-based 
finance by developing countries is conditional upon the provision of four elements 
established in 2010 during COP16 in Cancún (i.e. decision 01/CP.16, paragraph 71). These 
elements include, firstly, a national strategy or action plan in which the developing country 
describes how REDD+ is embedded within the national context and how it plans to 
develop the remaining three elements in a coherent REDD+ structure. The second and 
third elements concern national (or interim subnational) Forest Reference Emissions Level 
(FREL) or Forest Reference Level (FRL) as well as a robust and transparent forest monitoring 
system, which together enable the developing country to determine its results in terms of 
emission reductions. Finally, developing countries are required to establish a system for 
providing information on addressing safeguards, which involve (a) consistency with 
national forest programmes, (b) transparency and effectiveness of national governance 
structures, (c) respect for knowledge and rights of indigenous peoples and local 
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communities, (d) full and effective participation of relevant stakeholders, including 
indigenous peoples and local communities, (e) consistency with conservation of natural 
forests and biological diversity, (f) addressing the risk of reversals (i.e. impermanence), and 
(g) reducing displacement of emissions (i.e. leakage). This documentation currently 
mobilizes developing countries to make efforts for receiving results-based finance from 
the Green Climate Fund. 
4.4.1.  The Brazilian REDD+ structure in a post-Warsaw world
Prior to the first signs of an emerging REDD+ structure, the Brazilian government has been 
expressly resistant in international forest governance debates to the idea of using emission 
reductions in tropical forests to offset carbon emissions in developed countries, which has 
been the premise of the Clean Development Mechanism and was also proposed for 
REDD+ in the early 2000s (Carvalho, 2012). Instead, the Brazilian government sought 
opportunities for receiving financial compensation for the attainment of quickly dropping 
deforestation rates since 2004, which appeared in the context of Norwegian politics 
interested in providing development aid for emission reductions in tropical forests 
(Hermansen, 2015). The Brazilian and Norwegian governments reached an agreement 
in 2008, after which a Brazilian REDD+ structure started materializing with the 
establishment of the Amazon Fund (decree 6.527/2008). Under the administrative 
management of the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), the Amazon Fund would 
receive financial donations for the attainment of emission reductions from forest-related 
activities, as verified by its Technical Committee (CTFA), and reinvest in project activities 
that seek to contribute to attaining REDD+ objectives, as governed by its Steering 
Committee (COFA) (BNDES, 2017). At least until the adoption of WFR in 2013, the Amazon 
Fund has been the most important REDD+ institution in Brazil, and continues to channel the 
majority of financial resources for REDD+ implementation in following years (Van der Hoff  
et al., 2015).
Immediately after the adoption of WFR, the Brazilian REDD+ structure started expanding 
with the adoption of new institutions and the redefinition of existing institutions, the 
outcome of which is reflected in figure 4. In 2014, MMA established the Technical Working 
Group on REDD+ (GTT REDD+) with the purpose of “elaborating and revising input for 
Brazilian submissions on climate change and forests” (see Portaria 41/2013). During the first 
three meetings in the same year, GTT REDD+ almost exclusively discussed the FREL 
methodology, the first version of which was submitted to UNFCCC in June 2014. In 
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November 2015, four days before the decisive UNFCCC meeting in Paris, the Brazilian 
government established the National Commission of REDD+ (CONAREDD+). CONAREDD+ 
is responsible for the implementation of the National REDD+ Strategy (ENREDD+) and the 
compliance with requirements for access to results-based payments (decree 8.576/2015). 
During its initial years, CONAREDD+ consisted of three Thematic Consulting Chambers 
(CCTs) that provided a forum for discussing in more detail issues related to safeguards 
(CCT-Salv), coherence of multi-sector and multi-level governance (CCT-Pact) and 
fundraising and resource allocation (CCT-CDRNR). Together with GTT REDD+, these CCTs 
support CONAREDD+ in implementing REDD+ in Brazil and attaining access to financial 
resources from the Green Climate Fund. The latter objective has also become a 
responsibility, at least since March 2017, of the Secretariat for Strategic Affairs (SAIN) of the 
Ministry of Finance (MF) in its role as Nationally Designated Authority (NDA). Part of the 
SAIN’s responsibility is to assign accreditation to eligible organizations. BNDES has received 
automatic eligibility with the establishment of CONAREDD+ (see art. 5 of decree 
8.576/2015) and is awaiting accreditation, while other candidates are Caixa Econômica 
Federal (CEF) and the Brazilian Biodiversity Fund (FUNBIO).
Figure 4  REDD+ governance structure in Brazil 
(adapted from (adapted from MMA, 2016, p. 29)
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4.4.2.  Definition of results
Approaches to and instruments for the singularization of REDD+ results abound in 
submission documents and was a recurrent discussion point during meetings of REDD+ 
institutions. Already in 2008 did the Amazon Fund establish a methodology for calculating 
its fundraising limit on the basis of historical results in terms of emission reductions. 
In 2014, Brazil began preparations for the submission of FREL, which was extensively 
discussed during three GTT REDD+ meetings. By 2018, GTT REDD+ had elaborated and 
submitted two FRELs for the Amazon biome (2014 and 2018) and one FREL for the Cerrado 
biome (2017). FRELs for the remaining biomes, however, still require further elaboration. 
In addition, FRELs, the Brazilian government has been working on a Safeguards Information 
System for REDD+ (SISREDD+) during the period of our analysis, especially since 2018. 
For this purpose, CCT-Salv organized a series of workshops between February and October 
2018. The central objective of these workshops was to establish a set of indicators for 
evaluating the performance of REDD+ in terms of addressing safeguards. 
The Amazon Fund has adopted a retrospective approach to results-based payments, 
meaning that results need to be demonstrated prior to receiving financial compensation. 
The methodology for determining these results starts with the obtainment of data from 
the Amazon Deforestation Calculation Programme (PRODES), a spatial monitoring 
instrument based on satellite images developed by the Brazilian Institute for Spatial 
Research (INPE). Since PRODES generates annual deforestation rates in hectares, CTFA 
applies an emission factor (i.e. 100-132.3 tC/ha) and a conversion factor (i.e. 3.66 tC-tCO2) 
in order to transform this data into tCO2 (BNDES, 2017). The resultant annual emission 
rates form the basis for calculating the reference levels that alter every five years. More 
specifically, these reference levels constitute average emissions levels for the periods 
1996-2005 (i.e. 719 million tCO2), 2001-2010 (i.e. 605 million tCO2) and 2006-2015 (i.e. 298 
million tCO2), which are compared with actual emission levels for the periods 2006-2010, 
2011-2015 and 2016-2020 in order to obtain the results in terms of emission reductions. 
Based on these calculations, Brazil has achieved a cumulative emission reduction of 
3,638.4 million tCO2 for the period 2006-2015. 
Although the methodology for the FRELs is more complex than the Amazon Fund 
reference level, the basic mathematical approach to the singularization of REDD+ results 
is quite identical. The first step is to calculate the annual CO2 emissions since the first year 
of the reference period, namely 1996 for the Amazon biome and 2000 for the Cerrado 
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biome. The outcome of this calculation depends on a wide variety of factors, most notably 
the definition and inclusion of activities (e.g. deforestation, forest degradation, etc.), pools 
(e.g. soil, biomass, etc.), and gases (e.g. CO2, CH4, N2O, etc.), among others. These annual 
emission rates form the basis for calculating the reference levels that alter every five years. 
The FREL for the Amazon biome, for example, reflects the average emissions level for the 
periods 1996-2005 (i.e. FREL-A: 1,106 million tCO2), 1996-2010 (i.e. FREL-B: 908 million tCO2) 
and 1996-2015 (i.e. FREL-C: 750 million tCO2), which are compared with the annual 
emissions levels of the periods 2006-2010, 2011-2015 and 2016-2020, respectively. Based on 
this comparison, GTT REDD+ confirmed that Brazil has achieved a total reduction of over 
6,125.5 million tCO2 in the period 2006-2015, which is substantially higher than the results 
reported by CTFA and may be attributed to methodological differences. During the first 
meeting of GTT REDD+, an MMA representative clarified that “there is no problem in 
having a different design than the PNMC or the Amazon Fund, as long as it is consistent 
with the [forest] inventory”. A similar procedure also takes place with respect to the 
Amazon biome, where the FREL for the period 2000-2010 (i.e. 335.5 million tCO2) will be 
compared with the annual emissions levels in the period 2010-2015, but these results still 
await the publication of Brazil’s third Biennial Update Report (BUR) on its national 
greenhouse gas inventory, expected in 2018. 
While the singularization of emission reductions has been successfully completed in 
preparation for receiving results-based finance, similar outcomes were not observed with 
respect to safeguards. More specifically, the establishment of performance indicators for 
safeguards and co-benefits have proven much more challenging than determining 
emission reductions. The construction process of SISREDD+ aims to establish a number of 
performance indicators in order to evaluate the extent to which these safeguards are 
being addressed. During the first in a series of workshops organized by CCT-Salv to occur 
between February 2018 and October 2018, representatives of various organizations and 
social groups fervently debated an adequate set of indicators that would encompass and 
reflect all concerns. Initially, the debates rendered 52 indicators, but was quickly reduced 
to 16 indicators due to limited monitoring capacity. For instance, indicators related to 
safeguard ‘e’ (i.e. consistency with conservation of natural forests and biological diversity) 
have included reduction in species under threat of extinction, REDD+ finance for 
sustainable production and integrated management plans for protected areas, among 
many others. In absence of SISREDD+, however, the information on safeguards submitted 
by Brazil in May 2015 as well as a preliminary updated version of September 2017 involved 
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a largely qualitative discussion on how the Cancún safeguards apply to the Brazilian 
context of REDD+ implementation. Furthermore, ENREDD+ argues that Brazil already has 
a few information systems related to safeguards, citing “the National Registry of 
Conservation Units (CNUC), the National System for Forest Information (SNIF), the National 
System of the Rural Environmental Cadastre (SICAR) and the Biodiversity Portal” (MMA, 
2016, p. 24). None of these information systems, however, integrally address all REDD+ 
safeguards, which illustrates that a singularization of safeguards remains a tough challenge 
for policy-makers. 
4.4.3.  Valuation of results
As REDD+ implementation in Brazil encompasses a broad array of performance indicators, 
only results in terms of emission reductions have been subject to monetary valuation. 
Already since 2008, the Amazon Fund has valued these results at USD 5.00 per tCO2 
(BNDES, 2017). As such, the results obtained in the period 2006-2015 translate into a 
cumulative fundraising limit of USD 18.2 billion. The Green Climate Fund has adopted a 
similar approach after adopting decision B.18/07 in November 2017, which allows the 
allocation of up to USD 500 million for proposals to the “REDD-plus results-based payments 
pilot programme” on the basis of USD 5.00 per tCO2. Extrapolating this logic to the results 
reported by the FRELs for the Amazon biome, for example, this price would allow Brazil to 
receive over USD 30.6 billion for results obtained in the period 2006-2015. In spite of 
emission reductions being the only results with a monetary value, governmental repre-
sentatives maintain that REDD+ contributes to objectives beyond climate change 
mitigation. During the first meeting of GTT REDD+ in February 2014, for example, an MRE 
representative explained that “REDD+ is not just carbon”, but also encompasses safeguards 
and co-benefits (i.e. “carbon is just a proxy”). Still, potential recipient countries of 
results-based payments must provide information on how non-carbon benefits and 
safeguards have been obtained. In this respect, these non-carbon results are also 
represented in the valuation of emission  reductions as they pose conditional requirements 
for receiving results-based payments. Such requirements are not yet demanded in the 
context of the Amazon Fund, but the integration of the Amazon Fund with broader 
REDD+ initiatives has been a concern that was raised during the first meeting of CCT-Salv. 
4.4.4.  Modalities and conditions of payments
Corresponding to the Brazilian position with respect to forest finance in early international 
forest governance debates, Brazilian REDD+ institutions have formally retained the 
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non-offset nature of results-based payments. The first traces of evidence emerge with the 
establishment of the Amazon Fund by decree 6.527/2008, which determines that “the 
diplomas [for results-based payments] are nominal, non-transferable and do not generate 
rights or credits of any kind” (art. 2, §2). Similarly, the establishment of CONAREDD by 
decree 8.576/2015 included the determination that “results-based payments and their 
respective diplomas cannot be used, either directly or indirectly, for the purpose of 
meeting mitigation commitments of other countries” (art. 6). In December 2016, this 
statement was reiterated by CONAREDD+ in resolution 5, explaining that “results-based 
payments do not constitute an international transfer for the purpose of meeting mitigation 
obligations of other countries” (art. 1, VI). This retainment of the non-offset nature of 
REDD+ finance reinforces that results-based payments are essentially retrospective, that is, 
based on achievements realized in the past rather than directly conducive to future 
achievements. 
The attainment of future REDD+ results is pursued by means of guidelines and criteria for 
the redistribution of the financial resources obtained from results-based payments. In this 
respect, the formal agreement between donor countries and BNDES, for example, 
obligated the latter to report on “the contribution of the [Amazon] Fund in reducing 
emission from deforestation and forest degradation” (art. VIII-1). Furthermore, the 
guidelines and criteria for Amazon Fund projects warrants the coherence of project 
objectives with national policies, including ENREDD+, that seek to reduce emissions from 
forest-related activities. Similar provisions have not yet been fully elaborated in the context 
of CONAREDD+ except for a proposition in resolution 6 that state government should 
evenly distribute their resources on the basis of native forest cover and deforestation 
reduction. This suggests that guidelines and criteria for redistributing financial resources is 
ultimately a concern for accredited entities such as the Amazon Fund, which contrasts 
with the historical emission reductions that for the basis for fundraising efforts as discussed 
in section 4.4.2. This point was raised by the first author during the series of workshops on 
results-based payments from the Green Climate Fund. In response, SAIN presented as one 
of the outcomes that “REDD+ results-based payments are a modality of country support 
and not a specific theme for investments”.
Although the materialization of the Brazilian REDD+ structure has moved away from 
offset-based approaches to results-based payments, the possibility of offsetting carbon 
emissions has not been definitively removed from REDD+ debates. During COP22 in 
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Marrakesh in 2016, for example, a number of Brazilian organizations offered a letter to the 
Brazilian federal government arguing that the Brazilian position on offsets should be 
reconsidered. This letter, known as the Marrakesh Letter on REDD+, has already evoked 
much reaction from the Brazilian federal government, albeit still without an official 
response, as well as from other organizations either supporting or criticizing such a recon-
sideration. Another such event occurred during a CONAREDD+ meeting in June 2017, 
state government representatives demanded the possibility of commercializing REDD+ 
results on voluntary markets in order to open up alternative fundraising opportunities, or 
at least opening up debates in CONAREDD+ meetings for discussing offsets. Many 
participants, most notably federal government representatives, defended that the formal 
understanding of UNFCCC outcomes refrains from offset-based mechanisms. Instead, 
they relegated such debates to alternative forums and institutions like the Brazilian Climate 
Change Forum (FBMC) or the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International 
Aviation (CORSIA). CONAREDD+ did not agree on the incorporation of this suggestion 
from state government representatives, but rather soothed their demands by stating in 
resolution 6 that “those interested in fundraising through voluntary schemes […] must 
declare […] that they are aware that these exclusively represent one financing modality” 
(art. 5, §2). Concurrently, the same resolution reaffirmed that receipt of results-based 
payments “do not generate […] the right to realize international transfers for the purpose 
of meeting international mitigation commitments” (art. 5, §3). 
4.5.  Resonating market logics in REDD+ materialization
Although REDD+ development has generally been characterized as a results-based 
funding mechanism (Angelsen, 2017), our analysis of Brazilian REDD+ institutions has 
observed a retainment of the building blocks of environmental markets to some extent. 
We described how REDD+ in Brazil, in responding to the declining capacity of tropical 
forests to provide ecosystem services, emphasized the mechanical role of forests activities 
as sources (i.e. deforestation) or sinks (i.e. forest cover) of carbon dioxide. As illustrated in 
section 4.4.2, this conceptualization underpins the REDD+ methodology that compares 
annual deforestation rates with a reference level in order to derive the results that merit 
financial payments. We found few evidence, however, that REDD+ in Brazil builds on a 
more comprehensive understanding of forest and deforestation dynamics. While the first 
efforts to establish performance indicators for social and environmental safeguards have 
107
RUPTURED DEPENDENCIES AND MARKET LOGICS
begun, our observations suggest that they are unlikely to cover all 17 ecosystem services 
provided by tropical forests (Costanza et al., 1997) or reflect broader understandings of nature. 
These findings indicate that, in the context of REDD+, singularization (Callon & Muniesa, 
2005; Stephan, 2012) has been achieved to a large extent for performance indicators on 
carbon emissions and are only emerging for non-carbon performance indicators. 
The Brazilian REDD+ structure has attributed a monetary value to only one of the 
performance indicators, namely emission reductions (see section 4.4.3), thereby suggesting 
that the central tenet of REDD+ remains emission reductions, whereas non-carbon 
elements of REDD+, most notably safeguards, became auxiliary conditions for results-based 
payments at best. While the monetary values attributed to emission reductions may 
facilitate a commensurability of emission reductions, however, we did not find evidence 
that they convey a substitutability with alternative policy options. The monetary values 
referred to in the Brazilian REDD+ structure constitute fundraising limits for recipients of 
financial resources rather than commodities. By contrast, safeguards did not and will not 
receive any attribution of monetary values. Since they are clearly an important requirement 
for results-based payments from the Green Climate Fund, this suggests that safeguards 
pose a conditionality for such payments and do not constitute a final objective. Moreover, 
we found no evidence that REDD+ in Brazil builds on a more pluralistic foundation for 
value judgments. Stakeholders of the Brazilian REDD+ structure and participants in its 
institutions clearly expressed their understanding that REDD+ mobilizes financial 
resources, thereby underscoring monetary value judgements. One may argue that some 
safeguards, most notably respect for the knowledge and rights of indigenous peoples 
and local communities, includes alternative value judgements into decision-making 
processes (Neuteleers & Engelen, 2015), but it is still unclear under which circumstances 
either UNFCCC or Brazil have met these conditional requirements for results-based 
payments. These findings confirm that REDD+ remains faithful to its core objective of 
attaining emission reductions and attributes monetary values accordingly.
Evidence for the appropriation and subsequent exchange of trade objects has not been 
found during our analysis, but there were clear indications of political pressure in favour of 
this final building block. Many stakeholders have argued for the diversification of REDD+ 
finance, which is illustrated by the appeals from state government representatives during 
CONAREDD+ meetings as well as the Marrakesh Letter on REDD+ signed by various 
organizations. Other stakeholders have raised concerns about effectiveness of existing 
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REDD+ institutions as rising deforestation rates between 2013 and 2017 have jeopardized 
positive results in comparison with reference levels and thereby reduce the methodological 
foundation for results-based payments. Rather than engaging in polemic debates about 
whether market instruments are more efficient than alternative mechanisms (Cole & 
Grossman, 1999; Mendelsohn, 2006), these stakeholders may instead consider market 
instruments due to the ineffectiveness of results-based funding mechanisms. These lines 
of argument currently undermine Brazil’s sovereignty concerns that have been very 
influential in diverting REDD+ debates away from offset-based approaches (Carvalho, 
2012; Van der Hoff et al., 2015). One may argue that the resistance to carbon offsetting has 
been institutionalized in Brazil, which has been an argument used by MMA to ward off 
political pressure. However, our observations suggest that this institutionalization is not 
(yet) conclusive and may occupy forest politics in the future.
Although our discussion has demonstrated that REDD+ institutions in Brazil adhere only 
partially to the building blocks of market instruments, we argue that the regularity of 
actions and statements related to these institutions is governed by an existing order of 
ruptured dependence. The representation of nature in terms of performance indicators 
and reinforced by monetary values does not encompass all nature, in spite of recent 
attempts to do so through safeguards (see Hajkowicz, 2007). Moreover, monetary value 
judgements imply a temporary dependence on nature in addition to a further reduction 
of nature. The idea of a fundraising limit, for example, implies the view that the dependence 
on nature will cease to be relevant once the totality of financial resources has been 
received and the ‘debt’ will be paid for. These propositions repudiate the economic 
argumentation that the effort of ‘internalizing externalities’ (Pearce et al., 1989; Tietenberg 
& lewis, 2012) contributes to the integration of human and natural systems. The existing 
order of ruptured dependence does not, however, irrevocably justify the prevalence of 
market instruments over alternative approaches, which denotes that appropriation is 
subject to the politics of discourse. One may argue that Wunder (2015) acknowledged the 
political nature of market instruments as he revisited his understanding of PES schemes, 
since he removed the appropriation of nature from the definition by changing the 
emphasis from ‘exchange’ to ‘conditionality’ and from ‘service buyers’ to ‘service users’ 
(Fletcher & Büscher, 2017). At the same time, service users that are interested in obtaining 
‘political offsets’ (Angelsen, 2017) may consider alternative channels for climate finance 
when the conditions, or perceptions thereof, are not met. The first traces of such 
consequences have already been observed with respect to the Amazon Fund. 
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4.6.  Conclusion
Although we agree with most literature that REDD+ cannot be characterized as a market 
instrument for carbon offsetting, we found substantial evidence that suggest a potential 
for transformation, at least in Brazil. We have identified that REDD+ institutions in Brazil 
adhere to at least two building blocks of environmental market instruments, namely sin-
gularization and monetary valuation. Furthermore, we have shown that the resistance to 
market instruments, albeit institutionalized, still pertains to the politics of discourse. This 
was observed with respect to two particular argumentations. Firstly, some stakeholders 
have articulated their interest in a more diversified access to financial resources that, in 
their view, market instruments could provide. Secondly, and more significantly, other 
stakeholders have raised concerns about the effectiveness of existing REDD+ activities to 
which they make financial contributions in the form of donations to the Amazon Fund. 
While the former argument reflects a political interest in more diverse approaches to the 
appropriation of nature, the latter may hint at structural problems related to singularization 
and monetary valuation processes. These observations indicate that the prevalence of 
market instruments in REDD+ debates do not build on a predefined determination of 
superior efficiency, but are instead a reflection of either deeper structural problems related 
to ruptured dependence or diverging stakeholder interests in the politics of discourse.
It seems useful to further investigate the extent to which ruptured dependence indeed 
constitutes a governing social structure for a variety of financial and economic instruments 
as well as environmental policy-making in general. This latter proposition emanates from 
of the observation by some scholars that environmental policy-making has been mostly 
inspired by economic rationales (Baveye et al., 2013; Gómez-Baggethun & Muradian, 2015; 
Gómez-Baggethun & Naredo, 2015). If this investigation were to yield positive results, then 
it will be necessary to further develop the theoretical and philosophical foundations on 
which the concept of ruptured dependence builds. The development of such a theoretical 
framework for ruptured dependence could inform environmental and forest governance 
debates on the underlying foundations for appeals to the use of market instruments. More 
specifically, this framework will be useful for identifying whether such appeals reflect 
structural problems related to the reproduction of ruptured dependence or whether they 
reflect stakeholder interests that emerge in the politics of discourse. Understanding these 
dynamics could help policy-makers to decide whether market instruments are indeed 
necessary or whether adjustments in alternative financial instruments are preferred. Of 
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course, ruptured dependence may also reignite more critical arguments for a more 
comprehensive relation between humans and nature.
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The politics of environmental markets: 
advocacy coalitions´ struggle to operationalize 
the Brazilian trade in forest certificates
Although REDD+ has become a central concept for forest governance in Brazil, it does not reflect the 
full spectrum of political debates on the use of financial instruments. As argued in the introductory 
chapter of this dissertation, the underlying argumentations for resisting market instruments for 
REDD+ (i.e. national sovereignty concerns) may not apply to the use of such instruments for domestic 
forest governance. The present chapter aims to balance the findings of previous chapters with an 
analysis of a such a domestic market instrument, namely forest certificates trading. This market is 
particularly interesting for a number of reasons. First and foremost, it is indirectly related to the 
Brazilian REDD+ governance structure as it is a flexibility instrument for the Brazilian Forest Code. 
As suggested in early contributions (Moutinho et al., 2011) and confirmed in recent years (May et al., 
2016), the Brazilian Forest Code is an important building block for REDD+ implementation in Brazil and 
was explicitly mentioned as such in ENREDD+ (MMA, 2016). This includes the policy instruments 
adopted by the Brazilian Forest Code, such as the Rural Environmental Registry (CAR) and the 
Environmental Reserve Quota (CRA). Another reason is the extensive and inconclusive development 
of the Brazilian trade in forest certificates. Assuming that the trade in forest certificates corresponds 
with all three building blocks of market instruments, it is unlikely that political debates linger on the 
‘appropriation’, as was found for REDD+ debates in the previous chapter. Moreover, as national 
sovereignty concerns are not expected to be a governing factor, it remains difficult to understand why 
the development of this market has not yet been operationalized at the time of writing this dissertation. 
This chapter therefore transcends the REDD+ concept and contributes to a broader understanding 
of the factors that govern political debates on the use of financial instruments for forest governance 
in Brazil. 
This chapter has been submitted to Land Use Policy in 2018.
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5.1.  Introduction
Market instruments have become increasingly important for environmental governance 
since at least the 1970s. A notable example is the proliferation of emissions trading across 
the United States (Lane, 2012; Voß, 2007), Europe (Convery, 2009; Woerdman, 2004) and 
China (Hübler et al., 2014; Jiang et al., 2014; Zhang et al., 2014), among many other countries 
(World Bank, 2018). Even in Brazil, known for its resistance to emissions trading in the 
context of international forest governance debates (Carvalho, 2012), scholars have 
observed an incremental increase in debates on the use market instruments (Filoche, 2017). 
The operationalization of these market instruments has been much more challenging. 
Emissions trading schemes have been compelled to adapt to contextual factors during 
implementation and operationalization stages. In Brazil, the use of market instruments for 
Reducing Emissions of Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) has been banned 
from mainstream practices due to sovereignty concerns (Aubertin, 2015; Van der Hoff  
et al., 2015). Alternatively, the trade in forest certificates, established by the Brazilian Forest 
Code, has been debated since at least the late 1990s (Weigand Jr, 1998), but has still not 
been operationalized at the federal level, even after two decades of political debate 
(May et al., 2015; Soares-Filho et al., 2016). This difficulty of operationalizing market 
instruments in Brazil raises questions about the underlying factors that trump political 
and practical development. 
Few scholars have shed light on the development of market instruments for environmental 
governance in an attempt to answer this question. Empirical studies on the rise of 
emissions trading in the United States acknowledged that early market designs 
“represented the state-of-the-art in economic theory”, but argued that hindrances reflect 
“the messiness of reality” that demands technical fixes or ‘repairs’ to the original market 
design in order to “secure acceptance by target groups and the wider public” (Lane, 2012; 
Voß, 2007, pp. 335-336). These technical fixes laid the foundation for a ‘regime formation’ 
phase, in which the operationalization of market instruments became more commonplace 
(Voß, 2007). Already taking these foundations for granted, studies of emissions trading 
in Europe have identified the high costs of switching to alternative policies as main 
debilitating factor to policy change, although they were incrementally decreasing. 
In addition, the use of market instruments became increasingly more attractive as 
policy-makers became more knowledgeable and political pressures were building 
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(Woerdman, 2004). Chinese market instruments have similarly adjusted to the context of 
political interests, which have mainly revolved around economic growth (Hübler et al., 
2014; Jiang et al., 2014; Zhang et al., 2014). These studies have characterized the operation-
alization of market instruments either as a process of technological development, as 
build-up of political momentum and opportunity, or as process of contextual embedding. 
At the same time, they reflect a bias towards market instruments for emissions and air 
pollution, and emphasize how and why operationalization has been successful rather 
than problematic.
This research paper aims to contribute to this literature by analyzing the underlying factors 
of the problematic operationalization of trading forest certificates in Brazil. This market 
instrument is particularly interesting as it is rooted in the same foundations for emissions 
trading (Weigand Jr, 1998) while at the same time having a completely different function 
(May et al., 2015; Soares-Filho et al., 2016). Section 5.2 develops our analytical approach 
based on the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), particularly emphasizing the concept 
of policy learning and drawing on literature on organizational learning and knowledge 
utilization for refinement. Section 5.3 presents the empirical findings of this research, 
analyzing how advocacy coalitions understand spatial trade boundaries, identify buyers 
and sellers, and negotiate the possibility to go beyond compensation. We discuss the 
results of this analysis in section 5.4 and present conclusions in section 5.5.
5.2.   Obstacles to policy operationalization in advocacy 
coalitions
Although definitions and applications of policy learning have varied significantly across 
studies, it has been generally identified as a fundamental building block for achieving 
policy change, altering social behavior and attaining adaptive governance (Bennett & 
Howlett, 1992; Moyson, Scholten, & Weible, 2017; Pahl-Wostl, 2009). Despite the variety of 
approaches, policy learning generally involves an agency (e.g. individual, group, network) 
obtaining new knowledge or experience about a policy issue (e.g. process, program, 
ideas) in order to influence the policy process towards organizational, policy or societal 
change (Bennett & Howlett, 1992). Sabatier (1988, p. 133) defines policy-oriented learning 
as “relatively enduring alterations of thought or behavioral intentions which result from 
experience and which are concerned with the attainment (or revision) of policy objectives”. 
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Moreover, this approach “assumes that scientific and technical information plays an 
important role in modifying the beliefs of policy participants” that aim to influence 
policy-making processes (Sabatier & Weible, 2007, p. 192). For this definition to be useful 
for analyzing the operationalization of trading forest certificates in Brazil, it is helpful to 
circumscribe policy-learning within the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) from which 
it was derived.
The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) addresses political issues at the level of the 
policy subsystem, which “consists of actors from a variety of public and private 
organizations who are actively concerned with a policy problem or issue […] and who 
regularly seek to influence public policy in that domain” (Sabatier, 1998, p. 99). Furthermore, 
these actors tend to group together in advocacy coalitions on the basis of shared deep 
core beliefs (i.e. general assumptions about reality), policy core beliefs (i.e. subsystem-wide 
applications of deep core beliefs) and secondary beliefs (i.e. detail applications of policy 
core beliefs). Aamodt (2018), for example, has analyzed the political competition between 
a climate advocacy coalition and an agrobusiness advocacy coalition within a climate 
policy subsystem in Brazil. Although the ACF identifies policy subsystem as the most 
appropriate level of analysis, other scholars have argued that “formation of informal 
networks in early stages of change is essential” in (adaptive) environmental policy-making 
(Pahl-Wostl, 2009, p. 361). As policies-making develops, it moves to more formal settings 
like commissions or organizations and becomes established in formal documents like 
laws and programs. Policy learning, therefore, is done by the participants in the policy 
process in both informal and formal networks in order to advocate specific political 
objectives. As we elaborate in section 5.3, while some aspects of the Brazilian market in 
forest certificates may occur in formal networks (e.g. national congress), the operational-
ization of this market also relied on an informal network.
Like the belief systems of advocacy coalitions, policy learning has recently become 
understood as a layered process of different intensity and complexity levels. In the 
literature on organizational learning, these layers have been recognized as single-, double-, 
and triple-loop learning, although the latter has been variously conceptualized by 
different scholars (Tosey, Visser, & Saunders, 2012). While single- and double-loop learning 
refer to processes of correcting erroneous practices and adjusting objectives, respectively 
(Argyris & Schön, 1978), triple-loop learning generally involves processes that require a 
more systemic transformation in the way organizations operate (e.g. new organization 
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philosophy). Pahl-Wostl (2009) has applied these approaches to develop a conceptual 
framework for adaptive resource governance. In this framework, single-, double- and 
triple-loop learning refer to “a refinement of actions”, “a change in frame of reference [and] 
guiding assumptions”, and “a transformation of the structural context”, respectively 
(p. 359). For the purposes of our analysis, we attribute single-loop learning to the layer of 
secondary beliefs, double-loop learning to the layer of policy core beliefs and preferences, 
and triple-loop learning to deep core beliefs. This approach corresponds with ACF’s 
claim that policy-learning is most likely to affect only secondary beliefs and, in fewer 
cases, policy core beliefs or preferences, while deep core beliefs tend to remain unshaken 
(Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier & Weible, 2007). 
Although policy-oriented learning is one of the principal factors that contribute to policy 
change, the impacts of new knowledge and experience are often limited to incremental 
changes. Sabatier and Weible (2007) describe how advocacy coalitions apply perpetual 
filters that absorbs information corresponding with their beliefs and excludes information 
that contradicts them. Drawing on literature on knowledge utilization, we may further 
enrich this understanding of how policy participants deal with new knowledge and 
experiences. Bax (2011), for example, argues that new knowledge (and, for that matter, 
experiences) could be used for solving known policy problems (instrumental), identifying 
new problems (conceptual), legitimizing political stances (strategic) or resolving conflicts 
(reconciliatory). Boezeman (2015) adds that knowledge (and experience) may be 
transformed in order to align with political contexts, yet these transformations could 
essentially return to similar uses or shift to alternative uses. By contrast, Rayner (2012) 
described how knowledge (and experiences) could be considered ‘uncomfortable’ and, 
consequently, policy participants may not acknowledge its existence (denial), question its 
accuracy or relevance (dismissal), create distractive activities (diversion) or manage a 
representation of the main problem (displacement). The absorption and utilization of 
different knowledge and experience types, on the one hand, and the resistance to 
uncomfortable knowledge and experience, on the other, is useful to more clearly analyze 
the different processes by which participants aim to influence processes of policy-making.
Policy-oriented learning is only one of four factors that may help or hinder policy change. 
Since the inception of the ACF, external shocks were recognized to be the major 
contributing factor to policy change, which may involve changes in socioeconomic 
conditions, changes in systemic governing coalitions and policy decisions and impacts 
from other subsystems (Sabatier, 1988). Climate change politics in Brazil, for example, were 
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affected by a shift in power relations between advocacy coalitions in 2010 due to changes 
in governmental composition (Aamodt, 2018). As the ACF developed over time, theorists 
have recognized that policy change may also be induced by internal shocks (e.g. disasters 
within the policy subsystem) or may be achieved through a negotiated agreement 
between advocacy coalitions (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). While these factors (external 
shocks, internal shocks and negotiated agreement) have been presented as distinct from 
policy learning, we argue that they are absorbed (or rejected) in the policy learning 
processes of advocacy coalitions in order to effectuate policy change either through 
competition or negotiation. In this respect, external shocks, internal shocks and 
negotiation may feed into single-, double-, or triple-loop learning processes as new 
knowledge or experiences on the basis of which advocacy coalitions continue to influence 
policy-making. In case of a change in government regime, for example, advocacy 
coalitions learn to accept (or reject) the new governmental configuration, retreat from 
particular political positions or refrain from particular argumentations, and review their 
strategic approach to the new policy-making setup. All these occurrences may also affect 
their belief system to some extent, as reflected in single-, double-, or triple-loop learning.
The literature on the operationalization of market instruments has generally described 
policy learning as linear development processes towards implementation and operation-
alization. The conceptual repairs or fixes to market instruments, as identified by Voß (2007), 
reflect a gradual incorporation of experiences from interaction with reality that develops 
from gestation to regime formation. Similarly, Lane (2012) has elaborated how the 
provision of empirical evidence to previously theoretical claims have contributed to the 
mainstreaming of an emissions trading system in the United States. Woerdman (2004, 
p. 270) described how “the availability, quality and dissemination of information on permit 
trading among policy-makers improved over time”, evolving from a stage of unawareness 
or misunderstanding to a stage of active proposal, development and eventual 
implementation of a European directive. Emergent emissions trading systems in China, 
finally, build on past experiences elsewhere (e.g. economic crises and emissions trading in 
Europe) for applying an ‘intensity-based cap’ that shifts in accordance with economic 
conjuncture (Hübler et al., 2014; Jiang et al., 2014, p. 18; Zhang et al., 2014). Although 
these studies widely differ in their descriptions of policy learning processes, often without 
much detail, they seem to agree that policy learning contributed to enhancing the 
likelihood of implementation and operationalization. This does not disqualify observations 
that external and internal events have been decisive, which corresponds with ACF 
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propositions. For instance, policy learning was only one of several factors that have 
enabled emissions trading in Europe, including implementation of permit trading in some 
countries, the consequent drop in switching costs and the sudden withdrawal of the 
United States from negotiations (Woerdman, 2004).
These studies have shed light on the inception, development and operationalization of 
market instruments for environmental governance, but the implicit linearity of these 
processes may not accurately apply to all cases. According to the timeline developed by 
Voß (2007), the development of market instruments, arguably initiated in 1960 with 
Coase´s (1960) milestone publication, has taken 17 years to the first materialization in the 
United States and another 21 years to enter the ‘regime formation’ phase. Meanwhile, 
individual market instruments have taken less and less time to materialize in their 
respective contexts. Emissions trading in Europe had been developed in less than 10 years 
between the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 and the adoption of the European 
directive in 2003 (Woerdman, 2004). Emissions trading in China has been surging in even 
less time, with the first pilots emerging after only 4 years of communicating its national 
commitments (Zhang et al., 2014). These studies suggest that the timespan of operation-
alization processes tend to shorten as the use of market instruments becomes more 
commonplace. However, this implication starkly contrasts with other initiatives that have 
been much slower to develop, most notably the forest certificates market in Brazil. 
This market instrument has been in development for over 20 years since its first 
manifestation in scientific and political debates (Weigand Jr, 1998) without any prospects 
of operationalization by Brazilian legislators (May et al., 2016; Soares-Filho et al., 2016). 
These observations question whether policy learning is indeed a linear process towards 
operationalization and challenge the implication that these processes tend to shorten 
over time. Our study aims to clarify this by analyzing the role of policy learning in the 
 operationalization of the Brazilian trade in forest certificates.
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5.3.  Research methodology
The primary research data for analyzing this policy subsystem involves 13 semi-structured 
interviews with relevant stakeholders in the construction of a market for trading forest 
certificates, some of whom we interviewed more than once. Research data on the CRF 
market includes interviews with former representatives at the ministry of environment 
and ministry of finance. Research data on the CRA market includes interviews with 
 representatives of the ministry of environment (MMA) and ministry of finance (MF), 
environmental NGOs, agricultural organizations, universities and private organizations. 
All interviews were conducted in Portuguese, recorded and transcribed, and analyzed 
using open coding methods that focused primarily on the knowledge utilization 
categories and were organized in concert with political conflicts that emerged from the 
data (see next section). In addition to interviews, this research paper also builds on many 
secondary data sources. Document analysis mainly involves legal documents related to 
the Forest Code, such as laws, decrees and MPs. In addition, we analyzed 14 bills (PLs) that 
were discussing in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate between 1999 and 2011, 
including the relevant plenary debates, deputy opinions and substitutive versions). For 
the analysis of these documents, we have used a Forest Code database that was 
constructed for a broader analysis of the political development of the Forest Code. Other 
documents involve ten draft versions of the CRA decree between 2014 and 2017, which 
document the progress of political debates. These latter documents provided crucial for 
tracking the more recent development of specific trade elements. The research has also 
benefited from minutes of meetings at the Brazilian Environmental Council (CONAMA – 
Portuguese acronym) between 1996 and 2001, which has made important contributions 
to the political debates on the development of the CRF market. In addition to document 
analysis, this paper also relies on participant observation during a series of informal 
meetings on the formulation of a CRA decree, which took place in Brasília between 2014 
and 2017. Policy participants who attended these meetings include the second author of 
this paper, governmental organizations, environmental NGOs, private companies and 
agricultural organizations (more detail in the next section). The triangulation of interview 
analysis, graphical visualization of collective interpretations, document analysis and 
participant observations safeguard the validity of research findings.
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5.4.  Development of trading forest certificates
The inception and early development of the Brazilian trade in forest certificates was 
situated in a highly volatile political climate for advocating environmental concerns. 
 Environmentalist sympathies had built up in the late 1980s and early 1990s , while the 
Cardoso administration (1995-2002) manifested a strong interest in using market 
instruments (Viola, 2004; Zhouri, 2004). In this context, the idea took hold that trading forest 
certificates could enhance compliance with the Brazilian Forest Code (law 4.771/1965), 
which was based on observations from nature conservation developments in the United 
States (Weigand Jr, 1998). This idea was absorbed during a legal amendment process, or 
provisional measure (MP), for the Forest Code that was initiated by the executive branches 
of the Ministry of Agriculture (MAPA) and the Ministry of Environment (MMA) in 1996 
(MP1.511) and concluded by constitutional amendment in 2001 (MP 2.166-67)6. During this 
period, the development process passed through the National Environmental Commission 
(CONAMA), the advisory committee of MMA, after a representative of the Northeastern 
Environmental Entities called attention to the amendment process in a meeting in 
November 1999. The efforts of CONAMA, elaborated by a technical committee and debated 
in a meeting in March 2000, have contributed to the first appearance of the market for 
Forest Reserve Quota (CRF) in MP1.956-50 in May 2000. Despite these extensive debates, 
the adoption of the CRF market in 2001 provided very little detail on how it would function 
and left much open to the interpretation of legislators in subsequent years.
The Lula administration (2003-2010) had been a very favorable period for advancing 
environmental interests and was indeed very productive in terms of new environmental 
legislation and institutions as well as notable reductions in deforestation rates (Viola & 
Franchini, 2014). Nonetheless, it had also been a period in which the MMA and the Ministry 
of Finance (MF) made unsuccessful efforts to regulate the CRF market. By the end of the 
term, environmentalist influences reached a peak and economic concerns were on the 
rise, turning the tides once the Rousseff administration (2011-2016) took office (Aamodt, 
6  Before 2001, MPs were temporary legal documents that had a validity of 30 days after adoption. In this respect, 
the development of MP 1.511-01 (1996) to MP 1.956-50 (2000) to MP 2.166-67 (2001) reflects a monthly renewal of 
this document, all referring to the same legislative process albeit with minor or major adjustments. In September 
2001, the lower house and the senate adopted a constitutional amendment stating that, due to new regulations 
for issuing MPs, all MPs in progress will maintain their legal status until formally revoked. This means that the 
provisions in MP 2.166-67, including the establishment of the CRF market, remained in vigor without requiring 
consecutive renewal each month.
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2018; Viola & Franchini, 2014). Aamodt (2018) observed that power shifted from a climate 
advocacy coalition to an agribusiness advocacy coalition.  One of the consequences of 
these events involved the growing support for a proposal to alter the Forest Code, which 
involved a ‘legalization of illegalities’ and a general ‘flexibilization of regularization 
requirements’ (Antunes, 2013; Garcia, 2012; Sauer & França, 2012) in spite of many early 
warnings from scientists (Metzger, 2010; Silva et al., 2012; Sparovek, Barretto, Klug, Papp, 
& Lino, 2011; Sparovek, Berndes, Barretto, & Klug, 2012). The intense debates culminated in 
the adoption of a new Forest Code (law 12.651) in 2012 and had substantial consequences 
for the trade in forest certificates, now called Environmental Reserve Quota (CRA), that 
became manifested from 2013 onwards. Firstly, the Socialism and Liberty party (PSOL) and 
the attorney general of the republic, supported by several environmental groups and 
organizations, submitted an appeal to the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality 
of the new Forest Code. In addition, scientists had begun to engage in political debates 
on the operationalization of the market, evaluating its viability and, more importantly, 
critically identifying problematic trade-offs between environmental integrity of Brazilian 
ecosystems and low compliance costs for rural landowners (Bernasconi, Blumentrath, 
Barton, Rusch, & Romeiro, 2016; May et al., 2015; Silva & Ranieri, 2014; Soares-Filho et al., 
2016). These debates, however, had emerged in a political climate that was increasingly 
becoming unfavorable to environmental interests (Aamodt, 2018; Fearnside, 2016; 
Rochedo et al., 2018).
Throughout the history of developing and operationalizing the trade in forest certificates, 
three themes have been central to political debates and were the main conductors to 
conflict between advocacy coalitions. These themes concern (1) the nature and purpose 
of the market, (2) spatial trade boundaries, and (3) buyer and seller identification. While 
these conflicts have been derived from our empirical observations, they were already 
identified as such in the available literature, particularly after the adoption of the new 
Forest Code in 2012. The nature and purpose of the market emerged as a potential issue 
when Soares-Filho et al. (2016) coined the idea of forest certificates beyond compensation. 
In the same study, scenarios with different spatial trade boundaries were evaluated for 
market viability, while others have argued that this definition may involve trade-offs 
between environmental protection and economic efficiency (May et al., 2016). Finally, 
the identification of buyers and sellers was particularly problematized by Nunes et al. 
(2016), who distinguished between forest certificates from areas that cannot be used 
other than for compensation (i.e. ‘compensation-only surpluses) and those from areas that 
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are under threat (i.e. ‘deforestable surpluses’). We discuss these conflicts in more detail in 
the sections below. In line with Aamodt´s (2018) findings, these conflicts reveal two 
advocacy coalitions: an environmental integrity coalition and a legal flexibility coalition.
5.4.1.  Nature and purpose of trading forest certificates
Political debates on the nature and purpose of trading forest certificates were initially not 
manifested as an issue, but rather as a justification for establishing the market. The first 
traces of arguments for trading forest certificates were found in an academic publication 
in mid-1998 that proposed the establishment of a market for Negotiable Forest Reserve 
Certificates (CNRF) in the Atlantic Forest in the state of Bahia, which was inspired by 
observations of emissions trading in the United States (Weigand Jr, 1998). Similar 
observations were made by MMA, as recalled by a former official:
“We saw that there were places that had more [legal reserve] than required by law, [which 
landowners] could deforest, and there were other places that […] would have to cease 
production on parts [of their lands] in order to replant forest. Would it not be more logical if 
[the latter] could rent the land of [the former]?”
Based on these observations, the proposal claims that, on the one hand, the CNRF trade 
reduces social compliance costs of environmental legislation, because it provides 
individual landowners with an alternative to reforestation that enhances the likelihood of 
them complying with the requirements of the Forest Code. On the other hand, the CNRF 
market stimulates the protection of native vegetation, which has a higher ecological 
quality in comparison with reforested areas or cacao plantations. Trading forest certificates 
was therefore thought to provide joint benefits of enhancing legal compliance, reducing 
compliance costs and stimulating environmental protection, which was also the purpose 
of the CRF market.
As the market developed, the interpretation of this purpose slightly changed its emphasis 
in accordance with broader political developments that favored agrobusiness interests 
(Aamodt, 2018; Viola & Franchini, 2014). The amendments to the Forest Code in 2001 
(MP2.166-67) by MAPA and MMA included, at least in the Amazon, raising landowner’s 
nature conservation obligations from 50% to 80% of their properties. Although the 
augmentation of this ‘Legal Reserve’ had little effect in terms of compliance to the Forest 
Code (Bacha, 2004), it did evoke a sentiment of injustice among stakeholders that were 
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sympathetic to agrobusiness interests. A former MMA leader, who took office in 2010, 
interpreted these changes as such: 
“In the end, you are imposing a restriction on the use of a private property without 
compensation. […] You were transforming a legal reserve of biomass for economic use […] 
into a legal reserve for environmental conservation”
These sentiments gave impetus to advocating legal flexibilization not only to alleviate 
rural landowners, but also for improving legal compliance with the Forest Code. An MF 
official explained this point:
“We understand that the law signaled that it is necessary to have flexibility instruments. 
We think that this is important for guaranteeing the integral compliance with legislation. 
[…] It is in the public interest that the totality of legislation is implemented.”
A comparison with the initial intension of the market for forest certificates suggests that 
rise in agribusiness advocacy and the change of administration in 2010 did not immediately 
lead to formal changes in its nature and purpose (i.e. compensation was still key), but 
placed more emphasis on allowing landowners to economically exploit their properties in 
whichever way possible. One notable example of such efforts was the transformation of 
CRF into CRA proposed by Homero Pereira, a congressman linked to the rural caucus in 
Brazil7,8 in April 2008 (PL3342), which broadened certificates to include all vegetation. This 
proposal was motivated by the high deforestation rates in preceding years, the absence 
of legislation regulating the CRF market, and the unmet expectations of various economic 
sectors. As no stakeholder had explicitly manifested diverging interpretations, advocates 
of the legal flexibility coalition were able to shift the emphasis to a broad understanding 
of compensating legal reserve deficits, although this shift would become important in 
later stages.
Manifestations by the environmental integrity coalition became more apparent after the 
Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG) published a market evaluation report in 2014. 
Although initially invited by MF to provide instrumental knowledge on economic viability 
7 http://reporterbrasil.org.br/2006/10/composicao-da-bancada-ruralista-para-2007/
8 http://fpagropecuaria.org.br/integrantes/todos-os-integrantes/
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under different regulatory scenarios, UFMG researchers proposed to aggregate the 
compensation of legal reserve deficits with the provision of ecosystem services, such as 
biodiversity protection, avoided carbon emissions and watershed protection, in a new 
concept that they called ‘xCRA’ (Soares-Filho et al., 2016). While this new concept was 
intended to resolve some of the other challenges to the operationalization of trading 
forest certificates (see below), MMA policy-makers aligned with the legal flexibility 
coalition used this concept to convey an understanding of a forest certificate market that 
is broader than mere compensation of legal deficits. An MMA official confirmed this belief: 
“... if you are regulating CRA, which says it is an environmental title, and you only say that 
CRA can be used for compensating legal reserve [deficits], you are receding. […] If you read 
[the Forest Code], you see that the intention is to be something more than just compensating 
legal reserve [deficits]”
Moreover, MMA argued that the decree initially elaborated by MF between 2013 and 2014, 
which was primarily oriented towards compensating legal reserve deficits, did not reflect 
the “intention” or “spirit” of the new Forest Code. The MMA official was therefore adamant 
that at least the possibility of trading xCRAs should be included in a decree:
“The insertions in article 41 and 44 [of the Forest Code represent] the intention that this title 
has to be something more than just compensation of legal reserve [deficits]. […] It is 
possible that we will need to have more specific regulations afterwards, but the basic 
 differentiation saying that this title also serves for these ends is something that we think we 
need to mention in this decree. […] If we would not mention this, we will [need to] think 
about another decree that does.”
Consequently, all versions of the CRA decree after 2015 articulated the possibility 
“discriminating other characteristics” than compensation, and since 2016 the section 
labelled “On Legal Reserve Compensation With CRA” was transformed into “On The Use 
Of CRA”, among other provisions. MMA also advocated the cumulative use of forest 
certificates for a single hectare in order to diversify possibilities for landowners to 
economically exploit their properties. In late March 2017, this interest was incorporated 
into a draft version of the decree by stating that “CRA could be used for other purposes of 
conserving native vegetation […] other than compensating legal reserve deficits”, whereas 
a prohibition of “cumulative CRA utilization” was removed from the text. By 2018, this 
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interpretation has become more widely advocated by other ministries like MF, further 
ingraining the advocacy of legal flexibility within federal government organizations.
MMA’s insistence on trading multiple modalities of forest certificates and allowing 
accumulation evoked various responses from other participants of the policy process. 
Firstly, some UFMG research have severely challenged the unintended interpretation of 
their concept by MMA officials, arguing that the accumulation of forest certificates is 
detrimental for the environmental integrity of nature conservation on private lands. This 
sentiment was most clearly expressed during a knowledge sharing event in March 2018, 
when one researcher demanded that “the government should for once listen to what 
science says”. A second response involves a sentiment of impatience from policy 
participants with an active interest in having a functioning market. These include MF 
officials, agricultural organizations like the Brazilian Rural Society (SRB) and private 
companies like Biofílica and BVRio, which argue that a swift implementation of the CRA 
market is both possible and necessary in order to alleviate the individual costs of forest 
restoration and conservation for private landowners. Thirdly, some observers have 
expressed that the incorporation of ecosystem services perpetuates the debate about 
what CRA certificates represent in practice. For instance, a former MMA representative 
argues the following:
“Initially it seemed to be a renunciation of the right to deforest, which was the original 
proposal […], but you do not have this right to deforest. [...] I believe it is a royalty. You have 
a right [to use] the land, so a right [to use] the groundwater and biodiversity. When you 
create the quota, you […] recognize and identify [that right], which one can sell to other 
people. We will need to have this [kind of] discussion with respect to this proposal.” 
5.4.2.  Spatial trade boundaries
The interpretive conflict on the definition and demarcation of spatial boundaries for 
trading forest certificates emerged from the outset, but was initially overshadowed by 
broader debates on the legal amendments to the Forest Code proposed by MAPA and 
MMA. This was particularly evident during a CONAMA meeting in March 2000, when a 
temporary technical committee presented and discussed their proposal. This proposal 
stated that private landowners could only compensate legal reserve deficit by acquiring 
CRFs within the same ecosystem and micro-watershed. In addition, it suggested that, in 
absence of the possibility to do so, the responsible institution may adopt the criterium of 
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“greatest possible proximity”. An MMA representative explained that these trade 
restrictions directly reflected the manifestations of an environmentalist opposition that 
defended the protection of the integrity of local ecosystems. By restricting trade to 
 micro-watersheds, legal reserve deficits could only be compensated with forested areas 
of an equivalent or identical environmental profile. Many environmental groups, including 
the SocioEnvironmental Institute (ISA), indeed expressed their satisfaction with what they 
thought to be an “intelligent proposal”. By contrast, defenders of landowner interests, 
most notably the National Confederations of Agriculture (CNA) and Industry (CNI), did not 
manifest strong opinions on the trade in forest certificates, but instead expressed their 
dissatisfaction with the legal reserve percentages. Based on these CONAMA debates, 
MAPA and MMA determined in MP1.956-50 in May 2000 that the area to be compensated 
must not only be equivalent in size but also in ‘ecological importance’ (art. 44-III) and 
extended the proximity criterium to ensure that both properties pertain to the same 
watershed and federal state (art. 44-§4).
The attempts by MMA and MF to operationalize the trade in forest certificates between 
2004 and 2010 faced some insurmountable challenges. Policy-makers became increasingly 
convinced that the trade restrictions to the micro-watershed would obstruct its opera-
tionalization, although these claims were not subjected to any scientific analysis. According 
to a former MMA representative, legislators at both MMA and MF made several attempts 
to reinterpret the Forest Code in order to amplify compensation possibilities: 
“[The restriction to] micro-watersheds prevented us from having Forest Reserve Quota. 
That is basically it. If we would not have this requirement, we could have had [CRF] titles. 
[…] We [tried in vain] whether it would not be possible to interpret the law [differently] in 
order to amplify at least this […] micro-watershed, because we wanted to enable the market”.
One of the arguments that may have contributed to this conviction was the absence of a 
single market platform for trading CRFs. An MF representative explained that “there was 
no accurate monitoring system, [so] you would talk to [potential traders] in person on the 
basis of trust”. Correspondingly, available CAR data indicates that the CRFs emitted by over 
25,000 landowners since 2001 have never been traded for the compensation of legal 
reserve deficits. Policy-makers in the federal government therefore learned from new 
experiences (or, perhaps more accurately, new interpretations) rather than new knowledge, 
that operationalization required some degree of legal flexibilization. 
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The experiences from operationalization attempts seems to have reached politicians in 
the national congress as well, since there have been several proposals to amplify spatial 
trade boundaries. Already in September 2005, for example, a project specifically directed 
at the CRF market proposed that compensation would be possible within the same state 
and biome (PL5.876, art. 5-§3). Other projects would either adopt similar requirements 
(e.g. PL5.226/2009) or allow interstate trade within the same biome (e.g. PL6.732/2010). 
The amplification also migrated with the transition from CRF to CRA in the second half of 
the 2000s. The final proposal, compiled and authored by ruralist Aldo Rebelo, had 
amplified the spatial trade boundaries by allowing trade between federal states within 
the same biome (art. 41-§3) and remained unaltered as it passed through the senate in 
2011. Despite the lack of evidence that the experiences from operationalization attempts 
were indeed transferred to these formal policy networks, this interpretation would be 
highly convenient in the context of broader political shifts that started favoring the 
 flexibilization of climate change politics (Aamodt, 2018; Viola & Franchini, 2014). 
After formal adoption of the Forest Code in 2012, there have been a few attempts, mostly 
by academic researchers and environmental organizations, to restrict the trade of forest 
certificates to federal state boundaries, but these were met with severe opposition. 
The UFMG study, for example, showed that there was enough supply of CRAs within 
the states due to the plentiful amplifications of compensation opportunities (see also 
section 5). This would remove some of MF’s initial concerns that some states may not 
generate sufficient supply should they decide to allow transactions only within their 
borders, which was expected for states like São Paulo that have already lost most of its 
forests. In addition, and going beyond the original scope of the study contracted by MF, 
the study explicitly advocated these restrictions to generate environmental benefits 
(Soares-Filho et al., 2016), thereby advocating environmental integrity. Just after the release 
of this study, a research team of the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) also 
argued that the low prices, albeit contributing to low compliance costs, would not represent 
a fair compensation for forest conservation and may compromise the environmental 
integrity as landowners are expected to trade low value CRAs first (May et al., 2015). 
Other studies have also stressed the importance of positive conservation outcomes as 
the result of trade restrictions (Bernasconi et al., 2016; Silva & Ranieri, 2014). 
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In practice, however, restricting the trade of forest certificates to federal state borders has 
proven politically difficult to sustain. The federal state government of Mato Grosso, for 
example, has received much criticism from agricultural interest groups on the contradiction 
between the federal law, which was understood to allow trade across states within the 
biome, and decree 420 in 2016, which only allowed this “if there are no available areas for 
compensation in the state of Mato Grosso” (art. 47). A representative of the Amazon 
Environmental Research Institute (IPAM) explained this criticism:
“It is the prerogative of the state to be more restrictive than national law, but this generates 
many challenges within the state. [… The decree] is suffering contestation by the agrobusiness. 
They want to know why it closed [the state boundaries], because the [national] law does not. 
The federal law is open to [trade within] the biome.”
A year later, in 2017, the state government of Mato Grosso adopted decree 1.031, revoking 
the requirements for compensation determined in the previous decree. These 
observations suggest that, as the possibility of opening up spatial trade boundaries to the 
biome is articulated in federal legislation, the frontier of these debates seemed to have 
migrated from federal to state level politics.
This lasted until February 2018, when a judgement by the Supreme Court on the matter 
compelled political debates at the federal level to return to the issue of spatial trade 
boundaries. Although the majority of the contestations in the Forest Code were contro-
versially judged constitutional, the definition of trade restrictions was not. More specifically, 
the Supreme Court has decided that trading forest certificates will only be possible if 
traders can demonstrate the ‘ecological identity’ of compensated lands. Consequently, 
the development process of the market for forest certificates had now stagnated and 
participants were looking to researchers from UFMG, USP and other organizations to 
resolve the challenge of defining and operationalizing ‘ecological identity’.
5.4.3.  Supplier definitions
Interpretive conflicts on the definition of potential suppliers only emerged in the late 
2000s, before which the legal amendment of 2001 (MP2.166-67) allowed the institution of 
forest certificates for vegetation that exceeds legal reserve requirements for private 
landowners (art. 44B). From 2008 onwards, the legal flexibility coalition increasingly 
pressured for the diversification of potential suppliers, particularly (1) properties inside 
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conservation units and (2) the legal reserves of small properties. The consideration of 
properties inside conservation units as potential suppliers to the trade of forest certificates 
stemmed from a desire to provide some compensation for the legal restrictions within 
those areas. Such leniencies were already granted by the federal state government of 
Mato Grosso do Sul since 2004 (decree 11.700, art. 11), which had established “Titles of 
Legal Reserve Quota” for compensating legal reserve deficits in other areas. At the federal 
level, properties inside conservation units were included only in 2009 with PL5.226 (art. 
37-IV) and eventually in the formally adopted Forest Code in 2012. Political debates also 
leaned towards considering smallholders as potential suppliers to the trade of forest 
certificates, which was part of broader efforts to construct a more flexible legislation. 
According to Sauer and França (2012, p. 288), “the situation of small and medium properties 
was used as an excuse for sensitizing the public opinion”, citing efforts by ruralist Katia 
Abreu to emphasize the precarious situation of these groups. In this context, ruralists 
Leonardo Monteiro (PL5.226/2009) and Valdir Colatto (PL5367/2009), among others, have 
defined smallholders as a “social interest” group that merit legal flexibility. Corresponding-
ly, the Forest Code bill that was approved in the Chamber of Deputies in May 2011 
(Substitutive Amendment 186) allowed smallholders to supply forest certificates not 
merely for surpluses but for the integral legal reserve on their properties (art. 51-§4).
The amendments that passed through the Congress occurred without consulting 
stakeholders outside the policy process, although broader critiques were articulated in 
academic publications (Metzger, 2010; Sauer & França, 2012; Sparovek et al., 2012). These 
critiques became more pronounced after the formal adoption of the Forest Code in 2012 
and particularly addressed the environmental additionality of supplied forest certificates 
(Bernasconi et al., 2016; May et al., 2015; Nunes et al., 2016; Soares-Filho et al., 2016). More 
specifically, researchers voiced their dissatisfaction with the decision in the Forest Code 
(Law 12.651) that properties inside conservation units as well as smallholders with legal 
reserve deficits could still supply forest certificates despite being prohibited from clearing 
forests (art. 38-II and art. 44-§4, respectively). Similarly, an IPAM representative, argued 
that there is support for “a CRA instrument that is cheap, flexible and allows for easy 
regularization of properties […] as long as it has environmental additionality”. An independent 
policy consultant articulated these concerns in more detail:
“The area that cannot be deforested will be inserted in the market as CRA, does not have 
any opportunity costs because it cannot be used for any other [activity], and will compete 
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in the market with those areas [suitable for] planting soy or raising cattle. This will create a 
competition that will lower prices to the level of quota without opportunity costs, thereby 
erasing the incentive to conserve the areas that require conservation.”
These concerns have had consequences for the operationalization of the market for forest 
certificates via a decree. Together with the Forest Code Observatory (OCF), an environmental 
watchdog organization, these stakeholders advocated that compensation of legal reserve 
deficits would only be possible by using certificates from ‘deforestable surpluses’ (Nunes 
et al., 2016), thus manifesting their adherence to the environmental integrity coalition.
This advocacy was strongly contested by other policy participants by dismissing the 
likelihood that these concerns will be compromised. An MMA representative maintained 
that the obligation to retain a legal reserve on private properties is unique to Brazil and 
accrues costs for individual landowners in order to provide societal benefits. At one 
extreme, a representative of Biofílica, a private company interested in facilitating the trade 
in forest certificates, assured that “the costs of regularizing your liabilities – the legal 
reserve is a liability from the perspective of the producer – will fall, [which] is better for 
society”. Other stakeholders, including some aligned with the environmental integrity 
coalition, dismissed the likeliness of some potential suppliers to even provide forest 
certificates. According to an IPAM representative, private landowners located within 
conservation units would prefer to sell their lands rather than issue CRAs: 
“[Suppose] you have a farm that today is located within a Conservation Unit, but the state 
did not pay you, did not recompense you and did not expropriate you… but you are all 
restricted. […] For you it would be interesting to leave there, and you would like the state to 
compensate for the farm and turn it all into Conservation Unit, but the state has no money. 
[…] If you have a farm within a Conservation Unit, and you emit CRA, you will not solve the 
problem.”
Smallholders also face several challenges before participation becomes feasible. First, 
every participant must have legal ownership of the property, which, according to the 
IPAM representative, “are very few, and will not unbalance the market”. Second, they must 
invest financial resources in order to register at the local notary office, register in the 
Environmental Rural Cadaster (CAR – Portuguese acronym) and gain access to the CRA 
system before participation becomes possible. According to an MF representative, the 
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high transaction costs “make it practically unviable for smallholders to issue CRAs, so […] 
this really is not a problem”. These arguments were also advanced by representatives of 
NGOs like IPAM, thereby justifying that the inclusion of minority landowners will not 
relinquish environmental protection.
The conflicts between these advocacies became particularly apparent in anticipation of a 
meeting in March 2016. Up to that point, there have been regular meetings about the CRA 
degree with various policy participants from both advocacy coalitions: the Brazilian Forest 
Service (SFB), MMA, Greenpeace, WWF, Biofílica, BVRio, UFMG and OCF. As mentioned 
earlier, however, particularly UFMG had expressed critiques related to supplier definitions 
that were denied and dismissed by the legal flexibility coalition as well as some advocates 
of the environmental integrity coalition. The initial exclusion of UFMG, among others, 
from the meeting in March 2016 therefore raised suspicions of attempts to operationalize 
the market without answering these critiques. Only after insisting did the UFMG 
representative succeed in participating in the meeting, while others were more rebellious 
and refused to do so. Such occurrences, however, are often subtle and have taken place 
in informal networks. 
5.5.  Policy learning by advocacy coalitions in Brazil
Our analysis in the previous section has reconstructed two advocacy coalitions: an 
environmental integrity coalition and a legal flexibility coalition. On the one hand, policy 
participants like academic researchers, environmental NGOs and former MMA officials 
have collaborated in defending environmental concerns throughout the process. They 
share the policy core belief that nature conservation is an important concern for 
environmental policy-making and should be given priority. This reflects their secondary 
beliefs that cumulative CRA utilization jeopardizes environmental integrity, that narrow 
trade boundaries imply better environmental protection, and that fewer suppliers could 
value native vegetation more accurately. Some environmental NGOs, such as ISA and 
IPAM, however, also share the policy core belief that disadvantaged groups like 
smallholders and landowners within conservation units should not be prejudiced. On the 
other hand, policy participants like private companies, agricultural organizations, 
governmental organizations (i.e. MF, MMA, SFB) and congressmen linked to the rural 
caucus have grouped together to advocate legal compliance. In order to achieve this, 
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their policy core belief defends the importance of legal flexibilization. This reflects in their 
secondary beliefs about how to regularize the market for forest certificates, most notably 
their advocacy of trade within the biome as well as the inclusion of ‘compensation-only’ 
certificates (Nunes et al., 2016). At the same time, this advocacy coalition may be divided by 
an alternative policy core belief that stresses the importance of a smooth implementation. 
This may reflect their secondary belief that insistence on xCRA is delaying the operation-
alization process. In spite of the conflicting differences between advocacy coalition, we 
have identified three key moments or ‘milestones’ when the operationalization process 
advanced. We discuss milestones in more detail below.
The first milestone in policy learning involved the emulation of emissions trading schemes 
in the United States and the application thereof to Brazilian land use politics. This was 
clearest articulated in the publication that proposed CNRFs, which argued that a similar 
concept could be applied to forest conservation on private lands in the Atlantic forest 
(Weigand Jr, 1998). There were no confirmations by policy participants other than the 
author that conceptual emulation was indeed the foundation for the inception of forest 
certificates trading in governmental organizations, although it preceded any other 
reference in governmental documents. Despite this unclarity, it seems that policy learning 
did not have substantial impacts on the operationalization process. The initial adoption in 
2001 had provided very little detail on how to regulate the market and, as mentioned in 
section 5.4.2, had never resulted in any transactions. The shifting political climate in the 
2000s changed this. The Lula administration began spending an average of USD 1 billion 
per year on strengthening its previously weak monitoring and enforcement institutions, 
thereby exerting even more pressure on individual landowners to comply with demanding 
legal reserve requirements (Bacha, 2004; Cunha et al., 2016; Viola & Franchini, 2014). As 
deforestation rates declined, it raised sympathies towards private landowners. A former 
MMA official, for example, recalled that “the Forest Reserve Quota, which was already a 
good idea at the time, became even more important, because it [reduces the costs] of 
regularization”. One may therefore argue that this first milestone in policy learning did not 
have immediate consequences, but laid the foundation for future developments.
The second milestone in policy learning involved the failed attempts to operationalize the 
market for forest certificates and the realization that the narrow spatial trade boundaries 
obstructed this objective. This moment of policy learning, which gradually built up 
between 2004 and 2010, occurred for a very limited number of policy participants (i.e. 
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MMA and MF) who were working on the decree. Although clear evidence is absent, an MF 
official speculated that “as the executive power did not regulate and implement [the 
market], the legislative [power] therefore wanted to bring everything into the law in order 
to leave little room for requiring regulation”, thus suggesting that legislators had learned 
from this ‘experiential knowledge’. There were few critiques on the amplification of spatial 
trade boundaries by the environmental conservation coalition, but one may argue that 
most critiques were directed at broader changes to the Forest Code. A research team of 
the University of São Paulo (USP), for example, argued that “the proposed reductions in 
legal requirements […] are so far-reaching in the substitutive [Forest Code] that off-farm 
compensation requirements may become essentially zero (Sparovek et al., 2011). In a later 
publication, they acknowledged that spatial trade boundaries were initially too narrow 
(i.e. within same watershed) for allowing compensation to occur, but became too broad 
(i.e. within same biome) to ensure any effective protection of natural vegetation (Sparovek 
et al., 2011). These critiques, however, were either unheard or denied by the legislators 
discussing the new Forest Code at the time, who were generally sympathetic to the 
agribusiness coalition (Aamodt, 2018). 
The third and final milestone in policy learning involved the surge in critical studies on the 
operationalization of the market for forest certificates, most notably the UFMG study, and 
the political conflicts that they instigated. Rather than merely providing the instrumental 
knowledge on market viability, as MF had invited UFMG to provide, UFMG researchers had 
taken the opportunity to raise a number of conceptual concerns related to the amplification 
of spatial trade boundaries and supplier definitions. This is where perpetual filters were 
most clearly manifested. Although many studies had advocated to keep spatial trade 
boundaries narrow (i.e. within federal states), pressure from regional agricultural 
organizations were adamant to dismiss the justice of such restrictions in some states by 
pointing out the federal leniency towards trading across state boundaries. Likewise, the 
concerns about the environmental additionality of some suppliers were dismissed by 
claiming that high transaction costs will complicate participation for smallholders and 
properties within conservation units would prefer alternative regularization options, 
although such claims have not been subject to investigation. This latter event also reflects 
a slight change in policy core preferences by socioenvironmental organizations as their 
social concerns became more pronounced. Admittedly, impeding potential suppliers of 
certificates from ‘compensation- only surpluses (e.g. smallholder’s legal reserves), as 
argued by UFMG and others, also denies the legitimacy of Brazilian legislation. The UFMG 
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study had another important effect on policy learning by proposing a forest certificates 
market that goes beyond the compensation of legal reserve deficits (i.e. xCRA). Contrary 
to the concerns about environmental additionality, this conceptual novelty was readily 
absorbed by advocates of legal flexibility, most notably MMA, and was even adapted to 
allow for accumulation. This latter attempt, however, was all but reconciliatory and implies 
single-loop learning rather than the envisaged double-loop learning. In addition to 
prompting a critical response from environmental additionality advocates, particularly 
academic researchers, it also evoked dissatisfaction among several advocates of the legal 
flexibility coalition who favored a swift implementation, which implies a difference in 
 policy-preferences that may develop into the formation of a new advocacy coalition.
Throughout the history of developing and operationalizing the Brazilian market in forest 
certificates, political debates have been highly sensitive to external events and shocks. 
The inception of the Brazilian trade in forest certificates, firstly, was mainly possible due to 
increased sympathy towards the use of market instruments during the Cardoso 
administration (1996-2002) (Viola, 2004). Secondly, the experiences with operationalizing 
the forest certificate market between 2004 and 2010 coincided with an increasingly 
influential agrobusiness coalition (Aamodt, 2018; Viola & Franchini, 2014). During this 
period, most advocates of environmental protection were more concerned with broader 
dynamics in political debates on altering the Forest Code, as the surge in academic 
research testifies (Metzger et al., 2010; Sparovek et al., 2012). By the time environmentalist 
interests became more closely engaged in the operationalization of the trade in forest 
certificates, the political climate had become highly favorable to agrobusiness interests. In 
addition, the unstable political climate, such as the impeachment of the Rousseff 
administration and transition to the Temer administration in 2016, had contributed to 
substantial delays in market operationalization as policy participants stagnated the 
process in uncertain anticipation of unfolding events. A similar event might have occurred 
in anticipation of the 2018 elections, but the Supreme Court’s decision in February 2018 
had already shaken up the operationalization debates. Compelling legislators to consider 
the demonstration of ‘ecologically identical’ forest certificates by traders, this shock event 
implies the reprising importance of spatial trade boundaries in political debates that 
appears to favor advocates of environmental protection. In addition, policy participants 
now look to researchers to provide the instrumental knowledge for operationalizing this 
concept of ‘ecological identity’.
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5.6.  Conclusion
Our analysis of the operationalization of trading forest certificates in Brazil has provided 
empirical evidence for the proposition that many factors that induce policy change can 
also lead to policy stagnation. Mainly external factors have been influential, which 
corresponds with the ACF. For instance, broader political developments, such as 
administration changes and power shifts, have indirectly bolstered the legal flexibility 
coalition, but the operationalization processes have been thrown upside down after the 
Supreme Court´s decision in 2018. This contrasts with evidence from other studies that 
demonstrate how external factors have been conducive of policy change (e.g. Woerdman, 
2004). Policy learning has been an important driving force for advancing the trade in 
forest certificates, which is exemplified by the emulation of foreign trading schemes, 
learning from ‘experiential knowledge’, and the absorption of new ‘formal’ knowledge on 
certificates beyond compensation. At the same time, an important factor of these learning 
processes involves the perpetual filters applied by the advocacy coalitions. Although the 
environmental integration coalition used such filters to some extent (e.g. denial of legal 
provisions), the use of perpetual filters by the legal flexibility coalition, most notably 
federal governmental organizations, have made important contributions to political 
conflicts and policy stagnation. More specifically, while ‘experiential knowledge’ was 
readily absorbed, most ‘scientific’ knowledge was heavily filtered only to support evidence 
of a functioning market (e.g. UFMG study), instigating conflict, or the diversification of 
compensation opportunities (e.g. xCRA), delaying the process. These observations 
contrast with the argument that market operationalization is a linear process that adapts 
to reality (Voß, 2007) or that increased learning leads to higher probability of implementation 
(Woerdman, 2004).
A way out of this policy stagnation will not be simple. The first task at hand, compelled by 
the Supreme Court’s decision, is to sort out how to operationalize the concept of 
‘ecological identity’. Secondly, while the advocacy coalitions are not on equal footing, as 
would be expected, our findings denote a particularly underappreciated role of scientific 
knowledge, since knowledge utilization has almost exclusively been instrumental without 
much regard for critical perspectives. By contrast, the operationalization process has 
generally been guided by experiential knowledge. This seems to be symptomatic of 
broader trends in Brazilian environmental politics (Aamodt, 2018; Metzger, 2010). Future 
research efforts therefore need to address this issue in order to improve knowledge 
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utilization and policy learning processes. This would also require policy-makers to 
reconsider these relations in order to reduce political conflicts and reduce oscillations of 
operationalization processes.
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6.1.   The ambivalent politics of market instruments for 
forest governance
Debates on the use of financial markets for forest governance has been highly polemic. 
Particularly the use of market instruments has been widely advocated by some economists 
(Lane, 2012; Mendelsohn, 2006; Voß, 2007) and fiercely criticized by researchers from other 
disciplines (e.g. Kosoy & Corbera, 2010; Melathopoulos & Stoner, 2015). Historical analyses 
on the influence of economic thought on environmental governance have repeatedly 
confirmed that market instruments are firmly rooted in economic theory (Baveye et al., 
2013; Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2010; Gómez-Baggethun & Muradian, 2015; Gómez- 
Baggethun & Naredo, 2015) that has supported their prolific implementation in various 
political contexts (Bullock, 2012; Lane, 2012; Voß, 2007; Woerdman, 2004; Zhang et al., 2014). 
In forest governance, however, this use of market instruments has been much more 
problematic, particularly in the context of REDD+ debates. Many scholars have recognized 
that the initial offset-based REDD+ concept has evoked substantial criticism from some 
national governments (Carvalho, 2012) as well as various interest groups (Boas, 2011; 
Cabello & Gilbertson, 2011), especially after more stakeholders were included in international 
debates (Den Besten et al., 2014). These critiques were able to divert institutionalization 
away from carbon offsets towards a performance-based aid mechanism (Angelsen, 2017; 
Brockhaus et al., 2017). The case of REDD+ underscores that market instruments for 
environmental problems are the outcome of essentially political processes, as already 
argued by some scholars (e.g. Den Besten et al., 2014). Although this outcome represents 
an agreement among stakeholders to some extent, the previous chapters have 
demonstrated that it is still rife with ambivalence, paradoxes and contradictions. These 
factors account for the lingering political debates on the use of financial instruments. 
Forest governance in Brazil has been particularly interesting for its ambiguous use of 
financial instruments. On the one hand, the Brazilian government has been notorious for 
resisting the trade of carbon offsets from avoided deforestation in an international market, 
as was initially proposed in the context of both CDM and REDD+ (Carvalho, 2012), which 
denotes an impediment to market instruments for forest governance. Instead, Brazil 
established the Amazon Fund in order to channel results-based payments to REDD+ 
projects. On the other hand, Brazilian legislation furnishes the possibility of trading forest 
certificates for private landowners since at least 2001, which depicts quite a different 
approach to market instruments for forest governance. The introduction of this dissertation 
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already considered that the apparent motives for blocking offset-based approaches to 
REDD+ (i.e. sovereignty concerns) do not apply to domestic markets, but this cannot 
explain why the operationalization of forest certificates trading, as reconstructed in 
chapter 5, has been so challenging. Justifications for the prevalence of either economic 
rationales (e.g. cost-effectiveness) or their critiques from various literature strands remain 
unable to explain the prominence of some approaches to environmental problems over 
others, much less the confluence of contradictory approaches within a singular institutional 
context (Melathopoulos & Stoner, 2015). The coexistence of these approaches within the 
same institutional context in Brazil (see May et al., 2016) indeed poses an apparent 
paradox that remains unresolved, perpetuating questions about how Brazil is able to both 
oppose and propose the use of market instruments. These questions are linked to broader 
issues about which financial instruments are most adequate for reducing deforestation 
and were the focus of this dissertation.
This dissertation set out to untangle and illuminate the ambiguity surrounding the use of 
financial instruments for forest governance purposes and refine the understanding about 
how such instruments materialize in complex political contexts. Although the initial focus 
on the REDD+ concept has been broadened in accordance with political developments 
in Brazil (see section 1.7), it has been very central in national and international forest 
governance debates. With an implementation process that is already a few years ahead 
(Piffer Salles, Paiva Salinas, & Paulino, 2017; Turnhout et al., 2016; Voigt & Ferreira, 2015), 
there is much to learn from the case of REDD+ materialization in Brazil. These lessons not 
only comprise the performance of financial instruments like the Amazon Fund and the 
Green Climate Fund, but also their coexistence with instruments like the trade in forest 
certificates that seem paradoxical given the opposition to markets for REDD+. The analyses 
presented in preceding chapters have reconstructed the institutionalization of financial 
instruments for forest governance in Brazil in the 2000s and 2010s, focusing on the 
polarization between market instruments and results-based funding. These analyses 
contribute to answering the central research question presented in the introduction of 
this dissertation, namely:
How have the possibilities for using financial instruments for reducing deforestation in 
Brazil been shaped and reshaped in processes of political discourse and institutionaliza-
tion, and what factors and mechanisms underlie these processes?
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This final chapter aims to answer this research question by presenting four main 
conclusions. The first two conclusions, presented in section 6.2 and 6.3, argue that the 
REDD+ concept has not evolved into a financial mechanism, as much literature would 
suggest. Instead, REDD+ became a common set of objectives and conditions for which 
financial resources are mobilized in order to support forest governance in attaining them. 
As the results-based payments for REDD+ descend from international to national to 
subnational/project levels of governance, this carbon-centered concept dissolves into the 
forest governance nexus in Brazil and loses clarity about how projects contribute to 
emission reductions to the point that they are no longer recognizable as such. The third 
and fourth conclusions focus on the social structures and political controversies that 
govern the materialization of financial instruments (sections 6.4 and 6.5). On the one hand, 
these debates are also constrained by the formal rules (or interpretations thereof) provided 
by national legislation and international agreements. On the other hand, debates on the 
use of financial instruments must largely adhere to the epistemic foundations of ‘ruptured 
dependence’, which not only underlie the perpetual advocacy of market instruments but 
also the critiques on the performance of results-based funding. The chapter concludes 
with some considerations for policy-making (section 6.6) and reflections on the research 
of this dissertation (section 6.7).
6.2.  REDD+ is not a financial mechanism
At least part of the ambivalence, paradoxes and contradictions related to the use of 
financial instruments for REDD+ could be attributed to the very diffuse conceptualization 
in scholarly literature. Many scholars have characterized REDD+ as an innovative policy 
design involving numerous approaches to benefit-sharing mechanisms (Dunlop & 
Corbera, 2016; Luttrell et al., 2013; Pham et al., 2013), forest governance structures (Brockhaus 
et al., 2014; Vatn & Vedeld, 2013) and financial instruments (e.g. Chiroleu-Assouline, Poudou, 
& Roussel, 2018; Norman & Nakhooda, 2014; Stephan, 2012). While acknowledging 
these design elements, international negotiations on forest governance have agreed on 
a progressive materialization of REDD+ (i.e. phased approach), starting with the build-up 
of REDD+ readiness (i.e. policy development), moving towards implementation phase 
(i.e. policy implementation) and culminating in results-based actions (Angelsen, 2017; 
Brockhaus et al., 2017). These features would indeed characterize REDD+ as a financial 
instrument for results-based payments that rewards and incentivizes the attainment of 
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emission reductions. However, this does not entirely resonate with the findings in this 
dissertation. Chapter 2 has made clear that while the Amazon Fund indeed plays a central 
role in the dominant sustainable development discourse, other financial instruments, 
particularly carbon offsetting, have materialized in parallel. Moreover, chapter 3 has 
argued that although the dominant sustainable development discourse indeed supported 
projects based on broader criteria than their contribution to emission reductions, the 
donations of financial resources were still exclusively grounded within an emission 
reduction rationale. These findings indicate that both the practical approaches to and 
financial instruments for reducing emissions from deforestation are politically defined 
and vary greatly, but the analyses in this dissertation provide evidence for the retainment 
of emission reductions as central objective. This leads to the first conclusion: rather than 
being a financial mechanism, REDD+ articulates the common objective of emission 
reductions that mobilizes and channels a diversity of financial resources and other forms 
of support.
Evidence for the retainment of emission reductions as the central objective of REDD+ is 
abundant, but one may argue that REDD+ transcends this narrow objective by including 
safeguards and co-benefits (e.g. Aicher, 2014). These elements are certainly important 
requirements for results-based payments from the Green Climate Fund (Voigt & Ferreira, 
2015) and, as elaborated in chapter 4, the Brazilian government has been developing 
SISREDD+ since 2018. According to the same chapter, however, there is no clear evidence 
that these safeguards have a compelling influence on the mobilization of financial 
resources for the attainment of emission reductions. The Amazon Fund, for example, did 
not articulate any reference to safeguards in its documentation, which was a concern 
articulated by several stakeholders in the process of consolidating BNDES as a recipient 
organization of financial resources from the Green Climate Fund. Moreover, there is no 
clear evidence that performance evaluations for safeguards and co-benefits may instigate 
or affect the mobilization of financial resources for REDD+. The findings in chapter 3 
further emphasize that the performance or results in terms of emission reductions are 
the foundation for the financial transactions from donor to recipient country and have 
been the central factor for clashing interpretations on these results. As a consequence, 
safeguards and co-benefits may denote mere auxiliary rather than central requirements 
for the mobilization of financial resources for attaining emission reductions. 
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Conceptualizing REDD+ as the common objective of emission reductions helps to 
understand the parallel emergence and materialization of diverging and sometimes 
conflicting discourses. Indeed, it resonates with the acknowledgement in the Warsaw 
Framework for REDD+ that finance may come from a variety of sources (Voigt & Ferreira, 
2015), thereby allowing different stakeholders to hold different interpretations on which 
financial instrument is most appropriate. The Amazon Fund and other Brazilian REDD+ 
institutions, on the one hand, impose an approach that strongly refrains from carbon 
offsetting and renders appeals to alternative financial instruments, particularly carbon 
offsetting, illegitimate. On the other hand, chapter 2 confirmed that these alternative 
financial instruments are nonetheless materializing in the form of a carbon conservation 
discourse, as illustrated by the engagement of Amazonian state governments in a 
Californian REDD+ initiative for offsetting emissions (Lueders et al., 2014). Furthermore, 
these appeals to carbon offsetting have also applied discursive pressure on the dominant 
approach to financial instruments. Chapter 4 has illustrated how state government officials 
have pressured REDD+ institutions to provide some leeway to allow carbon offsetting. 
Moreover, the clashing interpretations of results and the lack of clear evidence on 
contributions to REDD+ objectives, as fully described in chapter 3, may provide a pretext 
for donor countries to consider alternative instruments for financing forest governance. 
These findings only underscore that the general characterization of REDD+ as results-based 
aid (Angelsen, 2017) only constitutes one modalities of financial instruments. 
6.3.  REDD+ dissolves into a forest policy nexus
The conceptualization of the REDD+ concept as a common objective rather than a 
financial mechanism is only a starting point for understanding the institutional and 
discursive dynamics of forest governance in Brazil. With the exception of some practices 
related to the carbon conservation discourse, the establishment of REDD+ institutions 
have firmly concentrated at the national level. According to the findings in chapter 2, the 
Amazon Fund has been the central institution for REDD+ in Brazil between 2008 and 2018. 
After the adoption of the Warsaw Framework for REDD+ in 2013 (Voigt & Ferreira, 2015), 
the collection of REDD+ institutions expanded with the establishment of GTT REDD+ in 
2014, the National REDD+ Commission (CONAREDD+) in 2015, and the development and 
implementation of the National Strategy for REDD+ (ENREDD+) in subsequent years (see 
chapter 3). These national REDD+ institutions coordinate a broad institutional and political 
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network of diverse stakeholders with intertwined discourses and practices (e.g. Gebara et 
al., 2014) geared towards the attainment of emission reductions. The findings in previous 
chapters, however, indicate the connections and references to emission reductions were 
not at all clear and in some cases even faded to the background. Rather than a coexistence 
of diverse stakeholders in a REDD+ policy network, chapter 3 found some evidence of 
discursive conflict between them (e.g. federal and state governments), particularly on the 
use of financial instruments. This suggests that ‘nexus’, understood as a complex web of 
interrelations between relevant stakeholders, could more accurately convey such competition 
than ‘network’. This sets up the second conclusion of this dissertation: the common 
REDD+ objective of emission reductions transforms in national REDD+ institutions and 
dissolves into a forest policy nexus.
The transformation of the REDD+ concept, firstly, starts at the national level of forest 
governance. This transformation of the REDD+ concept can be observed within the 
procedures and processes of national REDD+ institutions (see above) in two distinct yet 
interrelated processes. On the one hand, they translate the central REDD+ objective of 
reducing emissions into a set of national plans and policies that are deemed necessary for 
the attainment of this objective. Chapter 4, for example, described how ENREDD+ links 
the central objective of reducing emissions from deforestation to the more diverse 
objectives of existing forest policies and thereby form the institutional structure for 
REDD+ in Brazil (see also May et al., 2016). On the other hand, this transformation is 
reinforced through the obtainment and distribution of financial resources. Chapter 3 has 
explained how financial resources of the Amazon Fund are obtained from donations 
based on demonstrated emission reductions, whereas resource allocation to individual 
projects is based on their conformity to the objectives of national forest policies, most 
notably PPCDAm. Both the translation of policy objectives and the redistribution of 
financial resources denote the implication that existing forest policies (e.g. Forest Code, 
PNMC, PAS, PPCDAm, etc.) are relevant building blocks of policy change for the attainment 
of emission reductions. So far, therefore, these findings reiterate the sustainable 
development discourse identified in chapter 2 and are still congruent with arguments in 
the literature on REDD+ design (Korhonen-Kurki et al., 2018).
A second and perhaps clearer indication of REDD+ transformation relates to the impacts 
of financial support from national REDD+ institutions. The central REDD+ objective of 
emission reductions, as conceptualized in section 6.2., was not immediately reflected in 
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the performance of the policies, strategies and plans that were considered essential for its 
attainment. Chapter 3 demonstrated how the Amazon Fund rarely articulated a clear 
contribution to reducing emissions through its project performance indicators, which was 
acknowledged by donor countries to be very challenging. Instead, their performance was 
evaluated on aspects like the number of newly trained firefighters, number of CAR 
registrations and number of new conservation units, among many others (see also BNDES, 
2018). According to chapter 4, it is uncertain but highly probable that other accredited 
organizations for receiving financial resources from the Green Climate Fund (e.g. Funbio 
and Caixa Econômica Federal) may emulate these evaluation processes. The evaluation of 
REDD+ performance therefore seems to be transformed from a central focus on emission 
reductions to a myriad of different indicators geared towards the individual components 
of existing policies, strategies and plans. In other words, the REDD+ concept, understood 
as the attainment of emission reduction, is reflected only within national REDD+ institution 
and dissolves when descending to lower levels of forest governance.
The dissolution of the REDD+ concept into the forest policy nexus in Brazil has an 
important consequence for the use of market instruments. Brazil´s resistance to carbon 
offsetting, like the preoccupation with emission reductions, is concentrated at the federal 
level of forest governance, but seems to have little influence at lower levels. Chapter 4, for 
example, illustrates how mostly federal government officials effectively blocked efforts by 
state government officials to include carbon offsetting into a CONAREDD+ resolution. At 
the same time, the engagement of state governments in the GCF Task Force, as observed 
in chapter 2, underscores that such restrictions, if they were indeed voiced by the federal 
government, have not penetrated into lower levels of forest governance. The dissolution 
of this resistance to carbon offsetting, together with the REDD+ concept, into the forest 
policy nexus also explains the coexistence of market instruments at lower levels of this 
nexus. As chapter 5 reconstructed, the attempts to operationalize the trade in forest 
certificates concerns the legal obligation of private landowners to conserve forests and, 
even if xCRA develops, is unlikely to include carbon offsetting that transcends national 
boundaries. This also explains how trading forest certificates is indirectly subsumed within 
the forest policy nexus upon that forms the foundation for REDD+ in Brazil.
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6.4.   Formal rules of national institutions spur political 
conflict and ambiguity
The concentration of the sustainable development discourse for REDD+ at the national level, 
including the resistance to carbon offsetting, resonates with the argument that national 
sovereignty concerns have been a guiding principle for financing deforestation reductions 
(Carvalho, 2012). Despite this resemblance, this factor still cannot explain why domestic 
market instruments like forest certificates trading have not yet become operational. More 
importantly, the analyses in previous chapters did not reveal any statements by government 
officials that directly relate the resistance to carbon offsetting to a preoccupation with 
national sovereignty. The findings in these analyses instead point to various instances in 
which government officials have referred to Brazilian legislation and international agreements 
for evidence that the REDD+ concept refrains from carbon offsetting. Similarly, the analysis 
in chapter 5 suggests that Brazilian legislation has also been a determining factor for the 
operationalization of forest certificates trading. Much more than beliefs, worldviews, 
norms or values, it suggests that formal rules have a ‘power-over-ideas’ (Carstensen & 
Schmidt, 2016) with respect to the development and operationalization of market instruments 
for forest governance (Scott, 1995). This leads to a third conclusion of this dissertation: 
the political debates on the use of market instruments for forest governance in Brazil were 
largely circumscribed by the formal rules of national forest governance institutions. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the obstructions to establishing market instruments for forest 
governance were most clearly observed in REDD+ institutions. Chapter 4 has extensively 
described how formal rules have clearly and repetitively articulated the national opposition 
to offsetting carbon emissions. This was not only evident in the decrees establishing the 
Amazon Fund in 2008 (decree 6.527, art. 1) and CONAREDD+ in 2015 (decree 8.576, art. 6), 
but was also reiterated in CONAREDD+ resolutions in 2016 (no 5, art. 1) and 2017 (no 6, art. 
5), among other documents. In response to attempts by state government officials to 
include carbon offsetting in REDD+ institutions, federal government officials have 
repetitively referred to these formal rules. More importantly, the observations in chapter 4 
also included evidence for interpretations of international agreements that ignored the 
possibility of forest finance from various sources and emphasized the mainstreaming of 
results-based funding rather than carbon offsetting. Similar indications were also provided 
in chapter 3. For instance, the donations to the Amazon Fund are based on demonstrated 
emission reductions and do not generate future obligations to reduce emission. These 
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findings underscore that the opposition to carbon offsetting is no longer grounded in a 
political advocacy of protecting national sovereignty, but is instead institutionalized 
within the formal rules of REDD+ institutions. 
The ‘power-over-ideas’ emanating from the formal rules related to the market for forest 
certificates involve quite different dynamics. The evolution of regulating spatial trade 
boundaries for this market, as extensively described in chapter 5, best illustrates the 
ambiguous ‘power-over-ideas’ of these formal rules. Before the new Forest Code was 
adopted in 2012, the legal confinement of trading forest certificates to the micro-water-
shed had been perceived as severe obstructions to market operationalization processes. 
After 2012, by contrast, the substantially broader spatial trade boundaries had both 
increased trade viability and strengthened resistance to new socioenvironmental 
concerns, as observations in Mato Grosso (see section 5.4.1.) testified. Finally, the opera-
tionalization process was suspended by a Supreme Court’s verdict in 2018 that determined 
that the trade of forest certificates must demonstrate the ‘ecological identity’ of 
compensated lands. Spatial trade boundaries represent only one theme in political 
debates on market operationalization between 1998 and 2018, but they illustrate how 
formal rules of national institutions (i.e. the Brazilian Forest Code) were able to dictate the 
political processes of market operationalization. One needs to recognize, however, that 
these processes were highly susceptible to broader dynamics of federal politics, which is 
still congruent with the conclusion that national institutions exert much ‘power-over-
ideas’. By contrast, where the formal rules of national institutions are open to interpretation 
due to incompleteness or ambiguity, the ‘power-through-ideas’ becomes the determining 
factor for institutionalization processes. 
6.5.   The politics of financial instruments is grounded in 
‘ruptured dependence’
The ‘power-over-ideas’ of the formal rules of national institutions does not immediately 
discredit the legitimacy of argumentations that favor market instruments. Surely, the 
Brazilian government has been very conclusive in purposefully blocking appeals to the 
use of market instruments for the REDD+ concept, but the analyses in previous chapters 
reveal several occasions in which appeals were manifested. Firstly, chapter 2 demonstrates 
how market instruments have appeared at the margin of the mainstream REDD+ structure 
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among advocates of the ‘carbon conservation’ discourse, which includes private initiatives 
as well as state governments linked to the GCF Task Force. As argued in section 6.3, 
secondly, market instruments have appeared where the REDD+ concept has already been 
dissolved into the policy nexus, namely in the form of a market for forest certificates. 
Thirdly, chapter 4 has provided ample evidence of discursive attempts to impose the 
inclusion of carbon offsetting within the mainstream REDD+ structure, including state 
government officials’ manifestations during CONAREDD+ meetings, the Marrakesh letter 
on REDD+ pleading for openness to finance from carbon offsetting and CORSIA’s interest 
in purchasing carbon offsets from Brazil. Furthermore, chapter 3 has illustrated that 
Brazilian REDD+ institutions like the Amazon Fund are sensitive to such appeals due to 
clashing interpretations on their performance. In order to elucidate these findings, Chapter 
4 has offered the epistemic foundations that underpin political debates on financial 
instruments, namely ‘ruptured dependence’, and from which policy participants derive 
their ‘power-in-ideas’ (Carstensen & Schmidt, 2016). This leads to the fourth and final 
conclusion: the polemic political debates on the use of financial instruments for forest 
governance are grounded within the episteme of ‘ruptured dependence’.
The episteme of ‘ruptured dependence’, as explained in chapter 4, characterizes the 
human relation with nature as neither fully independent (i.e. some nature is useful) nor 
fully dependent (i.e. not all nature is useful). Moreover, ruptured dependence strongly 
reflects in the building blocks of market instruments, namely singularization, monetary 
valuation and appropriation, some of which also characterize alternative financial 
instruments like results-based funding. Although the privatization of nature has been 
acknowledged to be open to political contestation (see chapter 3 and section 6.3), the 
analysis suggests that weaknesses in the other building blocks have prompted discursive 
conflicts in some cases. For instance, chapter 3 found that the clashing interpretations of 
REDD+ results in the Amazon Fund stemmed from an unclear relation between the 
activities of the Amazon Fund and their impact on deforestation rates. This is most clearly 
reflected in the warning from the Norwegian government in 2017 that donations may 
stagnate if the deforestation rates would continue to fall. As these observations underscore 
the importance of performance indicators that correspond with the common objective of 
emission reduction, it becomes clear that the incapacity to demonstrate how individual 
projects contribute to the common REDD+ objective was problematized, consequently 
challenging the legitimacy of the financial instruments employed by Brazilian REDD+ 
institutions. In other words, the emphasis on emission reductions becomes less obvious 
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as the REDD+ concept dissolves into the forest policy nexus in Brazil. This exposes Brazilian 
REDD+ institutions to contestation and political debate, imbuing policy participants with 
‘power-through-ideas’ for supporting their advocacy of alternative financial instruments 
like carbon offsetting.
The argument that adherence to ruptured dependence increases the legitimacy of 
financial instruments for REDD+ does not imply that the politics of REDD+ finance tend to 
gravitate towards market instruments. The market for forest certificates, for example, is an 
exemplary combination of objectification (i.e. CRA), monetary valuation (determine by 
supply and demand) and privatization (i.e. trade among landowners) (Bernasconi et al., 
2016; Soares-Filho et al., 2016). As extensively described in chapter 5, however, this market 
instrument has occupied political debates for over 20 years without conclusive outcomes 
for operationalization, which section 6.5 has partially attributed to the formal rules of 
national institutions. Conversely, the mainstream REDD+ approach (i.e. ‘sustainable 
development’ discourse) has been operational for about a decade, but the partial 
adherence to ‘ruptured dependence’ have rendered this approach unstable and open to 
political contestation. More specifically, the dissolution of the REDD+ concept raises 
questions about whether the forest policy nexus in Brazil, for which financial resources 
have been mobilized, lives up to the expectation of being a “highly cost-effective way of 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions” (Stern, 2006, p. 537). If the existing institutional 
structure cannot provide clear evidence of this contribution, other approaches like market 
instruments may become more appealing.
6.6.  Considerations for policy-making
The four conclusions of this dissertation account for much of the diversity in financial 
instruments for forest governance in Brazil. It has become clear that the REDD+ concept is 
not a financial instrument, as was perhaps perceived in the literature, but is instead 
characterized in section 6.2 as the common objective of emission reductions that may 
mobilize financial resources through various channels for the support of a diversity of 
policies, programs and plans. This explained how policy participants have advocated 
different and often competing approaches to attaining this common objective. The 
mainstream interpretation of the REDD+ concept has been shown to dissolve into the 
forest policy nexus in Brazil, as described in section 6.3, which explained why forest 
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certificates trading could be subsumed within the same nexus. While this understanding 
accounts for the diversity of financial instruments for REDD+, their materialization and 
 institutionalization is still governed by two institutional factors. On the one hand, section 
6.4 has demonstrated how the formal rules of national institutions exert ‘power-over-
ideas’ in the politics of financial instruments in Brazil, mostly constraining appeals to 
market instruments. On the other hand, section 6.5 argued that these political debates on 
financial instruments are grounded in ‘ruptured dependence’. During the years of this 
research, this concept imbued advocates of market instruments with a ‘power-in-ideas’ 
and thereby sustained their appeals despite the constraints imposed by formal rules of 
national institutions. Although these conclusions may enhance our understanding of the 
use of financial instruments for forest governance, they also signify substantial challenges 
for sustaining and improving financial support for deforestation reductions. These 
challenges are discussed in more detail below.
While general adherence to ‘ruptured dependence’ is important for the successful mate-
rialization of financial instruments, this research has found that discursive problems have 
become particularly apparent with respect to the misalignment of performance indicators 
across different levels of forest governance. Chapter 4 described how official documents 
of the Amazon Fund (e.g. bilateral contracts, project document and guidelines) determined 
that BNDES shall provide information about its contribution to reducing deforestation, 
which places great importance on the provision of this information in quantitative terms. 
Although the financial transactions from donor countries do not imply an obligation to 
provide a return on investment, the legitimacy of these donations has started to erode as 
their impact cannot be accounted for. Moreover, while the Amazon Fund imposes strict 
requirements for project approval, there was no evidence of a clear strategy for allocating 
financial resources based on maximum impact on deforestation dynamics, which pushes 
legitimacy further down. Similar complications are to be expected for financial transactions 
from the Green Climate Fund to lower levels of forest governance. As discussed above, 
these appeals to the use of market instruments for REDD+ did not stem from a deep-rooted 
conviction of their superior efficiency and effectiveness, as has been the underlying 
argument for early emissions trading systems (Lane, 2012; Voß, 2007). Instead, stakeholders 
articulate alternative interests that do not necessarily lead to market instruments, such as 
demonstration of return on investment (i.e. donor countries) and access to financial 
resources (e.g. state governments). Neglecting these interests, however, may redirect 
political interests to the use of market instruments.
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One potential solution to the discursive conflicts emanating from misalignment of 
performance indicators is simply to translate all REDD+ activities into a contribution to 
emission reductions, avoiding the dissolution of the REDD+ concept into the forest policy 
nexus. Improving the commensurability of performance indicators across governance 
layers is more directly in line with the `ruptured dependence` episteme and, therefore, 
enhances the legitimacy of financial transactions and strengthens existing REDD+ 
institutions. At the same time, however, translating the indirect contributions of some 
initiatives, most notably CAR implementation, will be challenging and costly. Although 
pressing for more information on the Amazon Fund’s contribution to emission reductions, 
chapter 3 showed that donor countries acknowledged the necessity of such structuration 
projects and therefore concede to the lack of information to some extent. Moreover, 
insistence on producing commensurate performance indicators for measuring the 
contribution to emission reduction risks relinquishing attention to indirect drivers of 
deforestation (May et al., 2016; Weatherley-Singh & Gupta, 2015). These observations 
indicate that oversimplification, often described as ‘singularization’ (Callon & Muniesa, 
2005) or ‘disentanglement’ (Stephan, 2012) in the literature on market instruments, is likely 
to ignore these indirect contributions that advance the attainment of emission reductions.
Rather than tracing the direct contribution of financial transactions to emission reduction, 
another potential solution involves the diversification of ‘results’ that mobilize financial 
resources. This option directly responds to the many manifestations for opening up to 
carbon offsetting in order to broaden access to finance. Debates on the diversification of 
‘results’ have taken place to some extent, as described in chapter 5. More specifically, 
forest certificates may extend their initial focus on compensating legal reserve deficits to 
recognizing the provision of ecosystem services like carbon uptake, biodiversity 
conservation and watershed protection (i.e. “xCRA”, see Soares-Filho et al., 2016). A similar 
approach could also be applied to REDD+. Both the Amazon Fund and the Green Climate 
Fund exclusively use emission reductions as the basis for financial transactions, but this 
ignores that REDD+ also involves conservation, sustainable forest management and 
enhancement of forest carbon stocks (i.e. the “+” categories). While these observations are 
not new (e.g. Cenamo et al., 2014), the analysis in previous chapters found no evidence of 
such debates emerging in Brazilian REDD+ institutions. These considerations do not yet 
include financial transactions specifically directed at safeguards (e.g. respecting 
indigenous rights) or co-benefits (e.g. biodiversity conservation), which seem unlikely to 
materialize under the auspices of REDD+. Nonetheless, it is necessary to start considering 
156
CHAPTER 6
the establishment of parallel channels for financing emission reductions, carbon stocks, 
nature conservation and sustainable forest management, not to mention ecosystem 
service provision. While it is important to state that this broader approach should not 
redirect the finite financial resources away from deforestation, it will also require greater 
efforts of prioritization and strategic resource allocation as well as augmenting available 
financial resources altogether.
The discussion so far points to the necessity of making substantial changes to current 
forest governance practices, most notably at the national level, that may only materialize 
in the long run. Section 6.4 has made abundantly clear, however, that national institutions 
have tremendous power-over-ideas and push discursive competition into various 
directions. For REDD+, the insistence on results-based funding may turn a blind eye to the 
growing critiques on the (lack of information on) the perceived performance of the 
Amazon Fund and thereby jeopardize future financial support from foreign donating 
organizations. For forest certificates trading, the suspended operationalization process 
perpetuates the limited options for landowners to comply with the Forest Code, which 
may correlate with the more flexible legal requirements for forest conservation on private 
lands. This bottleneck of national institutions strongly reflects a broader erosion of forest 
and environmental governance at the national level for which the 2018 elections provide 
little perspective of a returning political will for improvement. These gloomy prospects 
increasingly suggest that sustaining and improving Brazilian forest governance may need 
to circumvent national institutions. Financial support for deforestation reductions could 
play an important role in this endeavor by seeking cooperation with other policy 
participants at lower levels of governance, such as state governments or alternative 
funding organizations. It is important to stress that this does not imply that all financial 
support should engage in carbon offsetting schemes like the GFC Task Force, but merely 
denotes that forest finance may need to avoid the concentration of financial resources 
within national institutions and seek diversification of recipient organizations.
There are, of course, downsides to this approach. Firstly, spreading financial support over 
multiple recipient organizations with diverging approaches and concerns may not 
generate the nation-wide results that the REDD+ concept, for example, seeks to attain. 
Indeed, the findings in chapter 3 included critiques from donor countries that the 
approach to resource allocation by the Amazon Fund is arbitrary (i.e. reactive evaluation of 
project proposals) rather than strategic (i.e. proactive targeting of project proposals). 
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Secondly, diversifying the recipient organizations of financial support may also imply an 
avoidance of addressing driving factors of deforestation (e.g. land tenure, land use 
planning, law enforcement) that generally pertain to the national level (Busch & Ferretti- 
Gallon, 2017; Dunlop & Corbera, 2016; Weatherley-Singh & Gupta, 2015). For instance, CAR 
may become a powerful monitoring tool if accompanied by increased law enforcement 
capacity, but would still require institutional improvements (Azevedo et al., 2014). A third 
downside involves an overall weakening of national forest governance in absence of 
financial resources and political will to invest in nature conservation. These downsides 
require substantial consideration by donation and investment organizations. The 
alternative would be to engage in perhaps lingering political debates in order to pressure 
Brazilian national institutions into increasing efforts for transformational change.
6.7.  Final reflections and considerations
Throughout the years of this doctorate research, the most challenging limitation has been 
the volatility of developments in the research field. As already mentioned in the introduction 
of this dissertation, political debates on REDD+ in Brazil have been in constant movement 
and different aspects of forest governance have been in the spotlights at different 
moments in time. Only in 2018 did political debates start the development of SISREDD+, 
which has been important for juxtaposing its performance indicators with the foundations 
for financial transactions to the Amazon Fund and from the Green Climate Fund (see 
chapters 3 and 4). Moreover, the development of the Brazilian market for forest certificates 
was shaken up by the introduction of ‘ecological identity’ in the conclusion of a legislative 
process on the Forest Code (see chapter 5). These events have made it very challenging to 
sufficiently focus research activities and find coherence in the chronology. In this sense, 
the development of this doctorate dissertation is the outcome of an organic research 
process that slowly took its present form. The discursive-institutional approach has been 
very helpful in this process, because it allowed for much flexibility for moving with the 
tumultuous tides of Brazilian forest politics. The difficulty, however, was to find a clear and 
stable pattern in these tidal developments that would lead to the general conclusions 
described in this chapter. In order to mitigate this, it has been very important to anchor 
the conclusions in the initial observations of the research field in the literature, namely the 
strong appeal of market instruments that are founded in economic theory and the 
often-claimed Brazilian resistance to such market instruments in relation to REDD+. 
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The results of these processes have yielded important conclusions on financial instruments 
for REDD+ and may partially resonate with REDD+ implementation in other countries and 
regions. For instance, there is a high probability that the findings related to the epistemic 
structure of ‘ruptured dependence’ governs the use of financial instruments more broadly. 
This conceptualization may therefore inspire further research in understanding why such 
instruments materialize the way they do. The conceptualization of REDD+ as a common 
objective that mobilizes financial resources may also be useful for this purpose, since it 
strips the concept of predetermined interpretations with respect to the use of financial 
instruments. This allows the researcher to discern the political nature of such instruments. 
Moreover, a combination with ‘ruptured dependence’ enables the researcher to detect 
where interpretations may influence established discourses or even deeper social 
structures of financial instruments, thereby anticipating outcomes of political processes. 
At the same time, however, the conclusion on the dissolution of REDD+ into the forest 
policy nexus may not apply to all contexts. The carbon offsetting approach to REDD+ in 
Costa Rica, for example, suggests that the REDD+ concept, understood as a common 
objective of emission reductions, may penetrate to lower levels of forest governance, 
since performance indicators of individual projects still refer to it explicitly (Corbera et al., 
2011). A more general theory about REDD+ implementation, if at all possible, would 
require more research on how the concept becomes embedded within different contexts.
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Summary
Forests have become increasingly important geopolitical entities in the past two decades, 
especially in light of the ecosystem services they provide. Their function as carbon sink has 
been particularly discussed in international climate change debates, but contemporary 
research shows that the capacity of forest to provide this function has been declining. Many 
economists have claimed that these problems exist because the functions of forest 
ecosystems are not valued and are therefore external to economic decision-making. In 
addition, they suggested that approaches to reducing deforestation could be the most 
cost-effective approach to climate change mitigation. A substantial body of literature has 
argued that efforts to reduce deforestation need to address the direct and indirect drivers of 
deforestation, which many scholars have argued to require nothing short of a transforma-
tional change. Moreover, these transformational changes often vary per country or region. 
These arguments also characterize the emerging regime known as Reducing Emissions 
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+), which is one of the elements of the 
international climate convention (UNFCCC). The core of REDD+ entails the financial 
support of successful efforts to reduce emissions. Initial scientific and political debates 
centered around the basis for payments, but currently there is much more attention for 
the question of how to achieve the aforementioned transformational change. The focus 
on the latter issue risks to divert attention away from the controversies surrounding the 
financial component. These controversies particularly concern the use of market 
instruments for financing REDD+ activities, which were firmly resisted by socioenviron-
mental organizations as well as some national governments, including Brazil, with national 
sovereignty concerns. Instead, there has been more political interest in results-based 
funding, which has become a dominant approach for REDD+ finance even without clear 
indications of their cost-effectiveness. At the same time, market instruments have not 
been excluded from forest governance debates altogether. Some countries have 
incorporated such instruments in their REDD+ strategies.  In addition, there is some 
evidence that countries that explicitly refrained from carbon offsetting still debate or even 
operationalize market instruments for forest governance within their borders. In Brazil, for 
example, the trade in forest certificates has been debated and developed since the late 
1990s, The inconclusiveness of this operationalization poses new questions on the politics 
of using market instruments that cannot be explained by relating them to national 
sovereignty concerns. 
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In this context, this research addresses the following research question:
How have the possibilities for using financial instruments for reducing deforestation in 
Brazil been shaped and reshaped in processes of political discourse and institutionalization, 
and what factors and mechanisms underlie these processes? 
The thesis encompasses the politics of market instruments for forest governance in Brazil 
and focuses on the establishment of new institutions, including REDD+, Amazon Fund 
and the market for forest certificates. For this purpose, the analysis builds on the premise 
that politics is governed by a scaffolding of social structures ranging from epistemic 
structures to the politics of discourse. Different from other approaches to institutionalism, 
Discursive Institutionalism emphasizes the power of discourses and ideas and recognizes 
that these social structures are essentially constructed. Discursive Institutionalism not 
merely emphasizes the constructive nature of social structures, but also acknowledges 
that they are actively constructed by agents as they create, communicate and negotiate 
their ideas. By using the concepts of power-through-ideas, power-over-ideas and power-
in-ideas, this approach allows for a focus on multiple levels in order to identify which 
elements of these discussions pertain to what depth of social construction. The research 
data entails both written and spoken texts that convey the deeper layers of social 
structures. 
Chapter 2 explores the political landscape of REDD+ in Brazil. REDD+ dominates 
international debates on the role of forests in climate change mitigation, but its concrete 
implementation remains a challenge. In contrast to this general trend, Brazil emerged as a 
noteworthy exception due to the widespread implementation of major REDD+ initiatives. 
This chapter aims at understanding the implementation of REDD+ in Brazil from a 
discursive perspective. The analysis identifies two discourses that are guiding the 
implementation of REDD+ in different ways. On the one hand, advocates of a sustainable 
development discourse conceive REDD+ as a centralized mechanism to foster pre-existing 
deforestation control and sustainable economic activities through centralized mechanisms 
like the Amazon Fund. On the other hand, a number of disconnected actors follow a 
carbon commodification discourse inspired by the idea of neoliberal conservation and 
create REDD+ projects to provide carbon offset to voluntary markets. The analysis of these 
discourses reveals that implementation processes do not rely on discursive convergence, 
but rather culminate in the parallel development and implementation of distinct REDD+ 
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discourses that are at the same time competing, coexisting and collaborating on different 
levels.
Chapter 3 further elucidates the mainstream REDD+ discourse in Brazil and analyses the 
political conflicts related to the use of results-based funding. Results-based funding (RBF) 
is a governance concept that is rapidly becoming the mainstream paradigm for 
international collaborations in the environmental sector. While portrayed as a compromise 
solution between market-based mechanisms and unconditional donations, the 
implementation of RBF is revealing new conflicts and contradictions of its own. This 
chapter explores the application of RBF for REDD+ by reconstructing the discursive 
conflicts between recipient (i.e. Brazil) and donor (i.e. Norway and Germany) countries of 
the Amazon Fund about what constitutes ‘results’ or ‘performance’. Although all parties 
agree that the financial transfers to RBF should be based on past emission reductions in 
relation to a historical baseline, they hold clashing interpretations about temporal (i.e. past 
or future) and epistemological (i.e. how to measure) aspects of the results these payments 
are intended for. Firstly, while Brazil emphasizes that it deserves a reward of USD 21 billion 
for results achieved between 2006 and 2016, donor countries have indicated an interest in 
paying only for most recent results as a way to incentivize further reductions. Secondly, 
while all parties believe that the Amazon Fund should support policies to reduce 
deforestation, donor countries have revealed concerns that the performance of the 
Amazon Fund projects in generating further reductions has not been measured in a 
rigorous manner. This suggests that donor countries may consider making changes to 
current RBF mechanisms or getting involved in new forms of finance.
Previous chapters have clearly indicated that results-based finance plays a dominant albeit 
controversial role in Brazilian forest governance, but chapter 4 analyses the epistemolog-
ical basis for market-based approaches for REDD+. After almost 20 years, political debate 
on Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) have reached agreement about the non-market 
nature of existing PES schemes, but the use of market instruments has persistently 
recurred in these debates, especially in the context of REDD+. This chapter adopts a 
Foucauldian approach to understanding how market logics still govern REDD+ institu-
tionalization in Brazil to a large extent and thereby reproduce a ruptured dependence on 
nature. More specifically, this ruptured dependence could be recognized in three building 
blocks of market instruments: the delimitation of tradeable objects (singularization), the 
valuation of these objects that enables payments (monetary valuation) and the attribution 
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of property rights of this object (appropriation). The analysis shows that REDD+ institutions 
have retained the singularization and monetary valuation of emissions reductions, while 
this did not occur for other components of REDD+ like biodiversity. The dominant form of 
appropriation is based on a rejection of carbon offsetting, and emphasizes the national 
ownership of emissions reductions. Inconsistencies, as has been the case for the Amazon 
Fund, may challenge the legitimacy of appropriation processes. At the same time, 
appropriation remains a highly politicized process that is sensitive to criticism and open to 
calls for alternative approaches. These factors are considered to be decisive for the 
likelihood of REDD+ to become a market instrument in the future.
Chapter 5 examines the extent to which challenges may arise for the operationalization 
of market instruments for forest governance. This operationalization of market instruments 
has often been represented by scholars as a linear process inspired by the standardization 
of neoliberal logics and the commodification of nature. In reality, however, many of the 
promises concerning the creation of environmental markets have not been materialized. 
This chapter examines the contested process behind the creation of the forest certificate 
market in Brazil in the past 20 years. With this purpose we adopt the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework (ACF) with a specific focus on policy learning. The analysis reconstructs the 
evolution of and interaction between two advocacy coalitions. The first involves an 
environmental integrity coalition (EIC) concerned with environmental additionality, 
composed chiefly of NGOs and academic researchers. The second entails a legal flexibility 
coalition (LFC) supported mainly by the agribusiness and governmental organizations. 
These two coalitions strived to influence policy processes and consequently the regulatory 
design of the market with respect to the nature and purpose of trading forest certificates, 
spatial trade boundaries and supplier definitions. The findings indicate that policy learning 
of both advocacy coalitions has occurred on three milestone moments: the emulation of 
foreign permit trading schemes, experiential knowledge on failed attempts at operation-
alization, and the production of scientific knowledge that raised critical questions. 
Although these moments facilitated the operationalization process to some extent, policy 
learning processes have been particularly favorable for advancing LFC interests, in part 
because EIC advocates only became more actively involved in policy processes in the 
2010s. The analysis also indicates that a stagnation of the operationalization process was 
not only effectuated by the dynamics between and within advocacy coalitions, but also 
by external events. One notable factor was a Supreme Court decision in 2018, which 
caused the operationalization process to languish.
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The analyses of REDD+, the Amazon Fund and the Brazilian market for forest certificates 
point to four conclusions on the use of financial instruments in Brazil. The first conclusion 
is that REDD+ articulates the common objective of emissions reductions that mobilizes 
financial resources and other forms of support through various public and private 
channels. This is different from much literature that characterizes REDD+ primarily if not 
solely as a financial mechanism. The consequences of viewing REDD+ as a common 
objective is that it opens up possibilities for considering a wide variety of financial 
instruments, including results-based funding and offset-based markets. Moreover, it helps 
to understand why the politics on the use of market instruments for REDD+ is rife with 
ambivalence, paradoxes and contradictions. 
The second conclusion is that REDD+, understood as the common objective of emissions 
reductions, , transforms through its operationalization from international via national to 
subnational levels and dissolves into a forest policy nexus. The concern with emissions 
reductions is almost exclusively found within national and international governance 
institutions. For instance, payments to Brazilian institutions like the Amazon Fund, whether 
from donor countries or from the Green Climate Fund, are based on this common 
objective. The redistribution of these financial resources across individual projects, 
however, often does not directly refer to emissions reductions. Moreover, the dissolution 
of REDD+ allows for a broader diversity of forest conservation approaches and financial 
instruments. This diversity resonates with the Brazilian market for forest certificates, which 
only indirectly contributes to REDD+ objectives and does not directly concern emissions 
reductions. 
The third conclusion is that formal rules of national institutions govern political debates on 
and conflicts over financial instruments for forest governance. With respect to the REDD+ 
concept, this conclusion argues that policy participants no longer articulate national 
sovereignty concerns as a principal argument for resisting carbon offsetting, but instead 
point to the formal rules that have been established by REDD+ institutions. This adherence 
to formal rules also applies to the trade in forest certificates, which have both supported 
and obstructed the operationalization process. 
The fourth and final conclusion is that the politics of financial instruments are grounded 
within the episteme of ‘ruptured dependence’. Analysis shows that the singularization and 
monetary valuation components of market instruments have been constant governing 
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factors for both fund-based and offset-based instruments. The influence of appropriation 
elements, by contrast, have been highly susceptible to politics of discourse. Adhering to 
ruptured dependence does not immediately prompt political debates towards considering 
the use of market instruments. Concurrently, the current political landscape in Brazil, 
including the interpretive clashes between donor and recipient countries in the Amazon 
Fund, has provided favorable conditions for their advocacy. This also explains why debates 
on the use of market instruments have continued to linger in spite of formal rules 
determining otherwise. 
Future contributions, either political or scientific, may involve, firstly, the establishment of 
a more direct link between common objective and individual contributions, thereby 
consolidating singularization. However, this would perpetuate the critiques on negative 
consequences of oversimplification. Alternatively, one may consider a diversification of 
results that mobilize financial resources for REDD+, for example by including biodiversity 
protection, but such efforts have not yet been observed in political debates. Since these 
approaches could only start to affect policy processes in the long term, one may also 
consider, thirdly, to circumvent the formal rules of national institutions altogether and 
instead direct financial support to lower governance levels. This latter approach, however, 
may not necessarily reduce the arbitrariness of financial support or address the driving 
forces of deforestation.
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Samenvatting
In de laatste twee decennia zijn bossen een steeds belangrijkere geopolitieke entiteit 
geworden, vooral vanwege hun zogeheten ecosysteemdiensten. In de politieke debatten 
hierover was vooral veel aandacht voor hun functie als opslag voor koolstof. Recent 
onderzoek toonde echter aan dat, vooral door ontbossing, de capaciteit van bossen om 
deze functie te vervullen steeds kleiner wordt. Veel economen stellen dat de oorzaak van 
deze problemen ligt in een gebrek aan monetaire waardering van eco-systemische 
functies en diensten van bossen en daardoor buiten de processen van economische 
besluitvorming vallen. Tegelijkertijd hebben economen evenwel aangegeven dat het 
tegengaan van ontbossing een zeer kosteneffectieve benadering kan zijn voor de 
mitigatie van klimaatverandering. Veel wetenschappers stellen dat de inspanningen om 
ontbossing tegen te gaan gericht zouden moeten zijn op de directe en indirecte drivers 
daarvan. Dat zou, in de huidige situatie, niets minder dan een ingrijpende transformatie 
betekenen. Uiteraard ziet zo’n transformatie er per land en regio inhoudelijk en strategisch 
heel anders uit.
Deze debatten en argumenten kenmerken ook het relatief nieuwe internationale regime 
als Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+), ofwel: 
vermindering van emissies door ontbossing en landdegradatie, onderdeel van het 
bredere klimaatverdrag van de Verenigde Naties (UNFCCC). De kern van REDD+ is het 
financieel ondersteunen van succesvolle inspanningen die leiden tot emissiereducties. 
Aanvankelijk was de basis voor die betalingen een belangrijk discussiepunt in zowel 
wetenschappelijke als politieke kringen. Tegenwoordig gaat in de wetenschappelijke 
literatuur echter vooral veel aandacht uit naar de wijze waarop de eerdergenoemde 
transformatie kan worden bewerkstelligd. Door de focus op dit laatste, dreigen de 
controverses omtrent de financiële component evenwel onvoldoende aandacht te 
krijgen. Die controverses gaan voornamelijk over het gebruik van marketinstrumenten 
voor de financiering van REDD+ activiteiten. Dit soort instrumenten stuitte op felle 
weerstand van zowel milieuorganisaties als van enkele nationale overheden, inclusief 
Brazilië, mede vanuit soevereiniteits-overwegingen. In plaats van voor marktinstrumenten 
was er meer politieke interesse voor resultaatgerichte financiering, waarbij financiële 
ondersteuning wordt verleend op basis van gerealiseerde emissiereducties. Dit laatste is 
een dominante benadering in de REDD+ financiering geworden, ondanks een gebrek aan 
duidelijk aantoonbare kosteneffectiviteit. Toch zijn marktinstrumenten niet uitgesloten 
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van de politieke debatten over bosbeleid: enkele landen hebben dergelijke instrumenten 
wel degelijk als onderdeel van hun REDD+ strategie opgenomen. Bovendien zijn er 
empirische aanwijzingen dat landen die expliciet tegen de compensatie van emissies 
waren, nog steeds onderhandelen over het gebruik van marktinstrumenten voor nationaal 
bosbeleid of deze instrumenten zelfs al operationaliseren. In Brazilië bijvoorbeeld is de 
handel in boscertificaten sinds eind jaren negentig en tot vandaag nog steeds onderwerp 
van politiek debat. Die aanslepende operationalisering roept echter nieuwe vragen op 
over de politieke overwegingen over het gebruik van marktinstrumenten. Die vragen 
kunnen trouwens niet afdoende worden beantwoord met een benadering die alleen of 
vooral het soevereiniteitsargument benadrukt. 
Gegeven deze problematiek wil dit proefschrift de volgende onderzoeksvraag beantwoorden:
Op welke manier zijn processen van politieke discoursvorming en -institutionalisering bepalend 
voor het gebruik van financiële instrumenten voor de vermindering van ontbossing in 
Brazilië, en welke factoren en mechanismen liggen hieraan ten grondslag? 
Dit proefschrift bestudeert de politieke discussies en processen met betrekking tot het 
gebruik van financiële instrumenten voor het bosbeleid in Brazilië. Het concentreert zich 
daarbij op discussies en processen rondom de oprichting van nieuwe instituties, inclusief 
REDD+, het Amazonefonds en de markt voor boscertificaten. De analyse gebruikt 
inzichten uit de literatuur over discursieve institutionalisering. Uitgangspunt daarvan is dat 
politieke processen worden gestuurd door sociale structuren die variëren van epistemol-
ogische structuren tot discourspolitiek. Discursieve institutionalisering benadrukt, in 
tegenstelling tot andere institutionele benaderingen, de wederkerige invloed van 
discoursen en ideeën op dieperliggende sociale structuren. Deze structuren oefenen niet 
alleen een sturende invloed uit op politieke processen, ook kunnen actoren deze 
structuren actief beïnvloeden, zelfs hervormen doordat ze actief ideeën creëren en 
daarover communiceren en onderhandelen in politieke processen. Door de concepten 
“invloed-door-ideeën”, “invloed-over-ideeën” en “invloed-in-ideeën” te gebruiken, is het 
mogelijk het gelaagde karakter van sociale mechanismen te benadrukken, om zo te 
identificeren welke factoren en mechanismen op welk niveau een rol spelen. Het onder-
zoeksmateriaal omvat zowel geschreven als gesproken teksten waarin deze factoren en 
mechanismen hun uitdrukking vinden.
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Hoofdstuk 2 verkent het politieke landschap rondom REDD+ in Brazilië. Het REDD+ 
concept domineert de internationale debatten over de rol van bossen in klimaatmitigatie, 
maar de implementatie daarvan blijft een probleem. De implementatie van REDD+ in 
Brazilië is een noemenswaardige uitzondering, omdat daar REDD+ projecten op grote 
schaal materialiseren. Dit hoofdstuk beoogt het Braziliaanse implementatieproces beter 
te begrijpen vanuit een discursief perspectief. De analyse identificeert twee discoursen 
die op diverse manieren leidend zijn voor de implementatie van REDD+. Voorstanders van 
een discours van ‘duurzame ontwikkeling’ begrijpen REDD+ als een financieel mechanisme 
voor de ondersteuning van reeds bestaande activiteiten voor het tegengaan van 
ontbossing en het ontwikkelen van duurzame activiteiten. Het Amazonefonds speelt 
hierbij een centrale rol. Een ander discours, gevormd door een verzameling onsamenhan-
gende actoren, benadrukt de opzet van REDD+ projecten om daarmee emissies te 
compenseren op vrijwillige markten. Hun discours is geïnspireerd door neoliberale 
benaderingen van bos- en natuurbescherming. De analyse van deze discoursen laat zien 
dat het implementatieproces niet afhankelijk is van discursieve convergentie, maar dat er 
een parallelle implementatie plaatsvindt van verschillende REDD+ discoursen die 
tegelijkertijd concurreren en samenwerken, en parallel aan elkaar bestaan op verschillende 
niveaus.
Hoofdstuk 3 gaat dieper in op het mainstream REDD+ discours in Brazilië en analyseert 
de politieke conflicten over het gebruik van resultaatgerichte financiering. Resultaat-
gerichte financiering is een governance-concept dat snel een mainstream paradigma 
begint te worden voor internationale samenwerking op milieugebied. Hoewel dit concept 
een compromis lijkt tussen het gebruik van marktinstrumenten en voorwaardelijke 
financiële steun, leidt de implementatie van die resultaatgerichte financiering tot nieuwe 
conflicten en tegenstrijdigheden. Dit hoofdstuk verkent het gebruik van resultaatgerichte 
financiering voor REDD+ door een reconstructie van discursieve conflicten tussen 
ontvangende (Brazilië) en donerende landen (Noorwegen en Duitsland) over wat de 
‘resultaten’ zijn en wat de ‘performance’ is van het Braziliaanse Amazonefonds. Terwijl 
beide partijen het erover eens zijn dat de financiële donaties gebaseerd zijn op het 
verschil tussen het werkelijke ontbossingsniveau en een tienjarig gemiddelde, hanteren 
ze tegenstrijdige interpretaties over de temporele (verleden of toekomstige resultaten) en 
epistemologische (hoe te meten) aspecten van de resultaten waarvoor deze betalingen 
zijn bedoeld: Brazilië benadrukt dat het een beloning verdient van USD 21 miljard voor 
resultaten behaald tussen 2006 en 2016; de donerende landen geven aan alleen interesse 
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te hebben in betalingen voor de meest recent behaalde resultaten om daarmee verdere 
reducties te stimuleren. Alle partijen hebben ook aangegeven dat het Amazonefonds 
financiële ondersteuning zou moeten bieden aan beleid om ontbossing te verminderen, 
maar donerende landen stellen dat de performancemetingen van projecten in het 
Amazonefonds niet direct aangeven in hoeverre ze bijdragen aan verminderde emissies. 
Het is daarom waarschijnlijk dat de donerende landen zullen aandringen op veranderingen 
in de bestaande mechanismen voor resultaatgerichte financiering of op de verkenning 
van nieuwe financieringsvormen.
Beide voorgaande hoofdstukken laten zien dat de resultaatgerichte financiering een 
dominante, maar controversiële rol speelt in het Braziliaanse bosbeleid. Toch is er nog 
steeds een epistemologische basis voor marktgerichte benaderingen voor REDD+, die in 
hoofdstuk 4 nader wordt geanalyseerd. In een ontwikkeling van bijna 20 jaar zijn de 
wetenschappelijke omschrijvingen van betalingen voor ecosysteemdiensten (PES) 
verschoven van een aanvankelijk sterk marktgerichte benadering van bos- en natu-
urbescherming naar een bredere benadering die, vaak om politieke redenen, niet als 
markt functioneert. Tegelijkertijd is, zoals aangegeven, het gebruik van marktinstrument-
en een terugkerend onderwerp in politieke debatten, juist in de context van REDD+. 
Hoofdstuk 4 past een Foucauldiaanse benadering toe om te begrijpen hoe marktbenade-
ringen nog steeds de institutionalisering van REDD+ in Brazilië sturen en daarbij een 
‘verbroken afhankelijkheid’ van de natuurlijke omgeving bekrachtigen. Deze verbroken 
afhankelijkheid is voornamelijk herkenbaar in drie onderscheiden basiscomponenten van 
marktinstrumenten: de afbakening van een verhandelbaar goed (singularisatie), de 
waardering van dit goed waardoor betalingen mogelijk worden (monetaire waardering) 
en de toekenning van eigendom van dit goed (toe-eigening). De analyse laat zien dat 
Braziliaanse instituties voor REDD+ de eerste twee componenten wél hebben toegepast 
op de vermindering van emissies, terwijl dit voor andere velden, bijvoorbeeld biodiversiteit, 
niet heeft plaatsgevonden. De gekozen vorm van toe-eigening is bovendien gebaseerd 
op de verwerping van de compensatie van emissies, en benadrukt dat behaalde en 
bevestigde emissiereducties het resultaat zijn van nationaal bosbeleid. Inconsistenties, 
zoals in het geval van het Amazonefonds, kunnen echter de legitimiteit van deze 
benadering ondermijnen. Daardoor is deze vorm van toe-eigening gevoelig voor kritiek 
van voorstanders van alternatieve benaderingen. Dit heeft als gevolg dat de compensatie 
van emissies nog steeds kan worden overwogen. Deze factoren zijn wellicht beslissend bij 
de vraag of marktbenaderingen in de toekomst een grotere rol zullen spelen in REDD+.
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Hoofstuk 5 gaat in op de vraag in hoeverre het gebruik van marktbenaderingen in 
nationaal bosbeleid problemen kan ondervinden tijdens de operationalisering. Deze op-
erationalisering wordt door wetenschappers vaak beschreven als een lineair proces, 
geïnspireerd door de veralgemening van een neoliberale gedachtegang en vermarkting 
van de natuur. In werkelijkheid worden echter veel van de beloftes van marktinstrument-
en niet ingelost. Dit hoofdstuk analyseert het 20 jaar lopende controversiële proces van 
totstandkoming van de Braziliaanse markt voor boscertificaten. Hierbij is gebruikgemaakt 
van het Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) met een focus op beleidsleren. De analyse 
reconstrueert de ontwikkeling van en de interacties tussen twee coalities. De eerste 
betreft een milieu-integriteitcoalitie (EIC), die voornamelijk bestaat uit NGO´s en 
academisch onderzoekers en begaan is met milieu-additionaliteit. De andere coalitie 
bepleit juridische flexibiliteit (LFC) en wordt gesteund door vertegenwoordigers van de 
commerciële landbouw en overheidsorganisaties. Deze twee coalities streven ernaar be-
leidsprocessen over marktregulering te beïnvloeden op drie centrale punten: de aard en 
doeleinden van de handel in boscertificaten, de ruimtelijke afbakening waarbinnen deze 
handel mag plaatsvinden, en bepalingen over wie certificaten mag aanbieden op deze 
markt. De bevindingen laten zien dat beleidsleren door beide coalities vooral plaatsvindt 
rondom drie sleutelmomenten: bij de ‘import’ van ideeën over markten voor emissiever-
gunningen uit het buitenland; bij de ervaringen uit niet-succesvolle pogingen de 
Braziliaanse markt te operationaliseren; en bij de gevolgen van kritische vragen vanuit de 
wetenschap. Hoewel deze leermomenten het operationaliseringsproces tot op zekere 
hoogte hebben beïnvloed, is het beleidsleren vooral gunstig geweest voor de LFC-coalitie. 
Dit komt deels doordat vertegenwoordigers van de EIC-coalitie pas in het tweede 
decennium van de 21e eeuw actiever bij deze beleidsprocessen betrokken raakten. De 
analyse laat verder zien dat de operationalisering niet alleen vertraging opliep door de 
dynamiek binnen en tussen de coalities, maar ook zijn beïnvloed door externe factoren. 
De meest noemenswaardige factor is een uitspraak van het Hooggerechtshof uit 2018, 
waardoor het proces van operationalisering zelfs is stilgevallen.
Voorgaande analyses van REDD+, het Amazonefonds en de Braziliaanse markt voor 
boscertificaten leiden tot vier conclusies over het gebruik van financiële instrumenten in 
Brazilië. De eerste conclusie is dat REDD+ te zien is als een overkoepelende, gemeen-
schappelijke doelstelling inzake emissiereducties, waarvoor financiële middelen en 
andere vormen van ondersteuning kunnen worden gemobiliseerd via publieke of private 
kanalen. Deze definitie is breder dan die in veel literatuur waarin REDD+ voornamelijk, zo 
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niet uitsluitend wordt gekarakteriseerd als een financieel mechanisme. Deze bredere 
omschrijving biedt mogelijkheden om een brede scala aan financiële instrumenten te 
overwegen, inclusief resultaatgerichte financiering en marktgerichte instrumenten. 
Bovendien is vanuit deze omschrijving beter te begrijpen waarom politieke processen 
over marktinstrumenten voor REDD+ vol ambivalenties, paradoxen en tegenstrijdigheden 
zitten.
De tweede conclusie is dat REDD+, gezien als de gemeenschappelijke doelstelling om 
emissies te reduceren, transformeert tijdens de operationalisering van internationaal via 
nationaal tot sub-nationaal niveau, en zodoende vervaagt in het bredere Braziliaanse 
bosbeleid. Zo zijn emissiereducties bijna uitsluitend van belang in nationale en 
internationale governance-instituties. De betalingen aan Braziliaanse instituties, zoals het 
Amazonefonds, zijn hoofdzakelijk gebaseerd op verminderde emissies, of deze betalingen 
nu van bilaterale donaties of van het Green Climate Fund komen. Bij de toewijzing van 
deze financiële middelen is echter vaak onduidelijk hoe de individuele projecten bijdragen 
aan het gemeenschappelijke doel: verminderde emissies. Doordat die centrale doelstelling 
van REDD+ geleidelijk vervaagt, eens opgenomen in het bredere Braziliaanse beleid, is 
een bredere diversiteit aan benaderingen van bosbescherming en aan financiële 
instrumenten mogelijk. Een goed voorbeeld hiervan is de Braziliaanse markt voor boscer-
tificaten: deze marktgerichte benadering voor het Braziliaanse bosbeleid heeft geen 
onmiddellijke relatie met emissiereducties, maar draagt toch indirect bij aan deze REDD+ 
doelstelling. 
De derde conclusie is dat de formele regels van nationale instituties leidend zijn bij 
politieke debatten en conflicten over financiële instrumenten in het bosbeleid. Voor het 
REDD+ concept betekent dit dat politieke actoren niet langer expliciet wijzen op soev-
ereiniteitsbelangen als hoofdargument voor de weerstand tegen compensatie van 
emissies. In plaats daarvan verwijzen zij naar formele regels die zijn vastgesteld door 
REDD+ instituties. In de analyse van de Braziliaanse markt voor boscertificaten werd 
overigens duidelijk dat actoren die formele regels gebruiken om de operationalisering 
daarvan zowel te ondersteunen als te belemmeren. 
De vierde en laatste conclusie is dat de politieke debatten over financiële instrumenten 
zijn gegrond in de episteme van ‘verbroken afhankelijkheid’. De analyse toont aan dat de 
marktcomponenten singularisatie en monetaire waardering voortdurend regulerende 
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factoren zijn geweest voor zowel resultaatgerichte financiering als marktinstrumenten, 
terwijl de component toe-eigening erg gevoelig is voor discourspolitiek. Een overeen-
stemming met ‘verbroken afhankelijkheid’ betekent niet meteen dat politieke debatten 
neigen in de richting van het gebruik van marktinstrumenten. Tegelijkertijd is het huidige 
politieke landschap in Brazilië, inclusief de interpretatieconflicten tussen donerende en 
ontvangende landen betrokken bij het Amazonefonds, gunstig voor voorstanders van 
marktinstrumenten. Dit verklaart ook waarom politieke debatten over het gebruik daarvan 
nog steeds van invloed zijn, ondanks de weerstand vanuit formele regels. 
In toekomstige politieke en wetenschappelijke bijdragen zal het, ten eerste, moeten gaan 
over de verbinding tussen de gemeenschappelijke doelstelling (emissiereductie) en 
individuele bijdragen, om daarmee de singularisatie te verstevigen. Zo’n benadering zal 
evenwel ook leiden tot doorgaande kritiek op de negatieve gevolgen van die simplificatie. 
Een alternatieve benadering kan bestaan uit een diversificatie van de resultaten waarop 
de toewijzing van financiële middelen voor REDD+ is gebaseerd, bijvoorbeeld door de 
bescherming van biodiversiteit erbij te betrekken. Zulke inspanningen zijn nu echter nog 
nauwelijks in politieke debatten te zien, ook omdat ze pas op langere termijn effect zullen 
hebben. Voor de korte termijn zou men kunnen overwegen om de belemmerende 
formele regels van nationale instituties te omzeilen en in plaats daarvan de financiële (en 
andersoortige) steun voor emissiereductie te richten op sub-nationale niveaus van 
governance. Deze laatste benadering zal echter niet de ogenschijnlijke willekeur van de 
financiering wegnemen, noch alle factoren van ontbossing aanpakken.
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Resumo
Florestas têm se tornado entidades geopolíticas cada vez mais importantes nas últimas 
duas décadas, devido especialmente aos serviços ecossistêmicos que provêm. Particular-
mente a sua função como sumidouro de carbono tem sido discutida nos debates 
internacionais sobre mudança climática. Todavia, pesquisas recentes mostraram que a 
capacidade das florestas para prover esta função está diminuindo. Muitos economistas 
argumentam que a causa principal de tais problemas é a falta de valorização monetária 
das funções dos ecossistemas florestais que, portanto, ficam externas aos processos 
econômicos de tomada de decisão. Além disso, eles sugerem que reduzir desmatamento 
poderia ser a abordagem mais custo-eficiente para mitigar a mudança climática. 
De acordo com muitos cientistas, esforços para reduzir desmatamento precisam ser 
direcionados aos fatores diretos e indiretos de desmatamento, o que demandaria nada 
menos do que uma transformação profunda. No entanto, cada região ou país abordaria 
tal transformação de forma diferente. 
Estes debates e argumentos também caracterizam o recém-estabelecido regime 
internacional de Redução das Emissões por Desmatamento e Degradação Florestal (REDD+), 
que faz parte da convenção climática sob as Nações Unidas (UNFCCC). O cerne do regime 
de REDD+ é o apoio financeiro de esforços bem-sucedidos que resultam em reduções de 
emissões no setor florestal. Inicialmente, a base do financiamento era um ponto de 
discussão muito importante e controverso nos debates internacionais e nacionais, mas, 
atualmente, a literatura científica se preocupa mais com a questão de como realizar a 
transformação mencionada acima. O foco nessa última questão pode desviar a atenção 
das controvérsias relacionadas ao componente financeiro. Estas controvérsias se referem 
particularmente ao uso de instrumentos de compensação de emissões de carbono para 
financiar atividades de REDD+, uma abordagem que foi firmemente resistida pelas 
organizações socioambientais bem como por governos nacionais, incluindo o Brasil, com 
preocupações relacionadas à soberania nacional. Em vez disso, houve mais interesse 
político em financiamento baseado em resultados, uma abordagem que se tornou 
dominante para financiar REDD+ mesmo sem claras indicações da sua custo-efetividade. 
Ao mesmo tempo, os debates políticos sobre governança florestal não excluíram os 
instrumentos de mercado completamente. Alguns países incorporaram tais instrumentos 
nas suas estratégias de REDD+. Além disso, há evidência de que ainda existem debates 
sobre o uso de instrumentos de mercado em países que explicitamente refrearam da 
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compensação de emissões de carbono, até operacionalizando-os em alguns casos. No 
Brasil, por exemplo, o mercado de títulos florestais vem sendo debatido e desenvolvido 
desde o final da década de 1990, mas este desenvolvimento ainda é inconclusivo. Tais 
fenômenos levantam perguntas sobre a política do uso de instrumentos de mercado que 
não poderiam ser explicadas com o argumento de soberania nacional. 
Neste contexto, a presente pesquisa busca responder à seguinte pergunta:
De qual forma foram moldadas e remoldadas as possibilidades para o uso de instrumentos 
financeiros para reduzir desmatamento no Brasil por meio de processos políticos e 
institucionais, e quais fatores e mecanismos regulam estes processos? 
Esta tese abrange a política relacionada ao uso de instrumentos de mercado para a 
governança florestal no Brasil e foca no estabelecimento de instituições relacionadas, 
incluindo REDD+, Fundo Amazônia e mercado de títulos florestais. Para este objetivo, 
a análise se baseia no reconhecimento de que a política é governada por um andaime de 
estruturas sociais variando de estruturas epistêmicas para a política de discurso. Diferente 
de outras abordagens do institucionalismo, o Institucionalismo Discursivo enfatiza o 
poder dos discursos e ideias e reconhece que as estruturas sociais são, em essência, 
construídas. Em outras palavras, Institucionalismo Discursivo não enfatiza apenas o cunho 
construtivo das estruturas sociais, mas também reconhece que estas são ativamente 
construídas por agentes no processo de criar, comunicar e negociar as suas ideias. Usando 
os conceitos de “poder-pelas-ideias”, “poder-sobre-ideias” e “poder-em-ideais”, esta 
abordagem permite uma análise em múltiplos níveis para identificar quais elementos das 
discussões políticas pertencem a qual nível da construção social. Os dados da pesquisa 
incluem textos escritos e falados que transmitem os níveis mais profundos das estruturas 
sociais.
O capítulo 2 explora a paisagem política para REDD+. O conceito de REDD+ domina os 
debates internacionais sobre o papel das florestas para mitigação da mudança climática, 
mas a sua implementação continua sendo desafiadora. Contrastando com essa tendência 
geral, o Brasil emergiu como uma notável exceção devido à ampla implementação de 
grandes iniciativas de REDD+. Este capítulo adotou uma perspectiva discursiva para 
compreender a implementação de REDD+ no Brasil. A análise identifica dois discursos 
que regulam a implementação de REDD+ de maneiras diferentes. Por um lado, defensores 
de um discurso de desenvolvimento sustentável concebem REDD+ como um mecanismo 
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centralizado para apoiar atividades existentes de controle de desmatamento e desenvol-
vimento econômico sustentável por meio de instituições centralizadas, tais como o Fundo 
Amazônia. Por outro lado, alguns atores desconexos seguem um discurso de mercantili-
zação de carbono inspirado pela ideia de conservação neoliberal, e criam projetos de 
REDD+ para fornecer títulos de compensação de emissões de carbono a mercados 
voluntários. A análise destes discursos revela que os processos de implementação não 
dependem da convergência discursiva, como sugerido na literatura, mas culminam em 
um desenvolvimento e implementação em paralelo de distintos discursos de REDD+ que, 
ao mesmo tempo, competem, coexistem e colaboram em diferentes níveis. 
O capítulo 3 aprofunda o discurso dominante de REDD+ e analisa os conflitos políticos 
sobre o financiamento baseado em resultados. Financiamento baseado em resultados é 
um conceito de governança que rapidamente está se tornando um paradigma dominante 
para colaborações internacionais que visam a conservação ambiental. Embora tratada 
como uma solução de compromisso entre mecanismos de mercado e doações 
incondicionais, a implementação do financiamento baseado em resultados está revelando 
novos conflitos e contradições. Este capítulo explora a aplicação de financiamento 
baseado em resultados para REDD+ e reconstrói os conflitos discursivos sobre o que 
constitui ‘resultados’ ou ‘desempenho’ entre países recipientes (Brasil) e doadores 
(Noruega e Alemanha) relacionados ao Fundo Amazônia. Apesar de todas as partes 
acordarem que as transferências financeiras deveriam ser baseadas na diferença entre 
taxas atuais de desmatamento e uma taxa média de desmatamento de dez anos, eles 
mantêm interpretações conflitantes sobre os aspetos temporais (ex. passado ou futuro) e 
epistemológicos (ex. como mensurar) dos resultados para os quais estes pagamentos 
foram direcionados. Em primeiro lugar, enquanto o Brasil enfatiza que merece uma 
recompensa de 21 bilhões de dólares para resultados obtidos entre 2006 e 2016, países 
doadores indicaram um interesse em pagar apenas por resultados mais recentes para 
incentivar futuras reduções. Em segundo lugar, enquanto todas as partes acreditam que o 
Fundo Amazônia deveria apoiar políticas para reduzir desmatamento, países doadores 
revelaram preocupações sobre a falta de uma mensuração rigorosa do desempenho dos 
projetos do Fundo Amazônia com respeito às reduções de emissões. Isso sugere que 
países doadores poderiam considerar mudanças no atual funcionamento do 
financiamento baseado em resultados ou se envolver em novas formas de financiamento.
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Ambos os capítulos anteriores demonstraram que financiamento baseado em resultados 
tem um papel dominante, embora controverso, na governança florestal brasileira. O 
capítulo 4 argumenta que ainda existe uma base epistêmica para abordagens de 
mercado. Após quase 20 anos, os debates políticos sobre Pagamentos por Serviços 
Ecossistêmicos (PSE) chegaram a um acordo sobre o cunho não-mercantil dos existentes 
esquemas de PSE. Todavia, o uso de instrumentos de mercado retornou persistentemente 
nesses debates, particularmente no contexto de REDD+. Este capítulo adota uma 
abordagem Foucauldiana para compreender como uma lógica de mercado ainda regula 
amplamente a institucionalização de REDD+ no Brasil e, assim, reproduz uma ‘dependência 
rompida’ da natureza. Especificamente, essa dependência rompida se encontra nos três 
elementos fundamentais de instrumentos de mercado: a delimitação de objetos 
negociáveis (singularização), a valorização desses objetos que permite pagamentos 
(valorização monetária) e a atribuição de direitos de propriedade a esses objetos 
(apropriação). A análise demonstra que instituições de REDD+ retiveram a singularização 
e valorização monetária das reduções de emissões, enquanto isto não ocorreu para outros 
componentes de REDD+, tal como a proteção da biodiversidade. Os processos de 
apropriação foram baseados na rejeição da possibilidade de comercializar créditos de 
carbono e, em vez disso, enfatizam a propriedade nacional das reduções de emissões. 
Inconsistências, como foi o caso para o Fundo Amazônia, poderiam desafiar a legitimidade 
dos processos de apropriação. Por isso, a apropriação continua sendo um processo 
altamente político que é sensível a críticas e aberto a apelos para abordagens alternativas. 
Estes fatores são considerados decisivos para a probabilidade de REDD+ se tornar um 
instrumento de mercado no futuro.
O capítulo 5 aborda os desafios que poderiam emergir durante a operacionalização dos 
instrumentos de mercado para governança florestal. Esta operacionalização de 
instrumentos de mercado foi muitas vezes representada por cientistas como um processo 
linear instigado pela padronização da lógica neoliberal e a mercantilização da natureza. 
Na realidade, todavia, muitas promessas de criação de instrumentos de mercado não se 
materializaram. Este capítulo examina o processo controverso para criação do mercado 
brasileiro de títulos florestais, que aconteceu nos últimos 20 anos. Para este objetivo foi 
adotado o Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) com um foco específico em aprendizagem 
política. A análise reconstrói a evolução e interação entre duas coalizões. A primeira é uma 
coalizão de integridade ambiental (Environmental Integrity Coalition – EIC) preocupada 
com adicionalidade ambiental e composta de ONGs e pesquisadores acadêmicos. A 
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segunda é uma coalizão de flexibilidade legal (Legal Flexibility Coalition – LFC) apoiada 
pelo agronegócio e por organizações governamentais. Estas duas coalizões buscaram 
influenciar os processos políticos e, consequentemente, o desenho do mercado com 
relação a três pontos principais: o cunho e objetivo do comércio de títulos florestais, os 
limites espaciais dentro dos quais de o comércio de títulos é permitido, e a determinação 
de quem pode ofertar títulos no mercado. Os resultados indicam que a aprendizagem 
política de ambas as coalizões ocorreu em três momentos marcantes: a importação de 
esquemas estrangeiros de mercados de títulos ambientais, a experiência das tentativas 
malsucedidas de operacionalização do mercado, e as consequências das críticas advindas 
de novo conhecimento científico sobre o funcionamento do mercado. Apesar destes 
momentos terem facilitado o processo de operacionalização até certo ponto, os processos 
de aprendizagem política foram particularmente favoráveis para o avanço dos interesses 
da coalizão de LFC, parcialmente porque defensores da coalizão de EIC se envolveram 
mais ativamente nos processos políticos apenas na década de 2010. A análise também 
indicou que os processos de operacionalização estagnaram não somente por dinâmicas 
internas das coalisões, mas também por dinâmicas entre elas, e ainda por processos 
externos. Um fator marcante foi um julgamento do Supremo Tribunal Federal em 2018, 
que provocou uma paralização do processo de operacionalização. 
As análises de REDD+, do Fundo Amazônia e do mercado brasileiro de títulos florestais 
apontam quatro conclusões sobre o uso de instrumentos financeiros no Brasil. A primeira 
conclusão é que REDD+ articula um objetivo comum de redução de emissões que 
mobiliza recursos financeiros e outras formas de apoio por meio de vários canais públicos 
e privados. Essa caraterização difere de muita literatura que caracteriza REDD+ 
primeiramente, se não exclusivamente, como mecanismo financeiro. Uma consequência 
de entender REDD+ como objetivo comum é que esta caraterização abre possibilidades 
para considerar uma ampla variedade de instrumentos financeiros, inclusive financiamento 
baseado em resultados e compensação de emissões. Além disso, esse entendimento 
ajuda a compreender por que a política sobre o uso de instrumentos de mercado para 
REDD+ está repleta de ambivalência, paradoxos e contradições. 
A segunda conclusão é que a implementação do conceito de REDD+, entendido como 
objetivo comum de redução de emissões, transforma do nível internacional para nacional 
para subnacional e dissolve no nexo de política florestal. A preocupação com redução de 
emissões se encontra quase exclusivamente nas instituições nacionais e internacionais de 
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governança. Por exemplo, os pagamentos para instituições brasileiras tal como o Fundo 
Amazônia, seja dos países doadores ou do Fundo Verde do Clima, são baseados nesse 
objetivo comum. Todavia, a redistribuição desses recursos financeiros entre os projetos 
individuais muitas vezes não se refere diretamente a reduções de emissões. Além disso, 
a dissolução de REDD+ permite uma ampla diversidade de abordagens de conservação 
florestal e instrumentos financeiros. Esta diversidade se reflete também no mercado 
brasileiro de títulos florestais, que tem uma contribuição meramente indireta e não trata 
diretamente de reduções de emissão. 
A terceira conclusão é que regras formais das instituições nacionais regulam os debates 
e conflitos políticos sobre instrumentos financeiros para governança florestal. Com respeito 
a REDD+, esta conclusão argumenta que participantes políticos não mais articulam 
preocupações com a soberania nacional como um dos principais argumentos para resistir 
a compensação de emissões, mas apontam as regras formais estabelecidos pelas 
instituições de REDD+. Estas regras formais também governaram o comércio de títulos 
florestais e tanto apoiaram quanto obstruíram os processos de operacionalização. 
A quarta e última conclusão é que a política dos instrumentos financeiros é fundada no 
episteme de ‘dependência rompida’. A análise demonstra que os componentes de 
singularização e valorização monetária foram fatores regulatórios constantes tanto para 
instrumentos de pagamento por resultado quanto para instrumentos de compensação 
de emissões. Ao contrário, a influência do componente de apropriação foi altamente 
suscetível à política de discurso. Aderir à dependência rompida não necessariamente leva 
os debates políticos a considerar o uso de instrumentos de mercado. Ao mesmo tempo, 
a atual paisagem política no Brasil, incluindo os conflitos interpretativos entre países 
recipientes e doadores no Fundo Amazônia, provê condições favoráveis para a defesa 
destes instrumentos de mercado. Isto também explica por que os debates sobre o uso 
dos instrumentos de mercado continuaram a demorar apesar das regras formais 
determinarem diferentemente. 
Futuras contribuições políticas e científicas incluiriam, primeiramente, o estabelecimento 
de um vínculo mais direto entre o objetivo comum e as contribuições individuais, assim 
consolidando o processo da singularização. Porém, tal contribuição perpetuaria as críticas 
às consequências negativas da simplificação excessiva. Uma contribuição alternativa 
poderia considerar uma diversificação dos resultados que mobilizam recursos financeiros 
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para REDD+, como, por exemplo, a inclusão da proteção da biodiversidade. No entanto, 
tais esforços ainda não foram observados nos debates políticos. Como estas abordagens 
somente afetariam os processos políticos a longo prazo, uma terceira contribuição poderia 
contornar integralmente as regras formais das instituições nacionais e, em vez disso, 
direcionar o apoio financeiro à governança em níveis inferiores. Ao mesmo tempo, tal 
abordagem não necessariamente reduz a arbitrariedade do apoio financeiro ou resolve 
os fatores principais de desmatamento.
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